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The hearing will come to order . I'd 

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first like to thank our witness , Dr 

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Sean Kirkpatrick for testifying here 

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and in today's earlier closed session 

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and for his long and distinguished 

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career , both in the intelligence 

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community and in the Department of 

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Defense . Doctor Kirkpatrick is the 

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director of the All Domain anomaly 

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resolution office or Arrow . Congress 

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established this office in law to get 

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to the bottom of a very serious problem 

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of unidentified anomalous phenomenon or 

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a Kirkpatrick has a very difficult 

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mission . While we have made progress , 

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there remains a stigma attached to this 

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phenomenon . There is a vast and 

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complex citizen engagement and there's 

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also very challenging scientific and 

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technical hurdles . So we appreciate 

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the willingness of Doctor Kirkpatrick 

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to lean in on this issue and the work 

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that he has accomplished thus far . And 

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we look forward to both his opening 

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statement and his presentation of 

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examples of the work Arrow has done . 

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In late 2017 , media reports surfaced 

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about activities set in motion by the 

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late long serving majority leader , 

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Senator Harry Reid . More than a decade 

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ago , we learned that there was strong 

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evidence of advanced technology 

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reflected in the features and 

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performance characteristics of many 

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objects observed by our highly highly 

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trained service members operating top 

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of the line military equipment . We 

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learned that for at least the past 

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eight years , military pilots 

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frequently encountered unknown objects 

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in controlled airspace off both the 

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east and west coast across the 

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continental United States in test and 

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training areas and ranges . We don't 

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know where they come from , who made 

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them or how they operate . As former 

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Deputy Secretary of Defense David 

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Norquist observed , had any of these 

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objects had the label made in China . 

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There would be an uproar in the 

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government and media . There would be 

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no stone unturned and no effort spared 

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to find out what we were dealing with . 

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We can look at the recent incursion of 

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the unidentified pr C high out to bloom 

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for as an example . But because of the 

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UFO stigma , the response has been 

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irresponsibly anemic and slow . 

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Congress established . Arrow . We made 

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it clear that we expect vigorous action . 

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We added very substantial initial 

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funding for the office . But despite 

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our best efforts , the president's 

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budget for fiscal 23 24 requested only 

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enough funding to defray the operating 

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expenses of a , it included almost no 

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funds to sustain the critical research 

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and development necessary to support a 

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serious investigation . It took a 

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letter to Secretary Austin from Senator 

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Rubio and me and 14 other senators to 

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get the office temporary relief for the 

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current fiscal year in this hearing I 

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tend to probe a series of specific 

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issues in the recent incidents where 

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multiple objects were shot down over 

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North America . It seemed that Pentagon 

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leadership did not turn to Aero office 

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to play a leading role in advising the 

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combatant commander . We need to know 

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whether this will continue . We need to 

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know whether the leadership and dod 

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will bring arrow into the decision 

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making process in a visible way and we 

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need to know what role arrow will play 

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in interagency coordination after the 

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NSC working group disbands in the 

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fiscal year 2023 National Defense and 

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Intelligence Authorization Act Congress 

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established a direct reporting chain 

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from the arrow director to the Deputy 

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Secretary of Defense . The role of the 

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office of the under Secretary of 

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Defense for Intelligence and Security 

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is limited to providing administrative 

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support . We need to know how this 

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direction is being implemented are 

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frequently observed flying in extremely 

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high or very low speeds and come in 

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various sizes and shapes during the 

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recent shoot downs over North America . 

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Do D disclosed that filters on radar 

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systems were adjusted to allow for 

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detection and tracking of diverse sets 

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of objects for the first time while 

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opening the aperture can overload the 

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real time analytic process . We cannot 

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keep turning a blind eye to 

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surveillance data that is critical to 

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detecting and tracking U A P . We need 

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to know whether Dr Kirkpatrick can 

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achieve the necessary control over 

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sensor filters and the storage and 

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access to raw surveillance data to find 

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U A anomalies . Finally , one of the 

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tasks Congress set for Arrow is serving 

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as an open door for witnesses of U A P 

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events or participants in government 

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activities related to U A to come 

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forward securely and disclose what they 

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know without fear of retribution for 

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any possible violations of previously 

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signed nondisclosure agreements . 

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Congress mandated that Arrow set up a 

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publicly discoverable and accessible 

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process for safe disclosure . While we 

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know that Arrow has already conducted a 

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significant number of interviews , many 

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referred by Congress , we need to set 

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up a public process that and we need to 

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know where that effort stands with that . 

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I'd like to turn to Senator Ernst for 

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her opening statement . Thank you madam 

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chair and thank you Doctor Kirkpatrick 

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for your testimony today . I'll keep 

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these remarks very brief so that we 

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have maximum time for your briefing . 

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The recent downing of the Chinese 

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surveillance surveillance balloon and 

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three other objects underscores the 

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need for Domain awareness , adversaries 

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like China and Russia are working to 

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hold us interests including our 

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homeland at risk . That's why your 

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testimony is so important . And I so 

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look forward to a progress update on 

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the establishment of your office . As 

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members know your office evolved from 

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the navy led unidentified aerial 

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phenomena task force to the All Domain 

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anomalous Resolution office known as 

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Arrow Kirkpatrick , your extensive 

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background in science and technology , 

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research and development and space 

155
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makes you well suited to discuss these 

156
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emerging challenges . My priority is 

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that we understand the full range of 

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threats posed by our adversaries in all 

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domains . That is what the joint force 

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needs to be prepared to fight and win 

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in defense of our nation . This 

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committee needs to know about Chinese 

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or Russian advanced technology programs 

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to exploit our vulnerabilities and it 

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needs to know whether your office along 

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with the IC has detected potential 

167
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Chinese or Russian capabilities to 

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surveil or attack us . Finally , we 

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need to ensure efficient interagency 

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coordination , multiple elements of the 

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dod and I own a piece of this 

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mission to add value . Arrow's efforts 

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cannot be redundant with others . Thank 

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you again , we look forward to your 

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testimony , Doctor Kirkpatrick . Uh You 

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can give your testimony . Thank you , 

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Chairwoman Jewel Brand , uh ranking 

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member , ernst distinguished members of 

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the subcommittee . It's a privilege to 

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be here today to testify on the 

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defense's efforts to address 

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unidentified anomalous phenomena . 

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First , I want to thank Congress for 

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its extensive and continued partnership 

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as the department works to better 

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understand and respond to U A in an 

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effort to minimize technical and 

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intelligence , surprise unidentified 

189
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objects in any domain , pose potential 

190
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risks to safety and security , 

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particularly from military personnel 

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and capabilities . Congress and dod 

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agree that UAP cannot remain unexamined 

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or unaddressed . We are grateful for 

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sustained congressional engagement on 

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this issue which paved the way for the 

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dod s establishment of the All Domain 

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anomaly resolution office in July of 

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last year though Arrow is still a young 

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office . The spotlight on U A in recent 

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months underscores the importance of 

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its work and the need for U A P to be 

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taken seriously as a matter of national 

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security , all leadership that I've had 

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the pleasure of working with whether 

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dod I CD O E civil Scientific or 

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industrial view , Congress as a 

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critical partner in this endeavor . 

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Arrow has accomplished much in the last 

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nine months since it was established . 

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The AERO team of more than three dozen 

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experts is organized around four 

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functional areas , operations , 

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scientific research , integrated 

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analysis and strategic communications . 

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In the nine months since ao's 

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establishment , we've taken important 

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steps to involve and improve U A P data 

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collection , standardize the 

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department's U A P internal reporting 

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requirements and implement a framework 

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for rigorous scientific and 

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intelligence analysis , allowing us to 

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resolve cases in a systematic and 

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prioritized manner . Meanwhile , 

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consistent with legislative direction , 

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arrow is also carefully reviewing and 

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researching the US government's U A P 

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related historical record . Arrow is 

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leading a focused effort to better 

231
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characterize , understand and attribute 

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U A P with priority given to U A P 

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reports by Dod and IC personnel in or 

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near areas of national security 

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importance . Fully appreciates the 

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eagerness from many quarters , 

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especially here in Congress and in the 

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American public to quickly resolve 

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every UAP encountered across the globe . 

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From the distant past through today . 

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It's important to note . However , 

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arrow is the culmination of decades of 

243
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dod intelligence community and 

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congressionally directed efforts to 

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successfully resolve U A P encountered 

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first and foremost by us , military 

247
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personnel , specifically Navy and air 

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force pilots . The law establishing AO 

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is ambitious and it will take time to 

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realize the full mission . We cannot 

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answer decades of questions about U A P 

252
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all at once , but we must begin 

253
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somewhere while I assure you that arrow 

254
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will follow scientific evidence 

255
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wherever it leads , I ask for your 

256
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patience . As do D first prioritizes 

257
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the safety and security of our military 

258
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personnel and installations in all 

259
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domains . After all A U A P encountered 

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first by highly capable do D N IC 

261
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platforms featuring the nation's most 

262
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advanced sensors are those most likely 

263
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to be resolved by my office . Assuming 

264
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the data can be collected if arrow 

265
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succeeds in first improving the ability 

266
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of military personnel to quickly and 

267
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confidently resolve they encounter . I 

268
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believe that in time we will have 

269
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greatly advanced the capability of the 

270
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entire United States government 

271
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including its civilian agencies to 

272
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resolve a . However , it would be naive 

273
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to believe that the resolution of all U 

274
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A P can be solely accomplished by the 

275
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dod and IC alone , we will need to 

276
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prioritize collection and leverage 

277
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authorities from monitoring all domains 

278
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within the continental United States . 

279
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Arrow's ultimate success will require 

280
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partnerships with the interagency 

281
00:10:07,770 --> 00:10:09,826
industry partners , academia and the 

282
00:10:09,826 --> 00:10:11,826
scientific community as well as the 

283
00:10:11,826 --> 00:10:13,979
public arrow is partnering with the 

284
00:10:13,989 --> 00:10:16,211
services , intelligence community D O E 

285
00:10:16,211 --> 00:10:18,267
as well as civil partners and across 

286
00:10:18,267 --> 00:10:20,156
the US government to tap into the 

287
00:10:20,156 --> 00:10:22,789
resources of the interagency . The 

288
00:10:23,080 --> 00:10:25,460
challenge is more an operational and 

289
00:10:25,469 --> 00:10:27,530
scientific issue than it is an 

290
00:10:27,539 --> 00:10:30,239
intelligence issue . As such . We are 

291
00:10:30,250 --> 00:10:32,520
working with industry academia and the 

292
00:10:32,530 --> 00:10:34,697
scientific community which bring their 

293
00:10:34,697 --> 00:10:37,390
own resources , ideas and expertise to 

294
00:10:37,400 --> 00:10:40,489
this challenging problem set , robust 

295
00:10:40,500 --> 00:10:42,690
collaboration and peer review across a 

296
00:10:42,700 --> 00:10:44,756
broad range of partners will promote 

297
00:10:44,756 --> 00:10:46,978
greater objectivity and transparency in 

298
00:10:46,978 --> 00:10:50,159
the study of U A I want to underscore 

299
00:10:50,169 --> 00:10:52,580
today that only a very small percentage 

300
00:10:52,590 --> 00:10:55,229
of U A P reports display signatures 

301
00:10:55,239 --> 00:10:57,350
that could reasonably be described as 

302
00:10:57,350 --> 00:10:59,099
anomalous . The majority of 

303
00:10:59,109 --> 00:11:01,760
unidentified objects reported to arrow 

304
00:11:01,770 --> 00:11:04,440
demonstrate mundane characteristics of 

305
00:11:04,450 --> 00:11:06,619
balloons , unmanned aerial systems , 

306
00:11:06,630 --> 00:11:08,852
clutter natural phenomena other readily 

307
00:11:08,852 --> 00:11:11,770
explainable sources . While a large 

308
00:11:11,780 --> 00:11:13,960
number of cases in our holdings remain 

309
00:11:13,969 --> 00:11:16,159
technically unresolved . This is 

310
00:11:16,169 --> 00:11:18,330
primarily due to a lack of data 

311
00:11:18,340 --> 00:11:20,840
associated with those cases without 

312
00:11:20,849 --> 00:11:22,793
sufficient data , we are unable to 

313
00:11:22,793 --> 00:11:25,750
reach defendable conclusions that meet 

314
00:11:25,760 --> 00:11:28,000
the high scientific standards we set 

315
00:11:28,010 --> 00:11:30,232
for resolution . And I will not close a 

316
00:11:30,232 --> 00:11:31,899
case that I cannot defend the 

317
00:11:31,899 --> 00:11:34,799
conclusions of I recognize that this 

318
00:11:34,809 --> 00:11:37,090
answer is unsatisfying to those who in 

319
00:11:37,099 --> 00:11:39,155
good faith assume that what they see 

320
00:11:39,155 --> 00:11:41,210
with their eyes , with their cameras 

321
00:11:41,210 --> 00:11:42,599
and with their radars is 

322
00:11:42,599 --> 00:11:44,210
incontrovertible evidence of 

323
00:11:44,210 --> 00:11:46,099
extraordinary characteristics and 

324
00:11:46,099 --> 00:11:48,321
performance . Yet time and again , with 

325
00:11:48,321 --> 00:11:50,432
sufficient scientific quality data it 

326
00:11:50,432 --> 00:11:52,869
is fact that U A P often but not always 

327
00:11:53,210 --> 00:11:55,340
resolve into readily explainable 

328
00:11:55,349 --> 00:11:57,799
sources . Humans are subject to 

329
00:11:57,809 --> 00:11:59,865
deception and illusions , sensors to 

330
00:11:59,865 --> 00:12:02,219
unexpected responses and malfunctions 

331
00:12:02,320 --> 00:12:04,130
and in some cases , intentional 

332
00:12:04,140 --> 00:12:06,570
interference , getting to the handful 

333
00:12:06,580 --> 00:12:08,413
of cases that pass this level of 

334
00:12:08,413 --> 00:12:11,030
scrutiny is the mission of error . That 

335
00:12:11,039 --> 00:12:13,469
is not to say that U A P wants resolved , 

336
00:12:13,479 --> 00:12:15,646
they're no longer of national security 

337
00:12:15,646 --> 00:12:17,812
interest . However , on the contrary , 

338
00:12:17,812 --> 00:12:19,989
learning that A U A P isn't of exotic 

339
00:12:20,000 --> 00:12:22,429
origin but is instead just a quadcopter 

340
00:12:22,440 --> 00:12:24,890
or a balloon leads to the question of 

341
00:12:24,900 --> 00:12:27,122
who is operating that quadcopter and to 

342
00:12:27,122 --> 00:12:29,700
what purpose , the answers to those 

343
00:12:29,710 --> 00:12:31,510
questions will inform potential 

344
00:12:31,520 --> 00:12:33,576
national security or law enforcement 

345
00:12:33,576 --> 00:12:36,309
responses . Arrow is a member of the 

346
00:12:36,320 --> 00:12:37,876
department's support to the 

347
00:12:37,876 --> 00:12:39,987
administration's Tiger team effort to 

348
00:12:39,987 --> 00:12:42,209
deal with stratospheric objects such as 

349
00:12:42,209 --> 00:12:44,760
the PR C high altitude balloon . While 

350
00:12:44,799 --> 00:12:47,049
when previously unknown objects are 

351
00:12:47,059 --> 00:12:49,710
successfully identified , it is Arrow's 

352
00:12:49,719 --> 00:12:52,059
role to quickly and efficiently hand 

353
00:12:52,070 --> 00:12:54,690
off such readily explainable objects to 

354
00:12:54,700 --> 00:12:56,811
the intelligence , law enforcement or 

355
00:12:56,811 --> 00:12:58,756
operational safety communities for 

356
00:12:58,756 --> 00:13:01,089
further analysis and appropriate action . 

357
00:13:01,859 --> 00:13:04,026
In other words , Arrow's mission is to 

358
00:13:04,026 --> 00:13:06,929
turn U A P into S E P . Somebody else's 

359
00:13:06,940 --> 00:13:10,820
problem . The US government , the dod 

360
00:13:10,830 --> 00:13:12,552
and the IC in particular , has 

361
00:13:12,552 --> 00:13:14,608
tremendous capabilities to deal with 

362
00:13:14,608 --> 00:13:16,719
those encountered objects in the wake 

363
00:13:16,719 --> 00:13:19,760
of the PRC hab event . The interagency 

364
00:13:19,770 --> 00:13:21,714
is working to better integrate and 

365
00:13:21,714 --> 00:13:23,326
share information to address 

366
00:13:23,570 --> 00:13:26,169
identifiable stratospheric objects . 

367
00:13:26,250 --> 00:13:29,770
But that is not arrows lane . Meanwhile , 

368
00:13:29,780 --> 00:13:31,724
for the few cases in all domains , 

369
00:13:31,724 --> 00:13:35,059
space , air and sea that do demonstrate 

370
00:13:35,070 --> 00:13:37,292
potentially anomalous characteristics , 

371
00:13:37,292 --> 00:13:39,599
Arrow exists to help the do D IC and 

372
00:13:39,609 --> 00:13:41,609
interagency resolve those anomalous 

373
00:13:41,609 --> 00:13:44,299
cases in doing so . Arrow is 

374
00:13:44,309 --> 00:13:46,142
approaching these cases with the 

375
00:13:46,142 --> 00:13:47,976
highest level of objectivity and 

376
00:13:47,976 --> 00:13:49,979
analytic rigor . This includes 

377
00:13:49,989 --> 00:13:51,822
physically testing and employing 

378
00:13:51,822 --> 00:13:54,045
modeling and simulation to validate our 

379
00:13:54,099 --> 00:13:56,321
analysis and underlying theories , then 

380
00:13:56,321 --> 00:13:58,543
peer reviewing those results within the 

381
00:13:58,543 --> 00:14:00,543
US government industry partners and 

382
00:14:00,543 --> 00:14:02,266
appropriately cleared academic 

383
00:14:02,266 --> 00:14:04,210
institutions . Before reaching any 

384
00:14:04,210 --> 00:14:06,450
conclusions , I should also state 

385
00:14:06,460 --> 00:14:08,404
clearly for the record that in our 

386
00:14:08,404 --> 00:14:10,460
research arrow has found no credible 

387
00:14:10,460 --> 00:14:12,700
evidence . Thus far of extraterrestrial 

388
00:14:12,710 --> 00:14:14,919
activity off world technology or 

389
00:14:14,929 --> 00:14:17,340
objects that defy the known laws of 

390
00:14:17,349 --> 00:14:19,880
physics in the event , sufficient 

391
00:14:19,890 --> 00:14:22,809
scientific data were ever obtained that 

392
00:14:22,820 --> 00:14:24,598
A U A P encountered can only be 

393
00:14:24,598 --> 00:14:26,764
explained by extraterrestrial origin . 

394
00:14:26,859 --> 00:14:28,915
We are committed to working with our 

395
00:14:28,915 --> 00:14:30,809
interagency partners at NASA to 

396
00:14:30,820 --> 00:14:32,876
appropriately inform us government's 

397
00:14:32,876 --> 00:14:35,330
leadership of its findings . For those 

398
00:14:35,340 --> 00:14:37,299
few cases that have leaked to the 

399
00:14:37,309 --> 00:14:39,253
public previously and subsequently 

400
00:14:39,253 --> 00:14:41,365
commented on by the US government . I 

401
00:14:41,369 --> 00:14:43,425
encourage those who hold alternative 

402
00:14:43,425 --> 00:14:45,647
theories or views to submit to research 

403
00:14:45,750 --> 00:14:47,806
to credible peer reviewed scientific 

404
00:14:47,806 --> 00:14:49,917
journals . Arrow is working very hard 

405
00:14:49,917 --> 00:14:52,289
to do the same . That is how science 

406
00:14:52,299 --> 00:14:55,950
works not by blog or social media . We 

407
00:14:55,960 --> 00:14:58,016
know that there is tremendous public 

408
00:14:58,016 --> 00:14:59,960
interest in U A P and a desire for 

409
00:14:59,960 --> 00:15:02,729
answers from Arrow by its very nature . 

410
00:15:02,739 --> 00:15:05,210
The U A challenge has for decades lent 

411
00:15:05,219 --> 00:15:08,210
itself to mystery , sensationalism and 

412
00:15:08,219 --> 00:15:10,780
even conspiracy for that reason , arro 

413
00:15:10,869 --> 00:15:12,989
remains committed to transparency , 

414
00:15:13,000 --> 00:15:15,559
accountability and to sharing as much 

415
00:15:15,570 --> 00:15:17,626
with the American public as we can , 

416
00:15:17,650 --> 00:15:19,539
consistent with our obligation to 

417
00:15:19,539 --> 00:15:21,960
protect not only intelligence sources 

418
00:15:21,969 --> 00:15:24,080
and methods but us and allied 

419
00:15:24,090 --> 00:15:27,390
capabilities . However , arrow's work 

420
00:15:27,400 --> 00:15:29,511
will take time if we are committed to 

421
00:15:29,511 --> 00:15:31,678
do it right . It means adhering to the 

422
00:15:31,678 --> 00:15:33,567
scientific method and the highest 

423
00:15:33,567 --> 00:15:35,760
standards of research integrity . It 

424
00:15:35,770 --> 00:15:38,320
means being methodical and scrupulous . 

425
00:15:38,510 --> 00:15:40,677
It means withholding judgment in favor 

426
00:15:40,677 --> 00:15:42,732
of evidence . It means following the 

427
00:15:42,732 --> 00:15:44,954
data where it leads wherever it leads , 

428
00:15:45,229 --> 00:15:47,340
it means establishing scientific peer 

429
00:15:47,340 --> 00:15:49,451
reviewed theoretical underpinnings of 

430
00:15:49,451 --> 00:15:52,049
observed data . An arrow is committed 

431
00:15:52,059 --> 00:15:54,789
to all of those standards . I'm proud 

432
00:15:54,799 --> 00:15:56,966
of arrow's progress over the last nine 

433
00:15:56,966 --> 00:15:59,049
months , months , much remains to be 

434
00:15:59,059 --> 00:16:01,281
done , but the hard work is under way . 

435
00:16:01,510 --> 00:16:03,677
Thank you for your continued support . 

436
00:16:03,677 --> 00:16:05,677
And before we turn to questions , I 

437
00:16:05,677 --> 00:16:07,621
wanna walk you through some of our 

438
00:16:07,621 --> 00:16:09,843
analytical trends and a couple of cases 

439
00:16:09,843 --> 00:16:11,066
that we've prepared . 

440
00:16:13,950 --> 00:16:16,859
So one of the things that arrow does is 

441
00:16:17,039 --> 00:16:19,679
high integrity analysis . As I've said , 

442
00:16:20,729 --> 00:16:24,140
this chart represents the trend 

443
00:16:24,150 --> 00:16:27,489
analysis of all the cases in 

444
00:16:27,520 --> 00:16:30,820
arrow's holdings were up to date . What 

445
00:16:30,830 --> 00:16:34,000
you'll see on the left is a histogram 

446
00:16:34,010 --> 00:16:37,469
of all of our reported sightings as a 

447
00:16:37,479 --> 00:16:41,460
function of altitude . So most of 

448
00:16:41,469 --> 00:16:45,440
our sightings occur in the 15 to 

449
00:16:45,450 --> 00:16:48,440
25,000 ft range . And that is 

450
00:16:48,450 --> 00:16:50,561
ultimately because that's where a lot 

451
00:16:50,561 --> 00:16:53,650
of our aircraft are on the far right 

452
00:16:53,659 --> 00:16:56,969
upper corner . You'll see a breakout of 

453
00:16:56,979 --> 00:16:59,580
the morpho of all of the U A P that are 

454
00:16:59,590 --> 00:17:03,580
reported over half about 52% of 

455
00:17:03,590 --> 00:17:07,010
what's been reported to us are round 

456
00:17:07,020 --> 00:17:10,890
orb spheres . The rest of those 

457
00:17:10,900 --> 00:17:13,011
break out into all kinds of different 

458
00:17:13,011 --> 00:17:15,849
other shapes . The gray box is 

459
00:17:16,520 --> 00:17:19,109
essentially there is no data on what 

460
00:17:19,119 --> 00:17:20,897
its shape is , either it wasn't 

461
00:17:20,897 --> 00:17:23,540
reported or the sensor did not collect 

462
00:17:23,550 --> 00:17:27,310
it . The bottom map is a heat map 

463
00:17:27,319 --> 00:17:30,219
of all reporting areas across the globe 

464
00:17:30,229 --> 00:17:33,579
that we have available to us . What 

465
00:17:33,589 --> 00:17:36,469
you'll notice is that there is a heavy 

466
00:17:36,479 --> 00:17:38,939
what we call collection bias both in 

467
00:17:38,949 --> 00:17:42,369
altitude and in geographic location . 

468
00:17:42,579 --> 00:17:45,000
That's where all of our sensors exist . 

469
00:17:45,760 --> 00:17:47,927
That's where our training ranges are . 

470
00:17:47,927 --> 00:17:50,260
That's where our operational ranges are . 

471
00:17:50,260 --> 00:17:52,371
That's where all of our platforms are 

472
00:17:53,430 --> 00:17:55,900
in the middle . What we have done is 

473
00:17:55,910 --> 00:17:59,329
reduce the most typically reported U A 

474
00:17:59,339 --> 00:18:02,660
P characteristics to these uh 

475
00:18:02,670 --> 00:18:06,609
fields mostly round , mostly 1 to 4 m 

476
00:18:06,930 --> 00:18:09,530
white , silver , translucent metallic 

477
00:18:09,939 --> 00:18:13,680
10,000 to 30,000 ft with apparent 

478
00:18:13,689 --> 00:18:16,520
velocities from the stationary to mach 

479
00:18:16,530 --> 00:18:19,170
two . No thermal exhaust is usually 

480
00:18:19,180 --> 00:18:21,959
detected . We get intermittent radar 

481
00:18:21,969 --> 00:18:24,949
returns , we get intermittent radio 

482
00:18:24,959 --> 00:18:27,729
returns and we get intermittent thermal 

483
00:18:27,739 --> 00:18:30,310
signatures . That's what we're looking 

484
00:18:30,319 --> 00:18:32,609
for and trying to understand what that 

485
00:18:32,619 --> 00:18:35,750
is next slide . 

486
00:18:38,939 --> 00:18:41,209
So I'm gonna walk you through two cases 

487
00:18:41,219 --> 00:18:44,040
that we've uh declassified recently . 

488
00:18:44,469 --> 00:18:47,849
Um This first one is an M Q nine in the 

489
00:18:47,859 --> 00:18:50,719
Middle East observing that blow up , 

490
00:18:50,729 --> 00:18:52,910
which is an apparent spherical object 

491
00:18:52,920 --> 00:18:55,790
via E O sensors . Those are not I R . 

492
00:18:57,989 --> 00:19:00,045
If you wanna go ahead and click that 

493
00:19:00,045 --> 00:19:04,020
and play it , you'll see it come 

494
00:19:04,030 --> 00:19:06,141
through the top of the screen . There 

495
00:19:06,141 --> 00:19:08,252
it goes and then the camera will slew 

496
00:19:08,252 --> 00:19:11,750
to follow it . You'll see it pop in and 

497
00:19:11,760 --> 00:19:15,050
out of the field of view there . This 

498
00:19:15,060 --> 00:19:17,229
is essentially all of the data we have 

499
00:19:17,239 --> 00:19:19,295
associated with this event from some 

500
00:19:19,295 --> 00:19:23,260
years ago . It is going to be virtually 

501
00:19:23,270 --> 00:19:27,209
impossible to fully identify that just 

502
00:19:27,219 --> 00:19:29,709
based off of that video . Now , what we 

503
00:19:29,719 --> 00:19:32,369
can do and what we are doing is keeping 

504
00:19:32,380 --> 00:19:35,880
that as part of that group of 

505
00:19:35,890 --> 00:19:39,430
52% to see what are the 

506
00:19:39,439 --> 00:19:41,383
similarities . What are the trends 

507
00:19:41,383 --> 00:19:43,495
across all of these ? Do we see these 

508
00:19:43,495 --> 00:19:45,661
in a particular distribution ? Do they 

509
00:19:45,661 --> 00:19:48,520
all behave the same or not as we get 

510
00:19:48,530 --> 00:19:51,780
more data , we will be able to go back 

511
00:19:51,790 --> 00:19:54,339
and look at these in a fuller context . 

512
00:19:55,189 --> 00:19:57,689
How are we gonna get more data ? We are 

513
00:19:57,699 --> 00:20:00,030
working with the joint staff to issue 

514
00:20:00,040 --> 00:20:02,040
guidance to all the services and 

515
00:20:02,050 --> 00:20:05,189
commands that will then establish what 

516
00:20:05,199 --> 00:20:07,255
are the reporting requirements , the 

517
00:20:07,255 --> 00:20:09,421
timeliness and all of the data that is 

518
00:20:09,421 --> 00:20:11,366
required to be delivered to us and 

519
00:20:11,366 --> 00:20:13,900
retained from all the associated 

520
00:20:13,910 --> 00:20:16,770
sensors that historically hasn't been 

521
00:20:16,780 --> 00:20:18,780
the case and it's been happenstance 

522
00:20:18,780 --> 00:20:22,410
that data has been collected next slide , 

523
00:20:24,689 --> 00:20:28,500
this particular uh event , South Asia M 

524
00:20:28,510 --> 00:20:31,140
Q nine , uh , looking at another M Q 

525
00:20:31,150 --> 00:20:33,589
nine and what's highlighted there in 

526
00:20:33,599 --> 00:20:36,109
that red circle is an object that flies 

527
00:20:36,119 --> 00:20:38,660
through the screen . Unlike the 

528
00:20:38,670 --> 00:20:41,810
previous one , this one actually shows 

529
00:20:41,819 --> 00:20:43,819
some really interesting things that 

530
00:20:43,819 --> 00:20:46,041
everyone thought was truly anomalous to 

531
00:20:46,041 --> 00:20:48,263
start with . First of all , it's a high 

532
00:20:48,263 --> 00:20:50,486
speed object that's flying in the field 

533
00:20:50,489 --> 00:20:53,520
of regard of two M Q nine s second . It 

534
00:20:53,530 --> 00:20:57,140
appears to have this uh trail behind it . 

535
00:20:58,079 --> 00:21:00,246
All right , which at first blush , you 

536
00:21:00,246 --> 00:21:01,912
would think that looks like a 

537
00:21:01,912 --> 00:21:05,550
propulsion trail in reality . Uh 

538
00:21:05,560 --> 00:21:08,469
If you want to play the first slide , 

539
00:21:08,479 --> 00:21:10,646
we'll show you what that looks like in 

540
00:21:10,646 --> 00:21:12,812
real time . Our first video . So we're 

541
00:21:12,812 --> 00:21:15,900
looking at that . There it goes , why 

542
00:21:15,910 --> 00:21:18,077
don't you play it again and then pause 

543
00:21:18,077 --> 00:21:21,319
it halfway through right there . All 

544
00:21:21,329 --> 00:21:23,329
right , if you might be able to see 

545
00:21:23,329 --> 00:21:26,010
that trail there behind it , that's 

546
00:21:26,020 --> 00:21:28,099
actually not a real trail that is a 

547
00:21:28,109 --> 00:21:31,140
sensor artifact . Um uh 

548
00:21:31,150 --> 00:21:33,520
Each one of those little blobs is 

549
00:21:33,530 --> 00:21:35,979
actually a representation of the object 

550
00:21:35,989 --> 00:21:38,100
as it's moving through . And later in 

551
00:21:38,100 --> 00:21:41,810
the video , as the as the uh 

552
00:21:41,819 --> 00:21:45,209
camera slews that trail actually 

553
00:21:45,219 --> 00:21:47,359
follows the direction of the camera , 

554
00:21:47,369 --> 00:21:50,010
not the direction of the object 

555
00:21:51,770 --> 00:21:53,959
we pulled these apart frame by frame . 

556
00:21:53,969 --> 00:21:56,080
We were able to demonstrate that that 

557
00:21:56,080 --> 00:21:58,979
is essentially a readout uh overlap of 

558
00:21:58,989 --> 00:22:00,933
the image . It's a , it's a shadow 

559
00:22:00,933 --> 00:22:03,439
image , right ? It's not real further . 

560
00:22:03,449 --> 00:22:06,310
If you later , um follow this all the 

561
00:22:06,319 --> 00:22:08,469
way to end , it starts to resolve 

562
00:22:08,479 --> 00:22:11,260
itself into that blob that's in that 

563
00:22:11,270 --> 00:22:13,619
picture on the top of right . And if 

564
00:22:13,630 --> 00:22:15,797
you squint , it looks like an aircraft 

565
00:22:15,797 --> 00:22:17,963
because it actually turns out to be an 

566
00:22:17,963 --> 00:22:20,074
aircraft , go ahead and put that on . 

567
00:22:21,510 --> 00:22:23,869
So you'll see the tail sort of pop out 

568
00:22:23,880 --> 00:22:25,991
there . And so what you're looking at 

569
00:22:25,991 --> 00:22:28,329
is this is in the infrared , this is 

570
00:22:28,339 --> 00:22:31,569
the heat signature off of the engines 

571
00:22:31,579 --> 00:22:33,801
of a commuter aircraft that happened to 

572
00:22:33,801 --> 00:22:35,746
be flying in the vicinity of where 

573
00:22:35,746 --> 00:22:39,040
those two M Q nine s were at . Why am I 

574
00:22:39,050 --> 00:22:41,270
showing you this ? So the first one 

575
00:22:41,280 --> 00:22:43,169
that I showed you , we don't have 

576
00:22:43,169 --> 00:22:45,058
resolved yet , right ? That is an 

577
00:22:45,058 --> 00:22:47,430
unresolved case . We are still studying 

578
00:22:47,439 --> 00:22:50,479
this one , we can resolve . But this is 

579
00:22:50,489 --> 00:22:52,600
the kind of data that we have to work 

580
00:22:52,600 --> 00:22:55,000
with and the type of analysis that we 

581
00:22:55,010 --> 00:22:56,788
have to do , which can be quite 

582
00:22:56,788 --> 00:22:58,899
extensive when you have to pull these 

583
00:22:58,899 --> 00:23:02,390
apart frame by frame further . We're 

584
00:23:02,400 --> 00:23:04,729
now matching all of this with the 

585
00:23:04,739 --> 00:23:07,750
models of all of those imaging sensors . 

586
00:23:07,760 --> 00:23:10,829
So that I can say I can recreate this . 

587
00:23:10,839 --> 00:23:13,060
I can actually show how the sensor is 

588
00:23:13,069 --> 00:23:16,119
going to respond . All of these sensors 

589
00:23:16,130 --> 00:23:18,241
don't necessarily respond the way you 

590
00:23:18,241 --> 00:23:21,170
think they do , especially out in the 

591
00:23:21,180 --> 00:23:22,709
world and in the field . 

592
00:23:25,699 --> 00:23:27,810
And I believe that's all I have and I 

593
00:23:27,810 --> 00:23:29,866
will open it up for your questions . 

594
00:23:29,949 --> 00:23:32,560
Thank you so much , Doctor Patrick . Um , 

595
00:23:32,569 --> 00:23:34,680
can you just give us some raw numbers 

596
00:23:34,680 --> 00:23:37,560
of how many , uh , U A P S you've 

597
00:23:37,569 --> 00:23:40,380
analyzed how many have been resolved 

598
00:23:40,390 --> 00:23:42,446
and sort of in what buckets and then 

599
00:23:42,446 --> 00:23:44,723
how many are still left to be resolved ? 

600
00:23:44,723 --> 00:23:46,946
Just an update from your January Public 

601
00:23:46,946 --> 00:23:49,168
Report where it was 3 66 or something . 

602
00:23:49,168 --> 00:23:51,630
And about 100 and 50 were , were , um , 

603
00:23:51,640 --> 00:23:53,869
balloons and about two dozen were 

604
00:23:53,880 --> 00:23:55,880
drones , you know , just give us an 

605
00:23:55,880 --> 00:23:58,060
update if you have . So , as of this 

606
00:23:58,069 --> 00:24:01,489
week , uh we are tracking over a 

607
00:24:01,500 --> 00:24:04,199
total of 650 cases . 

608
00:24:05,939 --> 00:24:08,290
Now , uh the report in January 

609
00:24:08,300 --> 00:24:10,780
basically said about half of the ones 

610
00:24:10,790 --> 00:24:12,846
at that time , about 100 and 50 were 

611
00:24:12,846 --> 00:24:15,180
balloon were likely balloon like or 

612
00:24:15,189 --> 00:24:17,411
something like that . That doesn't mean 

613
00:24:17,411 --> 00:24:19,633
they're resolved . I see . So what , uh 

614
00:24:19,633 --> 00:24:21,745
let me , let me walk everyone through 

615
00:24:21,745 --> 00:24:23,911
what our analytic process looks like . 

616
00:24:25,040 --> 00:24:27,750
We have a essentially a five step 

617
00:24:27,760 --> 00:24:30,089
process , right ? So we have , we get 

618
00:24:30,099 --> 00:24:32,229
our cases in with all the data . We 

619
00:24:32,239 --> 00:24:35,989
create a case uh for that uh event . 

620
00:24:37,380 --> 00:24:40,780
My team does a preliminary scrub of all 

621
00:24:40,790 --> 00:24:43,609
of those cases as they come in just to 

622
00:24:43,619 --> 00:24:45,949
sort out . Do we have any information 

623
00:24:45,959 --> 00:24:48,500
that says this is in one of those 

624
00:24:48,510 --> 00:24:50,399
likely categories ? It's likely a 

625
00:24:50,399 --> 00:24:52,510
balloon , it's likely a balloon , you 

626
00:24:52,510 --> 00:24:54,729
know , a bird , it's likely some other 

627
00:24:54,739 --> 00:24:58,000
object or we don't know , 

628
00:24:58,859 --> 00:25:02,550
then we prioritize those based off 

629
00:25:02,560 --> 00:25:05,300
of where they are , are they attached 

630
00:25:05,310 --> 00:25:08,010
to a national security area ? Does it 

631
00:25:08,020 --> 00:25:11,900
show some anomalous um phenomenology 

632
00:25:11,910 --> 00:25:14,209
that is of interest if it's just , if 

633
00:25:14,219 --> 00:25:16,163
it's just a spherical thing that's 

634
00:25:16,163 --> 00:25:18,163
floating around with the , with the 

635
00:25:18,163 --> 00:25:20,170
wind and it has no payload on it , 

636
00:25:20,459 --> 00:25:22,459
that's gonna be less important than 

637
00:25:22,459 --> 00:25:24,515
something that has a payload on it , 

638
00:25:24,515 --> 00:25:26,459
which would be less important than 

639
00:25:26,459 --> 00:25:28,626
something that's maneuvering . Right . 

640
00:25:28,626 --> 00:25:28,599
So there's , there's sort of a 

641
00:25:28,609 --> 00:25:30,380
hierarchy of just binning the 

642
00:25:30,390 --> 00:25:32,501
priorities because we can't do all of 

643
00:25:32,501 --> 00:25:36,369
them at once , once we do that and we 

644
00:25:36,380 --> 00:25:38,269
prioritize them when we take that 

645
00:25:38,269 --> 00:25:40,324
package of data in that case . And I 

646
00:25:40,324 --> 00:25:43,089
have set up two teams , I think of this 

647
00:25:43,099 --> 00:25:44,821
as a red team , blue team or a 

648
00:25:44,821 --> 00:25:47,260
competitive analysis . I have an 

649
00:25:47,270 --> 00:25:49,699
intelligence community team made up of 

650
00:25:49,709 --> 00:25:52,260
intelligence analysts and I have an S 

651
00:25:52,270 --> 00:25:54,750
and T team made up of scientists and 

652
00:25:54,760 --> 00:25:56,927
engineers and the people that actually 

653
00:25:56,927 --> 00:25:58,704
build a lot of these sensors or 

654
00:25:58,704 --> 00:26:00,649
physicists because , you know , if 

655
00:26:00,649 --> 00:26:02,427
you're a physicist , you can do 

656
00:26:02,427 --> 00:26:05,650
anything , right ? Um And but they're 

657
00:26:05,660 --> 00:26:08,189
not associated with the intel community 

658
00:26:08,209 --> 00:26:09,987
and they're , they're not intel 

659
00:26:09,987 --> 00:26:12,153
officers . So they , they look at this 

660
00:26:12,153 --> 00:26:14,320
through the lens of the sensor of , of 

661
00:26:14,320 --> 00:26:16,431
the what the data says , we give that 

662
00:26:16,431 --> 00:26:18,439
package to both teams . The 

663
00:26:18,449 --> 00:26:20,671
intelligence community is going to look 

664
00:26:20,671 --> 00:26:22,338
at it through the lens of the 

665
00:26:22,338 --> 00:26:24,560
intelligence record and , and what they 

666
00:26:24,560 --> 00:26:26,560
assess and their intel tradecraft , 

667
00:26:26,560 --> 00:26:28,782
which they have very specific rules and 

668
00:26:28,782 --> 00:26:30,671
regulations on how they do that . 

669
00:26:30,671 --> 00:26:32,505
Scientific community , technical 

670
00:26:32,505 --> 00:26:32,500
community is going to look at it 

671
00:26:32,510 --> 00:26:34,566
through the lens of what is the data 

672
00:26:34,566 --> 00:26:36,839
telling me what is the sensor doing ? 

673
00:26:36,890 --> 00:26:39,189
What would I expect a sensor response 

674
00:26:39,199 --> 00:26:42,689
to be and back that out ? Those two 

675
00:26:42,699 --> 00:26:45,910
groups give us their answers . We then 

676
00:26:46,010 --> 00:26:49,949
adjudicate . If they agree , then I 

677
00:26:49,959 --> 00:26:52,209
am more likely to close that case . If 

678
00:26:52,219 --> 00:26:54,163
they agree on what it is . If they 

679
00:26:54,163 --> 00:26:56,760
disagree , we will have an adjudication , 

680
00:26:56,880 --> 00:26:58,880
we'll bring them together and we'll 

681
00:26:58,880 --> 00:27:01,047
take a look at the differences . We'll 

682
00:27:01,047 --> 00:27:03,213
adjudicate . What , why do you say one 

683
00:27:03,213 --> 00:27:05,213
thing and you say another , we will 

684
00:27:05,213 --> 00:27:08,300
then come to a case um recommendation 

685
00:27:09,410 --> 00:27:12,199
that'll get written up by my team that 

686
00:27:12,209 --> 00:27:15,089
then goes to a senior technical 

687
00:27:15,099 --> 00:27:18,170
advisory group which is outside of all 

688
00:27:18,180 --> 00:27:20,609
of those people made up of senior 

689
00:27:20,619 --> 00:27:24,130
technical folks and , and uh um intel 

690
00:27:24,140 --> 00:27:26,290
analysts and operators from 

691
00:27:27,400 --> 00:27:30,770
retired uh out of the community . Uh 

692
00:27:30,780 --> 00:27:33,550
And they , they essentially peer review 

693
00:27:33,560 --> 00:27:36,650
what that case recommendation is . 

694
00:27:37,729 --> 00:27:39,840
They write their recommendations that 

695
00:27:39,840 --> 00:27:41,840
comes back to me . I review it . We 

696
00:27:41,840 --> 00:27:44,007
make a determination and I'll sign off 

697
00:27:44,007 --> 00:27:46,229
one way or the other and then that will 

698
00:27:46,229 --> 00:27:49,280
go out as the , the case determination . 

699
00:27:49,689 --> 00:27:52,349
Once we have an approved web portal to 

700
00:27:52,359 --> 00:27:55,040
hang the unclassified stuff , we will , 

701
00:27:55,050 --> 00:27:56,939
you know , we would downgrade and 

702
00:27:56,939 --> 00:27:59,217
declassify things and put it out there . 

703
00:27:59,217 --> 00:28:01,328
In the meantime , we're putting a lot 

704
00:28:01,328 --> 00:28:03,750
of these on our classified web portal 

705
00:28:03,849 --> 00:28:06,016
where we can then collaborate with the 

706
00:28:06,016 --> 00:28:08,127
rest of the community so they can see 

707
00:28:08,127 --> 00:28:10,839
what's going on . That's in a nutshell . 

708
00:28:10,849 --> 00:28:14,469
That is the process , right ? So , uh 

709
00:28:17,069 --> 00:28:20,469
because of that , that takes time . 

710
00:28:21,520 --> 00:28:24,930
So of those over 650 you know , we've 

711
00:28:24,939 --> 00:28:28,170
prioritized about uh 

712
00:28:28,180 --> 00:28:32,099
half of them to be of , of 

713
00:28:32,109 --> 00:28:35,189
um anomalous interesting value . 

714
00:28:36,219 --> 00:28:38,441
And now we have to go through those and 

715
00:28:38,441 --> 00:28:40,775
go , how much do I have actual data for ? 

716
00:28:40,775 --> 00:28:42,810
Because if all I have is a is a 

717
00:28:42,880 --> 00:28:46,500
operator report that says I saw X Y or 

718
00:28:46,510 --> 00:28:50,329
Z my assessment is A B or C that's 

719
00:28:50,339 --> 00:28:52,450
not really sufficient . That's a good 

720
00:28:52,450 --> 00:28:54,780
place to start . But I have to have 

721
00:28:54,790 --> 00:28:56,846
data . I have to have radar data . I 

722
00:28:56,846 --> 00:28:59,012
have to have E O data . I have to have 

723
00:28:59,012 --> 00:29:01,179
thermal data . I have to have overhead 

724
00:29:01,179 --> 00:29:03,346
data and we need to look at all that . 

725
00:29:04,079 --> 00:29:06,560
Now from a big picture perspective , I 

726
00:29:06,569 --> 00:29:08,791
still have that's all very , still very 

727
00:29:08,791 --> 00:29:11,250
valuable data . And we're looking at 

728
00:29:11,260 --> 00:29:14,359
applying a lot of things , new tools , 

729
00:29:14,439 --> 00:29:17,479
a analytic tools like natural language 

730
00:29:17,489 --> 00:29:19,656
processing . So I can go across all of 

731
00:29:19,656 --> 00:29:21,719
those reports and look for 

732
00:29:21,729 --> 00:29:23,969
commonalities . How many of them are 

733
00:29:23,979 --> 00:29:26,630
being described as round spherical 

734
00:29:26,640 --> 00:29:28,862
objects that are maneuvering ? How many 

735
00:29:28,862 --> 00:29:31,029
of them are not maneuvering ? How many 

736
00:29:31,029 --> 00:29:33,140
of them seem to have a plume to it or 

737
00:29:33,140 --> 00:29:36,520
not ? That's also going to be very 

738
00:29:36,530 --> 00:29:38,586
valuable to give us more of a global 

739
00:29:38,586 --> 00:29:40,697
picture and a trends analysis of what 

740
00:29:40,697 --> 00:29:43,530
are we seeing and help us get to the 

741
00:29:43,540 --> 00:29:46,510
determination . So , go back to your 

742
00:29:46,520 --> 00:29:50,339
question , ma'am . We have um um 

743
00:29:50,349 --> 00:29:52,589
this next quarterly report will be 

744
00:29:52,599 --> 00:29:54,766
coming out here pretty soon . Our next 

745
00:29:54,766 --> 00:29:58,569
annual report , um you all have uh 

746
00:29:58,579 --> 00:30:01,790
given us , uh moved it up to , to June , 

747
00:30:01,800 --> 00:30:03,967
July . We're gonna be having that done 

748
00:30:04,219 --> 00:30:06,780
about uh that time frame and we will 

749
00:30:06,790 --> 00:30:08,869
have a , we'll be combining a whole 

750
00:30:08,880 --> 00:30:12,130
number of reports in into that one . Uh 

751
00:30:12,599 --> 00:30:14,839
I think we , we're currently sitting at 

752
00:30:14,849 --> 00:30:17,630
around hm 

753
00:30:19,140 --> 00:30:21,029
If I remember correctly , we were 

754
00:30:21,029 --> 00:30:24,910
around 20 to 30 I or about halfway 

755
00:30:24,920 --> 00:30:27,290
through that analytic process . A 

756
00:30:27,300 --> 00:30:29,356
handful of them have made it all the 

757
00:30:29,356 --> 00:30:31,189
way out to the other side . Gone 

758
00:30:31,189 --> 00:30:33,244
through peer review . We've got case 

759
00:30:33,244 --> 00:30:36,000
closure reports done and signed . We're 

760
00:30:36,010 --> 00:30:38,619
gonna get faster as we get more people 

761
00:30:38,630 --> 00:30:41,209
on board . Uh And we get more of the 

762
00:30:41,219 --> 00:30:44,300
community tools to automate some of the 

763
00:30:44,310 --> 00:30:46,032
analysis that has to be done . 

764
00:30:48,560 --> 00:30:50,859
Yeah . Thank you madam chair and Dr 

765
00:30:50,869 --> 00:30:53,680
Kirk Patrick , the Odni Annual Threat 

766
00:30:53,689 --> 00:30:56,670
Assessment states that China's space 

767
00:30:56,680 --> 00:30:59,650
activities are designed to erode us 

768
00:30:59,660 --> 00:31:02,699
influence across military technological , 

769
00:31:02,819 --> 00:31:05,329
economic and diplomatic spheres . 

770
00:31:05,339 --> 00:31:07,839
Likewise , Russia will remain a key 

771
00:31:07,849 --> 00:31:11,079
space competitor in the course of your 

772
00:31:11,089 --> 00:31:13,089
work . Have you become aware of any 

773
00:31:13,089 --> 00:31:15,189
Chinese or Russia technical 

774
00:31:15,199 --> 00:31:17,989
advancements to surveil or attack us 

775
00:31:18,000 --> 00:31:21,699
interests ? So that's a great question . 

776
00:31:22,030 --> 00:31:24,479
Part of what we have to do as we go 

777
00:31:24,489 --> 00:31:27,010
through these , um especially the ones 

778
00:31:27,020 --> 00:31:30,329
that show signatures of advanced 

779
00:31:30,339 --> 00:31:33,160
technical capabilities is determine if 

780
00:31:33,170 --> 00:31:36,670
there is a foreign nexus . That's 

781
00:31:36,680 --> 00:31:39,930
really hard if what we observe doesn't 

782
00:31:39,939 --> 00:31:42,329
have a Chinese or Russian flag on the 

783
00:31:42,339 --> 00:31:45,079
side of it . Now , 

784
00:31:46,479 --> 00:31:49,969
I think it is um prudent to 

785
00:31:49,979 --> 00:31:53,339
say of the of the 

786
00:31:53,459 --> 00:31:57,189
cases that are showing , you know , 

787
00:31:57,199 --> 00:31:58,977
some sort of advanced technical 

788
00:31:58,977 --> 00:32:01,349
signature of which we're talking single 

789
00:32:01,359 --> 00:32:04,130
percentages of the entire population of 

790
00:32:04,140 --> 00:32:07,640
cases . We have . Um I am 

791
00:32:07,650 --> 00:32:11,520
concerned about what 

792
00:32:11,530 --> 00:32:14,489
that nexus is and I have indicators 

793
00:32:14,500 --> 00:32:16,810
that some are related to foreign 

794
00:32:16,819 --> 00:32:20,479
capabilities . We have to investigate 

795
00:32:20,489 --> 00:32:24,349
that with our IC partners and as we get 

796
00:32:24,359 --> 00:32:26,660
evidence to support that , that gets 

797
00:32:26,670 --> 00:32:29,050
then handed off to the appropriate IC 

798
00:32:29,060 --> 00:32:32,920
agency to investigate again , it 

799
00:32:32,930 --> 00:32:35,660
becomes an S E P at that point somebody 

800
00:32:35,670 --> 00:32:37,726
else's problem . Right . Very good . 

801
00:32:37,726 --> 00:32:41,160
Thank you . Yes . Is it , is it uh 

802
00:32:41,170 --> 00:32:44,199
is it possible that the Chinese or 

803
00:32:44,209 --> 00:32:46,320
Russian advanced technologies could , 

804
00:32:46,320 --> 00:32:48,410
could be causing some of these 

805
00:32:48,420 --> 00:32:50,969
anomalous behaviors ? And , and you 

806
00:32:50,979 --> 00:32:53,839
said there seems to be um some 

807
00:32:53,849 --> 00:32:57,469
indicators . Uh so just for us 

808
00:32:57,479 --> 00:33:00,489
today , uh could you describe potential 

809
00:33:00,500 --> 00:33:02,930
threat that might exist out there if 

810
00:33:02,939 --> 00:33:05,910
they are foreign nexus ? 

811
00:33:07,520 --> 00:33:09,380
In order to do this research 

812
00:33:09,390 --> 00:33:12,959
appropriately , we have to uh 

813
00:33:12,969 --> 00:33:15,569
also be cognizant of what is the state 

814
00:33:15,579 --> 00:33:17,801
of the art and development across the S 

815
00:33:17,801 --> 00:33:20,459
and T community . What is , what are 

816
00:33:20,469 --> 00:33:22,859
the of the world doing ? What are our , 

817
00:33:22,890 --> 00:33:26,000
what's the horizon scanning of 

818
00:33:26,310 --> 00:33:29,050
emerging technologies appropriate to 

819
00:33:29,060 --> 00:33:31,630
this subcommittee , what is happening 

820
00:33:31,640 --> 00:33:33,790
out there ? And if somebody could 

821
00:33:33,800 --> 00:33:36,420
accelerate that capability , how would 

822
00:33:36,430 --> 00:33:38,597
that manifest itself and what would it 

823
00:33:38,597 --> 00:33:40,597
look like ? And do those signatures 

824
00:33:40,597 --> 00:33:44,099
match what we're seeing ? Um There are 

825
00:33:44,109 --> 00:33:46,680
emerging capabilities out there that , 

826
00:33:46,689 --> 00:33:49,619
that in many instances , 

827
00:33:50,719 --> 00:33:53,170
Russia and China , well , China in 

828
00:33:53,180 --> 00:33:56,979
particular are on par or 

829
00:33:56,989 --> 00:34:00,000
ahead of us in some areas , right ? So 

830
00:34:00,010 --> 00:34:02,310
previously I used to be the defense 

831
00:34:02,319 --> 00:34:04,469
department's Intelligence Officer for 

832
00:34:04,479 --> 00:34:06,535
Science and Technical Intelligence . 

833
00:34:06,535 --> 00:34:08,830
That was our job was to look for . What 

834
00:34:08,840 --> 00:34:12,639
does all that look like . Um And then , 

835
00:34:12,669 --> 00:34:14,780
you know , my last several years , of 

836
00:34:14,780 --> 00:34:17,810
course in in space command doing space , 

837
00:34:20,350 --> 00:34:23,860
the the the adversary is not 

838
00:34:25,040 --> 00:34:28,229
waiting , they are advancing and 

839
00:34:28,239 --> 00:34:30,810
they're advancing quickly . If I were 

840
00:34:30,820 --> 00:34:33,042
to put on some of my old hats , I would 

841
00:34:33,042 --> 00:34:36,599
tell you they are less risk averse at 

842
00:34:36,608 --> 00:34:39,868
technical advancement than we are , 

843
00:34:40,938 --> 00:34:42,994
right . They are just willing to try 

844
00:34:42,994 --> 00:34:45,229
things and see if it works . Are there 

845
00:34:45,239 --> 00:34:47,239
capabilities that could be employed 

846
00:34:47,239 --> 00:34:49,368
against us in both an I S R and A 

847
00:34:49,378 --> 00:34:52,260
weapons fashion ? Absolutely . Do I 

848
00:34:52,270 --> 00:34:54,437
have evidence that they're doing it in 

849
00:34:54,437 --> 00:34:58,399
these cases ? No , but I have 

850
00:34:58,409 --> 00:34:59,939
concerning indicators . 

851
00:35:02,260 --> 00:35:04,260
Thank you . I appreciate that . And 

852
00:35:04,260 --> 00:35:06,427
that's , that is why it's so important 

853
00:35:06,427 --> 00:35:08,093
that you are working with the 

854
00:35:08,093 --> 00:35:10,093
intelligence community as well . Um 

855
00:35:10,093 --> 00:35:12,149
because you , you have the science , 

856
00:35:12,149 --> 00:35:14,371
the data background , but you also need 

857
00:35:14,620 --> 00:35:18,070
to know um from various sources 

858
00:35:18,080 --> 00:35:20,889
what adversaries may be working on . Is 

859
00:35:20,899 --> 00:35:23,010
that correct ? Ok . Thank you . Thank 

860
00:35:23,010 --> 00:35:25,343
you very much . Thank you , madam chair . 

861
00:35:27,040 --> 00:35:29,318
Uh Well , thank you , Chair Gillibrand , 

862
00:35:29,318 --> 00:35:31,429
ranking member , Ernst . Uh This is a 

863
00:35:31,429 --> 00:35:33,596
really important hearing . I'd like to 

864
00:35:33,596 --> 00:35:35,818
thank you , Doctor Kirkpatrick for your 

865
00:35:35,818 --> 00:35:37,707
service to the country . And as a 

866
00:35:37,707 --> 00:35:39,596
former systems analyst myself , I 

867
00:35:39,596 --> 00:35:41,762
really appreciate uh your flow chart , 

868
00:35:41,762 --> 00:35:43,707
the description of the process and 

869
00:35:43,707 --> 00:35:45,873
particularly the trends analysis going 

870
00:35:45,873 --> 00:35:47,929
forward , how that's gonna help us . 

871
00:35:47,929 --> 00:35:49,929
And you talked about language , the 

872
00:35:49,929 --> 00:35:51,818
large L L MS , the large language 

873
00:35:51,818 --> 00:35:53,818
models of artificial intelligence . 

874
00:35:53,818 --> 00:35:56,040
That's really gonna help us in the hunt 

875
00:35:56,040 --> 00:35:58,151
forward predictive analysis . I think 

876
00:35:58,151 --> 00:36:00,679
uh um to some of your point what we're 

877
00:36:00,689 --> 00:36:02,745
worried about , but I wanna focus on 

878
00:36:02,745 --> 00:36:04,879
Nevada because uh I wanna talk about 

879
00:36:04,889 --> 00:36:07,129
the impact of U A P S on aviation 

880
00:36:07,139 --> 00:36:09,709
safety . So when it comes to unified 

881
00:36:09,719 --> 00:36:11,800
unidentified aerial phenomenal 

882
00:36:11,810 --> 00:36:14,032
phenomena , excuse me , one of my first 

883
00:36:14,032 --> 00:36:16,199
concerns is really about the safety of 

884
00:36:16,199 --> 00:36:18,649
Nevada's military aviator . So we have 

885
00:36:18,659 --> 00:36:20,992
airmen stationed at NAAS Air Force Base , 

886
00:36:20,992 --> 00:36:22,937
naval aviators flying at Naval Air 

887
00:36:22,937 --> 00:36:25,250
Station , Fallon and service members 

888
00:36:25,260 --> 00:36:28,399
across from across the world , training 

889
00:36:28,409 --> 00:36:30,631
at the Nevada test and training range . 

890
00:36:30,631 --> 00:36:32,465
I know , you know , all this and 

891
00:36:32,465 --> 00:36:34,298
unfortunately , the existence of 

892
00:36:34,298 --> 00:36:36,520
advanced U A P S in the US airspace and 

893
00:36:36,520 --> 00:36:38,899
over us military installations , um not 

894
00:36:38,909 --> 00:36:41,250
a new phenomenon . The Navy's 

895
00:36:41,260 --> 00:36:43,316
officially acknowledged that between 

896
00:36:43,316 --> 00:36:46,760
2004 and 2021 11 near misses 

897
00:36:46,770 --> 00:36:48,820
occurred involving U A P S that 

898
00:36:48,830 --> 00:36:51,129
required pilot action and follow up 

899
00:36:51,139 --> 00:36:53,629
reports . As a result in 2019 , the 

900
00:36:53,639 --> 00:36:56,090
navy established a protocol for pilots 

901
00:36:56,100 --> 00:36:58,433
to report on their dangerous encounters . 

902
00:36:58,433 --> 00:37:01,004
So , could you speak to any ongoing 

903
00:37:01,014 --> 00:37:03,245
efforts within dod to ensure the safety 

904
00:37:03,254 --> 00:37:06,205
of our aviators with a potential um U A 

905
00:37:06,215 --> 00:37:07,882
P encounter ? And what's your 

906
00:37:07,882 --> 00:37:09,882
relationship with North com ? No ad 

907
00:37:09,882 --> 00:37:11,659
space com when it comes to this 

908
00:37:11,659 --> 00:37:14,685
immediate real time response and how 

909
00:37:14,695 --> 00:37:16,917
they're , they're , they're right there 

910
00:37:16,917 --> 00:37:19,084
in the moment , right ? That's a great 

911
00:37:19,084 --> 00:37:22,250
question . So uh let me start with , um 

912
00:37:22,260 --> 00:37:24,260
you know , my relationship with the 

913
00:37:24,260 --> 00:37:26,260
commands are , are , are , are very 

914
00:37:26,260 --> 00:37:28,149
good . I I just came back from uh 

915
00:37:28,149 --> 00:37:30,204
sitting down with , with General Van 

916
00:37:30,204 --> 00:37:32,316
Huk and all the , all the J staff out 

917
00:37:32,316 --> 00:37:34,204
at North uh a couple of weeks ago 

918
00:37:34,204 --> 00:37:36,427
talking through exactly what we need to 

919
00:37:36,427 --> 00:37:38,538
do to help them get their arms around 

920
00:37:38,538 --> 00:37:41,129
us . Uh We are also working very 

921
00:37:41,139 --> 00:37:43,306
closely with joint staff and the joint 

922
00:37:43,306 --> 00:37:45,820
staff has just been very outstanding in 

923
00:37:45,830 --> 00:37:48,320
helping uh work through policy and 

924
00:37:48,330 --> 00:37:50,386
guidance issues to the forces and to 

925
00:37:50,386 --> 00:37:54,300
the services . And I would like to 

926
00:37:54,310 --> 00:37:56,959
just make sure that we , we message 

927
00:37:56,969 --> 00:37:59,100
back to all of the operators , the 

928
00:37:59,110 --> 00:38:02,959
importance of their uh reporting and 

929
00:38:02,969 --> 00:38:05,080
the fact that you're about to get a , 

930
00:38:05,080 --> 00:38:07,247
you know , a bunch of new requirements 

931
00:38:07,247 --> 00:38:09,302
that we're issuing through the joint 

932
00:38:09,302 --> 00:38:11,409
staff on all of the data that we're 

933
00:38:11,419 --> 00:38:13,850
gonna need you to save and , and report 

934
00:38:13,860 --> 00:38:17,620
back to us . Um It is invaluable and we 

935
00:38:17,629 --> 00:38:19,929
are working to try to , to take the 

936
00:38:19,939 --> 00:38:22,161
most advantage of that to learn what it 

937
00:38:22,161 --> 00:38:24,383
is that we're trying to mitigate to get 

938
00:38:24,383 --> 00:38:27,409
directly to your question . First thing 

939
00:38:27,419 --> 00:38:29,699
that we're doing is normalizing our 

940
00:38:29,709 --> 00:38:31,931
reporting , right ? We're standardizing 

941
00:38:31,931 --> 00:38:33,876
our reporting and the requirements 

942
00:38:33,876 --> 00:38:35,987
associated with that uh guidance from 

943
00:38:35,987 --> 00:38:38,153
the joint staff I think goes out maybe 

944
00:38:38,153 --> 00:38:40,570
this week , um maybe next week uh that 

945
00:38:40,580 --> 00:38:42,691
we've been working with them for some 

946
00:38:42,691 --> 00:38:44,858
months . That does exactly what I just 

947
00:38:44,858 --> 00:38:46,858
said . It gives them timelines , it 

948
00:38:46,858 --> 00:38:49,191
gives them requirements , it gives them , 

949
00:38:49,191 --> 00:38:51,413
here's all the data you have to have um 

950
00:38:51,413 --> 00:38:53,560
And you got to retain it . The next 

951
00:38:53,570 --> 00:38:55,681
thing that comes after that is a plan 

952
00:38:55,681 --> 00:38:59,610
or that will go out to the commands for 

953
00:38:59,620 --> 00:39:01,787
mitigation and response . So there's a 

954
00:39:01,787 --> 00:39:03,898
couple of things that we have to do . 

955
00:39:04,129 --> 00:39:07,939
One , I need to uh work with uh the 

956
00:39:07,949 --> 00:39:11,260
commands and with the IC and with um 

957
00:39:11,360 --> 00:39:14,110
our outside of our dod and IC partners 

958
00:39:14,120 --> 00:39:16,550
to extend our collection posture 

959
00:39:16,560 --> 00:39:19,530
targeted at some of these key areas 

960
00:39:19,540 --> 00:39:22,679
that you saw on that heat map uh that 

961
00:39:22,689 --> 00:39:25,389
have a lot of activity so that we can 

962
00:39:25,620 --> 00:39:28,110
turn on extra collection when an 

963
00:39:28,120 --> 00:39:30,540
operator sees something . So part of 

964
00:39:30,550 --> 00:39:34,290
this is generating uh it is a response 

965
00:39:34,300 --> 00:39:36,260
function in what we call a tactic 

966
00:39:36,270 --> 00:39:39,229
technique and procedure for an operator . 

967
00:39:39,239 --> 00:39:41,406
When he sees something , calls back to 

968
00:39:41,406 --> 00:39:43,628
the operations floor , they can turn on 

969
00:39:43,628 --> 00:39:45,795
additional collection . What does that 

970
00:39:45,795 --> 00:39:47,906
collection look like ? How do I bring 

971
00:39:47,906 --> 00:39:49,906
all that together so I can get more 

972
00:39:49,906 --> 00:39:51,961
data on ? What is that thing ? Can , 

973
00:39:51,961 --> 00:39:54,183
can I ask really quickly , you have the 

974
00:39:54,183 --> 00:39:56,295
authorities , you need to extend your 

975
00:39:56,295 --> 00:39:58,572
collection process between agencies or , 

976
00:39:58,572 --> 00:40:00,406
or uh branches of the military ? 

977
00:40:00,406 --> 00:40:02,628
Because that seems to me to uh maybe be 

978
00:40:02,628 --> 00:40:04,628
a sticking point . I know my time's 

979
00:40:04,628 --> 00:40:06,739
just about up . I'd love to follow up 

980
00:40:06,739 --> 00:40:08,239
about your risk management 

981
00:40:08,239 --> 00:40:10,350
methodologies for some of these . But 

982
00:40:10,350 --> 00:40:12,406
do you need any authorities that you 

983
00:40:12,406 --> 00:40:14,517
don't have to uh get , get the data ? 

984
00:40:14,517 --> 00:40:16,850
There are some authorities that we need . 

985
00:40:16,850 --> 00:40:19,017
We currently are operating under title 

986
00:40:19,017 --> 00:40:21,017
10 authorities , but we have um you 

987
00:40:21,017 --> 00:40:23,072
know , good relationships across the 

988
00:40:23,072 --> 00:40:25,128
other agencies but having additional 

989
00:40:25,128 --> 00:40:27,183
authorities for collection tasking , 

990
00:40:27,183 --> 00:40:29,183
counterintelligence . Those are all 

991
00:40:29,183 --> 00:40:31,239
things that would be helpful . Yes . 

992
00:40:31,239 --> 00:40:33,017
Thank you to follow up , Doctor 

993
00:40:33,017 --> 00:40:35,072
Kirkpatrick . Will you help us write 

994
00:40:35,072 --> 00:40:34,989
that language so we can put it in the 

995
00:40:35,000 --> 00:40:37,167
defense bill this year so that we know 

996
00:40:37,167 --> 00:40:39,278
what authorities you need . We can do 

997
00:40:39,278 --> 00:40:41,500
that . Thank you . Um We're gonna start 

998
00:40:41,500 --> 00:40:43,722
second round . So if you want to stay , 

999
00:40:43,722 --> 00:40:45,833
you can ask another round . I have at 

1000
00:40:45,833 --> 00:40:48,056
least three more questions . So do , do 

1001
00:40:48,056 --> 00:40:50,278
you wanna do , you wanna go right now ? 

1002
00:40:50,278 --> 00:40:52,611
So you in case you have to leave ? Yeah , 

1003
00:40:52,611 --> 00:40:55,290
go ahead . That would be great . Um I'm 

1004
00:40:55,300 --> 00:40:57,739
gonna stay on the , it should be 

1005
00:40:57,750 --> 00:40:59,806
because obviously , we also have pre 

1006
00:40:59,806 --> 00:41:01,972
pre air force base about those Reapers 

1007
00:41:05,510 --> 00:41:07,780
balloon . It did cross through the US 

1008
00:41:07,790 --> 00:41:10,080
airspace shot down by a sidewinder 

1009
00:41:10,090 --> 00:41:13,959
missile fired from an F-22 sidewinders 

1010
00:41:13,969 --> 00:41:16,679
cost us close to half a million dollars 

1011
00:41:16,689 --> 00:41:19,449
each . So given the cost of these 

1012
00:41:19,459 --> 00:41:21,681
missiles , the cost per flight , all of 

1013
00:41:21,681 --> 00:41:23,903
these other things like I said , follow 

1014
00:41:23,903 --> 00:41:25,515
up on the authorities , your 

1015
00:41:25,515 --> 00:41:27,626
methodologies , the data collection , 

1016
00:41:27,626 --> 00:41:29,681
they can help us in other ways . But 

1017
00:41:29,681 --> 00:41:31,570
how do you think we can develop a 

1018
00:41:31,570 --> 00:41:33,737
sustainable , affordable response to U 

1019
00:41:33,737 --> 00:41:36,389
A P S where we need to um that may , 

1020
00:41:36,399 --> 00:41:38,232
that will definitely violate our 

1021
00:41:38,232 --> 00:41:40,570
airspace not , may definitely violate 

1022
00:41:40,580 --> 00:41:42,860
our airspace every chance that they can 

1023
00:41:42,870 --> 00:41:44,926
get because they are our adversaries 

1024
00:41:44,926 --> 00:41:46,926
and they want this information . So 

1025
00:41:46,926 --> 00:41:49,037
what do you think some cost effective 

1026
00:41:49,037 --> 00:41:51,219
measures might be that we can um get 

1027
00:41:51,229 --> 00:41:53,340
what we need out of that or take them 

1028
00:41:53,340 --> 00:41:55,562
down whatever is appropriate , whatever 

1029
00:41:55,562 --> 00:41:57,729
the appropriate measure is , let's put 

1030
00:41:57,729 --> 00:41:57,409
it that , that , that is actually 

1031
00:41:57,419 --> 00:41:59,419
wrapped into the plan or that we're 

1032
00:41:59,419 --> 00:42:01,586
working with joint staff to send out ? 

1033
00:42:01,586 --> 00:42:03,752
What are the commands need from both a 

1034
00:42:03,752 --> 00:42:05,808
capabilities perspective for kinetic 

1035
00:42:05,808 --> 00:42:08,510
and non kinetic engagements ? What are 

1036
00:42:08,520 --> 00:42:11,189
the response functions of , of the , of 

1037
00:42:11,199 --> 00:42:14,600
the uh particular wings or , or 

1038
00:42:14,610 --> 00:42:18,389
Navy ? Uh what have you and then what 

1039
00:42:18,399 --> 00:42:20,669
authorities do they need ? So one of 

1040
00:42:20,679 --> 00:42:22,846
the , one of the challenges that we've 

1041
00:42:22,846 --> 00:42:24,901
seen is , is , you know , there's an 

1042
00:42:24,901 --> 00:42:27,129
authority issues with the , with the 

1043
00:42:27,139 --> 00:42:30,250
owners , operators of those ranges that 

1044
00:42:30,260 --> 00:42:32,371
they need to work through . And we're 

1045
00:42:32,371 --> 00:42:34,593
working that with the joint staff and , 

1046
00:42:34,593 --> 00:42:38,330
and OS D so big picture , we need to do 

1047
00:42:38,340 --> 00:42:40,451
all that . If you want to get down to 

1048
00:42:40,451 --> 00:42:42,507
the specifics for , you know , there 

1049
00:42:42,507 --> 00:42:44,396
are non kinetic options to engage 

1050
00:42:44,396 --> 00:42:46,396
pretty much everything , right . Uh 

1051
00:42:46,396 --> 00:42:48,284
Whether it's electronic warfare , 

1052
00:42:48,284 --> 00:42:50,062
whether it's , you know , laser 

1053
00:42:50,062 --> 00:42:52,062
technology for this data , having a 

1054
00:42:52,062 --> 00:42:53,951
good data collection , predictive 

1055
00:42:53,951 --> 00:42:57,100
analytics , you can make some 

1056
00:42:57,110 --> 00:42:59,221
assumptions on possibilities . That's 

1057
00:42:59,221 --> 00:43:00,888
right . And we will inform uh 

1058
00:43:00,888 --> 00:43:03,054
recommendations back to the department 

1059
00:43:03,054 --> 00:43:05,110
on . Here's what could work , here's 

1060
00:43:05,110 --> 00:43:07,166
what we've seen , work , here's what 

1061
00:43:07,166 --> 00:43:09,110
doesn't work . Thank you so much . 

1062
00:43:09,110 --> 00:43:11,443
Thank you madam chair . I appreciate it . 

1063
00:43:11,443 --> 00:43:13,443
Thank you very much . Um Can I just 

1064
00:43:13,443 --> 00:43:15,610
wanted to just talk a little bit about 

1065
00:43:15,610 --> 00:43:17,666
your logistics , who you report to , 

1066
00:43:17,666 --> 00:43:19,832
how that's going , uh Whether you need 

1067
00:43:19,832 --> 00:43:21,610
different reporting lines um by 

1068
00:43:21,610 --> 00:43:23,832
congressional legislation . Your office 

1069
00:43:23,832 --> 00:43:25,888
is a Arly located with the office of 

1070
00:43:25,888 --> 00:43:27,777
the undersecretary of Defense for 

1071
00:43:27,777 --> 00:43:29,943
intelligence security , but you're not 

1072
00:43:29,943 --> 00:43:29,695
substantively subordinate to the 

1073
00:43:29,705 --> 00:43:31,594
undersecretary . Rather you are a 

1074
00:43:31,594 --> 00:43:33,816
direct report to the deputy secretary . 

1075
00:43:33,816 --> 00:43:35,983
Are you taking direction directly from 

1076
00:43:35,983 --> 00:43:38,149
the deputy secretary ? Are you able to 

1077
00:43:38,149 --> 00:43:40,261
meet and brief ? The deputy secretary 

1078
00:43:40,261 --> 00:43:43,364
is the office of us D I N s um working 

1079
00:43:43,375 --> 00:43:45,542
with you to have the right framework . 

1080
00:43:46,560 --> 00:43:50,409
So us D I N s and , and the , uh 

1081
00:43:50,419 --> 00:43:53,719
I , I currently report to us D I N s 

1082
00:43:53,729 --> 00:43:57,590
um until they come up with the , the 

1083
00:43:57,600 --> 00:43:59,656
plan for how they're gonna implement 

1084
00:43:59,656 --> 00:44:03,540
legislation . Dod and 

1085
00:44:03,550 --> 00:44:05,899
D and I are working through that . Now , 

1086
00:44:05,909 --> 00:44:08,389
I'd have to refer you back to us D I N 

1087
00:44:08,399 --> 00:44:11,899
S on what their plan is . Um , 

1088
00:44:15,570 --> 00:44:17,669
do I need to update your reporting 

1089
00:44:17,679 --> 00:44:19,790
structure in the next defense bill or 

1090
00:44:19,790 --> 00:44:21,901
is this something that you think will 

1091
00:44:21,901 --> 00:44:23,735
work its way out or does it need 

1092
00:44:23,735 --> 00:44:23,540
further clarity ? I think they're 

1093
00:44:23,550 --> 00:44:25,717
planning on coming back to you with an 

1094
00:44:25,717 --> 00:44:28,149
answer on what that plan is . And I 

1095
00:44:28,159 --> 00:44:30,159
think at that time that will inform 

1096
00:44:30,780 --> 00:44:33,290
what you want to do . Ok , thank you . 

1097
00:44:33,530 --> 00:44:36,659
Um As you know , uh Doctor Kirkpatrick , 

1098
00:44:36,669 --> 00:44:38,836
Congress has mandated that your office 

1099
00:44:38,836 --> 00:44:41,058
establish a discoverable and accessible 

1100
00:44:41,058 --> 00:44:42,836
electronic method for potential 

1101
00:44:42,836 --> 00:44:44,669
witnesses of U A P incidents and 

1102
00:44:44,679 --> 00:44:47,429
potential participants in government U 

1103
00:44:47,439 --> 00:44:49,606
A P related activities to contact your 

1104
00:44:49,606 --> 00:44:51,383
office and tell their stories . 

1105
00:44:51,383 --> 00:44:53,550
Congress also set up a process whereby 

1106
00:44:53,550 --> 00:44:56,100
people subject to non disclosure 

1107
00:44:56,110 --> 00:44:57,999
agreements , preventing them from 

1108
00:44:57,999 --> 00:45:00,221
disclosing what they may have witnessed 

1109
00:45:00,221 --> 00:45:02,388
or participated in could tell you what 

1110
00:45:02,388 --> 00:45:04,388
they know about risk of retribution 

1111
00:45:04,388 --> 00:45:06,443
from the or violation of their N D . 

1112
00:45:06,443 --> 00:45:08,388
Have you submitted a public facing 

1113
00:45:08,388 --> 00:45:10,443
website product for approval to your 

1114
00:45:10,443 --> 00:45:10,189
superiors ? And how long has it been 

1115
00:45:10,199 --> 00:45:14,010
under review ? I have uh we submitted 

1116
00:45:14,020 --> 00:45:16,310
the first version of that uh before 

1117
00:45:16,320 --> 00:45:20,070
Christmas . And do you 

1118
00:45:20,080 --> 00:45:22,136
have an estimate from them when they 

1119
00:45:22,136 --> 00:45:23,969
will respond or when you'll have 

1120
00:45:23,969 --> 00:45:26,899
feedback on that ? No , I don't . Ok . 

1121
00:45:27,080 --> 00:45:29,136
Uh We will offer a letter asking for 

1122
00:45:29,136 --> 00:45:31,889
that timely response um to your 

1123
00:45:31,899 --> 00:45:35,770
superiors . Uh When when do you expect 

1124
00:45:35,780 --> 00:45:38,002
that you will establish a public facing 

1125
00:45:38,002 --> 00:45:41,229
discoverable um and access for , for 

1126
00:45:41,239 --> 00:45:43,461
people to use to contact your office as 

1127
00:45:43,461 --> 00:45:47,310
the law requires . So I would like to 

1128
00:45:47,320 --> 00:45:50,679
first say , thank you all very much for 

1129
00:45:50,689 --> 00:45:52,689
um referring the witnesses that you 

1130
00:45:52,689 --> 00:45:55,080
have thus far to us . I appreciate that 

1131
00:45:55,090 --> 00:45:57,590
we've brought in uh nearly two dozen so 

1132
00:45:57,600 --> 00:45:59,600
far . It's been , it's been very uh 

1133
00:45:59,600 --> 00:46:01,870
helpful . I'd ask that you continue to 

1134
00:46:01,879 --> 00:46:04,300
do that until we have an approved plan . 

1135
00:46:05,010 --> 00:46:07,870
Um We have a multi phased approach for 

1136
00:46:07,879 --> 00:46:10,000
doing that , that we've been uh uh 

1137
00:46:10,010 --> 00:46:13,600
socializing and have submitted for 

1138
00:46:13,610 --> 00:46:17,449
approval some time . Uh 

1139
00:46:17,459 --> 00:46:19,626
And once that happens , then we should 

1140
00:46:19,626 --> 00:46:21,848
be able to push all that out and get uh 

1141
00:46:21,848 --> 00:46:23,959
get this a little more automated . Um 

1142
00:46:23,959 --> 00:46:26,310
What I would ask though is as you all 

1143
00:46:26,320 --> 00:46:29,090
continue to uh refer to us and uh refer 

1144
00:46:29,100 --> 00:46:31,322
witnesses to us , I'd I'd appreciate if 

1145
00:46:31,322 --> 00:46:33,510
you do that . Um Please try to 

1146
00:46:33,520 --> 00:46:35,742
prioritize the ones that you want to do 

1147
00:46:35,742 --> 00:46:38,350
because we do have a small uh research 

1148
00:46:38,360 --> 00:46:41,449
staff dealing with that . Thank you . 

1149
00:46:41,850 --> 00:46:44,229
Um And then do you have any plans for 

1150
00:46:44,239 --> 00:46:46,183
public engagement that you want to 

1151
00:46:46,183 --> 00:46:48,406
share now that you think it's important 

1152
00:46:48,406 --> 00:46:50,683
that the public knows what the plan is ? 

1153
00:46:50,899 --> 00:46:54,790
So we have a um uh a number of 

1154
00:46:54,800 --> 00:46:57,870
public engagement uh recommendations uh 

1155
00:46:57,879 --> 00:47:00,429
according to our strategic plan , um 

1156
00:47:00,439 --> 00:47:03,070
all of those have been submitted for 

1157
00:47:03,080 --> 00:47:05,247
approval , they have to be approved by 

1158
00:47:05,247 --> 00:47:08,429
us D I N s . Um We are waiting for 

1159
00:47:08,439 --> 00:47:10,495
approval to go do that . Ok , I will 

1160
00:47:10,495 --> 00:47:12,717
follow up on that . Um And then my last 

1161
00:47:12,717 --> 00:47:16,560
question is about um the 

1162
00:47:16,570 --> 00:47:18,626
integration of departments , U A P , 

1163
00:47:18,626 --> 00:47:20,681
operations , research , analysis and 

1164
00:47:20,681 --> 00:47:23,510
strategic communications . Um during 

1165
00:47:23,520 --> 00:47:25,631
the recent U A P incidents over North 

1166
00:47:25,631 --> 00:47:27,631
America , it didn't appear that you 

1167
00:47:27,631 --> 00:47:29,810
were allowed to play that role . Um Do 

1168
00:47:29,820 --> 00:47:32,042
you agree that the public perception is 

1169
00:47:32,042 --> 00:47:34,153
generally that you in your office did 

1170
00:47:34,153 --> 00:47:36,320
not appear to play a major role in the 

1171
00:47:36,320 --> 00:47:35,850
department's response to the detection 

1172
00:47:35,860 --> 00:47:38,760
of objects over North America . Uh What 

1173
00:47:38,770 --> 00:47:40,937
can you tell us what's going on behind 

1174
00:47:40,937 --> 00:47:43,103
the scenes from your perspective ? And 

1175
00:47:43,103 --> 00:47:45,381
in the after action assessment process , 

1176
00:47:45,381 --> 00:47:47,603
is there awareness that there is a need 

1177
00:47:47,603 --> 00:47:49,659
to operate differently in the future 

1178
00:47:49,659 --> 00:47:52,379
and a commitment to doing so when the , 

1179
00:47:52,389 --> 00:47:54,610
when the objects were first detected , 

1180
00:47:54,620 --> 00:47:57,850
I got called by joint staff leadership 

1181
00:47:57,860 --> 00:48:01,290
uh to come in uh late one night to 

1182
00:48:01,300 --> 00:48:04,060
review uh events as they were unfold , 

1183
00:48:04,090 --> 00:48:06,820
unfolding and to give them uh uh you 

1184
00:48:06,830 --> 00:48:08,989
know , an assessment based on what we 

1185
00:48:09,000 --> 00:48:12,250
knew at that time . Uh I did that , I 

1186
00:48:12,260 --> 00:48:14,379
worked with uh the director of joint 

1187
00:48:14,389 --> 00:48:17,070
staff , the J two and the J three uh 

1188
00:48:17,080 --> 00:48:18,989
that night and over the couple of 

1189
00:48:19,000 --> 00:48:21,939
following days on what are the types of 

1190
00:48:21,949 --> 00:48:24,270
things that we are tracking from an 

1191
00:48:24,280 --> 00:48:26,447
unidentified object perspective . What 

1192
00:48:26,447 --> 00:48:28,760
databases do we use those sorts of 

1193
00:48:28,770 --> 00:48:31,229
things for , for norm for known objects , 

1194
00:48:31,239 --> 00:48:33,669
known tracking ? Um 

1195
00:48:35,330 --> 00:48:38,479
Beyond that , the response I would have , 

1196
00:48:38,489 --> 00:48:40,600
I would have to refer you back to the 

1197
00:48:40,600 --> 00:48:42,600
White House for the decision on how 

1198
00:48:42,600 --> 00:48:45,820
they did the response . We did not play 

1199
00:48:45,830 --> 00:48:49,100
a role in what you would respond other 

1200
00:48:49,110 --> 00:48:52,250
than that initial , you know , advice 

1201
00:48:52,260 --> 00:48:54,316
on what we are seeing and how we are 

1202
00:48:54,316 --> 00:48:55,316
seeing . 

1203
00:48:58,580 --> 00:49:00,747
Thank you , ma thank you madam chair , 

1204
00:49:00,860 --> 00:49:04,350
um Doctor Kirk Patrick , I , I know 

1205
00:49:04,360 --> 00:49:06,416
that your office has gotten a lot of 

1206
00:49:06,416 --> 00:49:09,870
attention uh recently and of course , 

1207
00:49:09,879 --> 00:49:12,229
any new agency , there tends to be a 

1208
00:49:12,239 --> 00:49:15,290
push to increase size and , and 

1209
00:49:15,300 --> 00:49:17,790
funding . Um We want to make sure that 

1210
00:49:17,800 --> 00:49:20,110
you're able to meet your goals . But 

1211
00:49:20,120 --> 00:49:22,189
what I also need to ensure is that 

1212
00:49:22,199 --> 00:49:24,949
we're not duplicating or replicating 

1213
00:49:24,959 --> 00:49:27,590
existing functions um and creating 

1214
00:49:27,600 --> 00:49:31,149
redundancy within dod and uh the 

1215
00:49:31,159 --> 00:49:33,939
interagency . So what steps are you 

1216
00:49:33,949 --> 00:49:37,129
taking right now to make sure that your 

1217
00:49:37,139 --> 00:49:41,070
particular office and function is , 

1218
00:49:41,080 --> 00:49:44,689
is unique uh to any of the other 

1219
00:49:44,699 --> 00:49:47,120
agencies that might be involved in 

1220
00:49:47,129 --> 00:49:49,407
these types of cases ? Yeah , that's a , 

1221
00:49:49,407 --> 00:49:51,462
that's a great question . So I would 

1222
00:49:51,462 --> 00:49:53,870
like to um lay down here's , here's 

1223
00:49:53,879 --> 00:49:56,270
what I , you know , some of my mission 

1224
00:49:56,280 --> 00:49:58,502
and my goal and my vision here . So the 

1225
00:49:58,502 --> 00:50:01,310
vision is at , at one point at some 

1226
00:50:01,320 --> 00:50:03,679
point in the future , you should not 

1227
00:50:03,689 --> 00:50:06,419
need an arrow . If I'm successful in 

1228
00:50:06,429 --> 00:50:08,540
what I'm doing , we should be able to 

1229
00:50:08,540 --> 00:50:10,780
normalize everything that we're doing 

1230
00:50:10,790 --> 00:50:13,070
into existing processes , functions , 

1231
00:50:13,080 --> 00:50:15,610
agencies and organizations and make 

1232
00:50:15,620 --> 00:50:17,676
that part of their mission and their 

1233
00:50:17,676 --> 00:50:19,731
role . Right now , the niche that we 

1234
00:50:19,731 --> 00:50:23,120
form is really going after the unknowns . 

1235
00:50:23,679 --> 00:50:25,800
If you , I think you articulated it 

1236
00:50:25,810 --> 00:50:28,770
early on , this is a hunt mission for 

1237
00:50:29,149 --> 00:50:31,149
what might somebody be doing in our 

1238
00:50:31,149 --> 00:50:33,939
backyard that we don't know about ? All 

1239
00:50:33,949 --> 00:50:36,005
right . Well , that , that , that is 

1240
00:50:36,005 --> 00:50:38,227
what we are doing , right ? But at some 

1241
00:50:38,227 --> 00:50:40,393
point , we should be able to normalize 

1242
00:50:40,393 --> 00:50:42,616
that . That's why it's so important the 

1243
00:50:42,616 --> 00:50:44,671
work we're doing with joint staff to 

1244
00:50:44,671 --> 00:50:46,909
normalize that into uh dod policy and 

1245
00:50:46,919 --> 00:50:50,419
guidance . We are bringing in all of 

1246
00:50:50,429 --> 00:50:52,750
our interagency partners . So NASA is 

1247
00:50:52,760 --> 00:50:55,449
providing a , a liaison for us . I have 

1248
00:50:55,459 --> 00:50:58,330
FBI liaison , I have O si liaison , I 

1249
00:50:58,340 --> 00:51:02,260
have service liaisons . The I half of 

1250
00:51:02,270 --> 00:51:05,639
my staff come from the IC , half of my 

1251
00:51:05,649 --> 00:51:08,270
staff come from uh other scientific and 

1252
00:51:08,280 --> 00:51:10,520
technical backgrounds . I have D O E uh 

1253
00:51:10,530 --> 00:51:12,739
And so what we're trying to do is 

1254
00:51:12,750 --> 00:51:16,689
ensure , again , as I make U A 

1255
00:51:16,699 --> 00:51:19,810
P into S E P , they get handed off to 

1256
00:51:19,820 --> 00:51:22,209
the people that that is their mission 

1257
00:51:22,219 --> 00:51:25,100
to go to so that we aren't duplicating 

1258
00:51:25,110 --> 00:51:27,590
that I'm not gonna go chase the Chinese 

1259
00:51:27,600 --> 00:51:29,711
high altitude balloon . For example , 

1260
00:51:29,711 --> 00:51:31,933
that's not my job . It's not an unknown 

1261
00:51:31,933 --> 00:51:34,156
and it's not anomalous anymore . Now it 

1262
00:51:34,156 --> 00:51:36,550
goes over to them . Right . Very good . 

1263
00:51:36,560 --> 00:51:40,500
Thank you madam chair . Um I wanted 

1264
00:51:40,510 --> 00:51:43,270
just to follow up on the filters for 

1265
00:51:43,280 --> 00:51:45,391
surveillance . Outside observers have 

1266
00:51:45,391 --> 00:51:47,570
speculated that do D sets filters on 

1267
00:51:47,580 --> 00:51:49,989
certain sensors to eliminate objects 

1268
00:51:50,000 --> 00:51:52,111
that are moving really fast or slow . 

1269
00:51:52,111 --> 00:51:53,889
Because what we are looking for 

1270
00:51:53,889 --> 00:51:55,944
militarily are conventional aircraft 

1271
00:51:55,944 --> 00:51:58,419
and missiles . U A P that doesn't fit 

1272
00:51:58,429 --> 00:52:00,485
into these programs would thereby be 

1273
00:52:00,485 --> 00:52:02,489
weeded out and never noticed . This 

1274
00:52:02,500 --> 00:52:04,667
spec speculation was proven to be true 

1275
00:52:04,667 --> 00:52:06,778
during the U A P incidents over North 

1276
00:52:06,778 --> 00:52:09,000
America where dod publicly acknowledged 

1277
00:52:09,000 --> 00:52:11,222
that we were able to start seeing these 

1278
00:52:11,222 --> 00:52:13,167
U O P only when we opened up these 

1279
00:52:13,167 --> 00:52:15,278
filters . Um Obviously , our military 

1280
00:52:15,278 --> 00:52:17,278
operators cannot be overloaded with 

1281
00:52:17,278 --> 00:52:19,167
objects that are not conventional 

1282
00:52:19,167 --> 00:52:20,889
aircraft or missiles . Can you 

1283
00:52:20,889 --> 00:52:23,111
nonetheless make sure that the raw data 

1284
00:52:23,111 --> 00:52:25,056
is being captured and subsequently 

1285
00:52:25,056 --> 00:52:27,278
processed that your office knows what's 

1286
00:52:27,278 --> 00:52:29,500
really out there ? And is that going to 

1287
00:52:29,500 --> 00:52:31,722
cost money ? Will you expect to pay for 

1288
00:52:31,722 --> 00:52:34,320
that money out of arrows ? Budget ? One 

1289
00:52:34,330 --> 00:52:36,497
of the key tenets that we're trying to 

1290
00:52:36,497 --> 00:52:39,080
do in our science plan is understand 

1291
00:52:39,090 --> 00:52:42,040
what those signatures are . So we get 

1292
00:52:42,050 --> 00:52:45,260
all the raw , for example , radar data 

1293
00:52:45,409 --> 00:52:49,129
prior to the scrubbing and filtering to 

1294
00:52:49,139 --> 00:52:51,028
allow it to enter into our weapon 

1295
00:52:51,028 --> 00:52:54,310
systems and our detection systems , we 

1296
00:52:54,320 --> 00:52:56,929
are now taking all that data and cross 

1297
00:52:56,939 --> 00:52:59,439
correlating it to what pilots are 

1298
00:52:59,449 --> 00:53:01,179
saying they're seeing or other 

1299
00:53:01,189 --> 00:53:04,159
observations from other operators . 

1300
00:53:05,840 --> 00:53:08,129
What that allows us to do is then see 

1301
00:53:08,139 --> 00:53:10,929
if there are any , any signatures in 

1302
00:53:10,939 --> 00:53:14,080
that data that I can pull out generate 

1303
00:53:14,409 --> 00:53:16,939
uh what we'll call automatic target 

1304
00:53:16,949 --> 00:53:19,489
recognition algorithms that allow us to 

1305
00:53:19,500 --> 00:53:22,250
then use that signature associated with 

1306
00:53:22,260 --> 00:53:25,909
a observed U A P . Whatever that U A P 

1307
00:53:25,919 --> 00:53:29,409
may be , we will then make those 

1308
00:53:29,419 --> 00:53:32,199
recommendations of what those changes 

1309
00:53:32,209 --> 00:53:34,320
should be back to the department . So 

1310
00:53:34,320 --> 00:53:36,600
the Deputy secretary asked me last 

1311
00:53:36,610 --> 00:53:39,719
October to make those recommendations . 

1312
00:53:39,729 --> 00:53:41,673
What changes do we need to make to 

1313
00:53:41,673 --> 00:53:45,060
radars , to uh platforms , to detection 

1314
00:53:45,070 --> 00:53:47,340
systems and algorithms to , to pull on 

1315
00:53:47,350 --> 00:53:49,350
those , those algorithms make those 

1316
00:53:49,350 --> 00:53:51,350
changes . That's going to take some 

1317
00:53:51,350 --> 00:53:53,406
time . That's where the research and 

1318
00:53:53,406 --> 00:53:55,739
development comes in , right ? It's not , 

1319
00:53:55,739 --> 00:53:57,794
it's not instantaneous right now . A 

1320
00:53:57,794 --> 00:54:01,290
lot of the I I won't say uh you know , 

1321
00:54:01,300 --> 00:54:04,239
a lot of the , the things that fall 

1322
00:54:04,250 --> 00:54:06,979
outside of the ranges of those filters 

1323
00:54:06,989 --> 00:54:09,320
have been identified by people in the 

1324
00:54:09,330 --> 00:54:11,441
loop and you can't have people in the 

1325
00:54:11,441 --> 00:54:14,580
loop all the time . It's just not cost 

1326
00:54:14,590 --> 00:54:18,070
effective . So part of our budget is 

1327
00:54:18,080 --> 00:54:20,080
working through what is , what does 

1328
00:54:20,090 --> 00:54:22,550
that look like and then making those 

1329
00:54:22,560 --> 00:54:24,790
recommendations back to the big program 

1330
00:54:24,800 --> 00:54:27,750
offices for them to put into changes in 

1331
00:54:27,760 --> 00:54:31,419
that acquisition . My last 

1332
00:54:31,429 --> 00:54:33,151
question is about the academic 

1333
00:54:33,151 --> 00:54:35,179
community . Um Can you give us an 

1334
00:54:35,189 --> 00:54:37,300
update on sort of how you collaborate 

1335
00:54:37,300 --> 00:54:39,959
with the academic community and whether 

1336
00:54:39,969 --> 00:54:42,191
um how the independent study being done 

1337
00:54:42,191 --> 00:54:44,310
by NASA complements Aeros work ? 

1338
00:54:46,340 --> 00:54:48,507
Two questions So I'm gonna , I'm gonna 

1339
00:54:48,507 --> 00:54:51,570
try to make it quick . The uh in 1979 

1340
00:54:52,050 --> 00:54:55,590
Carl Sagan said extraordinary claims 

1341
00:54:55,600 --> 00:54:58,590
require extraordinary evidence . I 

1342
00:54:58,600 --> 00:55:00,711
would go one step further and I would 

1343
00:55:00,711 --> 00:55:03,360
say extraordinary claims require not 

1344
00:55:03,370 --> 00:55:05,148
only extraordinary evidence but 

1345
00:55:05,148 --> 00:55:07,259
extraordinary science . And so how do 

1346
00:55:07,259 --> 00:55:09,203
you do that ? You do that with the 

1347
00:55:09,203 --> 00:55:11,314
scientific method ? Right ? And so as 

1348
00:55:11,314 --> 00:55:13,370
arrow is developing and implementing 

1349
00:55:13,370 --> 00:55:16,439
its science plan , it has to do so 

1350
00:55:16,449 --> 00:55:19,040
grounded in a solid foundation of 

1351
00:55:19,050 --> 00:55:21,820
scientific theory across the entire 

1352
00:55:21,830 --> 00:55:24,540
range of hypotheses that have been 

1353
00:55:24,550 --> 00:55:27,909
presented for what U APR 

1354
00:55:29,669 --> 00:55:33,479
that range spans adversary breakthrough 

1355
00:55:33,489 --> 00:55:36,979
technology on one hand , known objects 

1356
00:55:36,989 --> 00:55:39,360
and phenomena in the middle , all the 

1357
00:55:39,370 --> 00:55:41,139
way to the extreme theories of 

1358
00:55:41,149 --> 00:55:44,429
extraterrestrials . All of that 

1359
00:55:44,659 --> 00:55:48,169
has physics based signatures associated 

1360
00:55:48,179 --> 00:55:50,401
with it , whether it's theoretical from 

1361
00:55:50,401 --> 00:55:53,870
the academic community known from 

1362
00:55:53,879 --> 00:55:57,750
things like hypersonic weapons or uh 

1363
00:55:57,760 --> 00:56:00,169
adversary breakthrough technologies as 

1364
00:56:00,179 --> 00:56:03,129
we've talked about before or the known 

1365
00:56:03,139 --> 00:56:05,195
objects that we have to go measure . 

1366
00:56:06,159 --> 00:56:08,989
The idea is across that entire range . 

1367
00:56:09,000 --> 00:56:11,889
You have to come up with peer reviewed 

1368
00:56:12,969 --> 00:56:15,820
scientific basis for all of it . The 

1369
00:56:15,830 --> 00:56:17,919
academic community plays a very big 

1370
00:56:17,929 --> 00:56:20,820
role on the one end of the spectrum , 

1371
00:56:21,439 --> 00:56:23,661
the intelligence community on the other 

1372
00:56:23,661 --> 00:56:25,383
end of the spectrum . And then 

1373
00:56:25,383 --> 00:56:27,606
measurement in the middle , once I have 

1374
00:56:27,606 --> 00:56:31,290
those signatures identified in in 

1375
00:56:31,300 --> 00:56:35,189
validated peer reviewed um documents , 

1376
00:56:35,199 --> 00:56:37,310
then I have something to point to for 

1377
00:56:37,310 --> 00:56:39,800
all that data because all that data is 

1378
00:56:39,810 --> 00:56:42,088
going to match one of those signatures , 

1379
00:56:42,250 --> 00:56:44,472
right ? And then I can go , well , it's 

1380
00:56:44,472 --> 00:56:47,919
that and not that or it's that and that 

1381
00:56:47,929 --> 00:56:51,500
helps us go through all that where NASA 

1382
00:56:51,510 --> 00:56:54,639
comes in and , and the , the study that 

1383
00:56:54,649 --> 00:56:58,520
they're doing , which I'm supporting 

1384
00:56:58,689 --> 00:57:02,040
is really um 

1385
00:57:02,050 --> 00:57:05,800
looking at the unclassified data 

1386
00:57:05,810 --> 00:57:08,969
sources that might be used to augment 

1387
00:57:08,979 --> 00:57:11,620
our classified data sources to 

1388
00:57:11,629 --> 00:57:13,962
understand if there's a signature there , 

1389
00:57:13,962 --> 00:57:16,080
we can pull on so very similar to the 

1390
00:57:16,090 --> 00:57:17,699
radars but 

1391
00:57:19,469 --> 00:57:21,800
civil capabilities . So for example , 

1392
00:57:21,810 --> 00:57:23,800
we have a lot of Climate science 

1393
00:57:23,810 --> 00:57:26,032
satellites , for example , that look at 

1394
00:57:26,032 --> 00:57:29,229
earth , lots of them . How many of 

1395
00:57:29,239 --> 00:57:32,800
those is the data valuable 

1396
00:57:33,669 --> 00:57:37,120
in seeing these kinds of objects ? The 

1397
00:57:37,129 --> 00:57:40,209
challenge in that is those , those 

1398
00:57:40,219 --> 00:57:42,840
platforms don't necessarily have the 

1399
00:57:42,850 --> 00:57:44,628
resolution you need . So if you 

1400
00:57:44,628 --> 00:57:46,800
remember the slide , I put up there 

1401
00:57:46,810 --> 00:57:48,699
with the trends , the size of the 

1402
00:57:48,699 --> 00:57:51,239
objects we're looking for are typically 

1403
00:57:51,250 --> 00:57:54,739
reported to be 1 to 4 m . Well , the 

1404
00:57:54,750 --> 00:57:56,669
resolution of many of the climate 

1405
00:57:56,679 --> 00:57:59,739
science , civil um you know , civil 

1406
00:57:59,750 --> 00:58:02,399
satellites is much larger than that , 

1407
00:58:02,409 --> 00:58:04,353
which means you'd have a hard time 

1408
00:58:04,353 --> 00:58:06,409
picking out something that's smaller 

1409
00:58:06,409 --> 00:58:09,580
than a pixel on the imagery on the data . 

1410
00:58:09,929 --> 00:58:11,818
That's not to say all of it's not 

1411
00:58:11,818 --> 00:58:13,985
useful . And there are ways of pulling 

1412
00:58:13,985 --> 00:58:15,985
through that data and going through 

1413
00:58:15,985 --> 00:58:18,096
that is what NASA is focused on right 

1414
00:58:18,096 --> 00:58:20,151
now . So what is what are some other 

1415
00:58:20,151 --> 00:58:22,207
data sources that could be used ? In 

1416
00:58:22,207 --> 00:58:24,373
addition , things like open source and 

1417
00:58:24,373 --> 00:58:26,939
crowdsourcing of , of data . We're 

1418
00:58:26,949 --> 00:58:29,350
exploring public private partnerships , 

1419
00:58:29,360 --> 00:58:31,304
ma'am . As you know , we've talked 

1420
00:58:31,304 --> 00:58:34,209
about in the past to look at , is there 

1421
00:58:34,219 --> 00:58:38,219
a way to smartly crowd source 

1422
00:58:38,229 --> 00:58:41,840
additional data that might be useful to 

1423
00:58:41,850 --> 00:58:44,310
augment some of my classified sources ? 

1424
00:58:45,610 --> 00:58:47,777
And what does that look like ? And how 

1425
00:58:47,777 --> 00:58:49,610
would we do it so that we're not 

1426
00:58:49,610 --> 00:58:51,721
overwhelmed by , you know , everybody 

1427
00:58:51,721 --> 00:58:53,443
who wants to take a picture of 

1428
00:58:53,443 --> 00:58:53,179
everything , 

1429
00:58:58,840 --> 00:59:00,896
like to tell the committee before we 

1430
00:59:00,896 --> 00:59:02,951
close or do you have another round ? 

1431
00:59:02,951 --> 00:59:05,118
Yeah . Do you have anything else you'd 

1432
00:59:05,118 --> 00:59:04,830
like to tell the committee before we 

1433
00:59:04,840 --> 00:59:06,889
close ? Thank you very much for 

1434
00:59:06,899 --> 00:59:09,066
allowing us to come and share a little 

1435
00:59:09,066 --> 00:59:11,288
bit of insight into what arrow is up to 

1436
00:59:11,288 --> 00:59:13,288
and what we're doing . I hope to be 

1437
00:59:13,288 --> 00:59:15,399
able to share a whole lot more in the 

1438
00:59:15,399 --> 00:59:17,621
future . Um We have a lot of work to do 

1439
00:59:17,621 --> 00:59:20,050
so if you don't hear from me outside , 

1440
00:59:20,060 --> 00:59:22,282
it's because we've got a lot of work to 

1441
00:59:22,282 --> 00:59:24,449
do . Well , thank you so much , Doctor 

1442
00:59:24,449 --> 00:59:26,449
Cappa . Thank you for the hearing . 

1443
00:59:26,449 --> 00:59:26,010
Thank you .