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That the chair be authorized to declare 

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a recess at any time without objection . 

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So ordered , I'd like to begin by 

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welcoming our witnesses who are here 

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today . We have Mr John Hill , the 

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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

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for Space and Missile Defense Policy . 

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We have another John Hill , Vice 

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Admiral Hill , the director of the 

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missile defense agency . We have 

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Lieutenant General Carb from us . Army 

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Space and Missile Defense command . 

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General Carb was great visiting with 

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you last week in Huntsville and seeing 

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all the work you and your team are 

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doing . And finally , we have Major 

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General David Miller , Director of 

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Operations for Space Command . This 

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will likely be the last time that we 

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have Vice Admiral Hill and Lieutenant 

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General Carb before our subcommittee . 

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Thank you both for your decades of 

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service and for the sacrifices your 

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families have made as well . Our 

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country is stronger and safer because 

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of your tireless dedication and 

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sacrifices that accompany your service . 

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I offer heartfelt thanks for myself and 

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the members of this committee for it . 

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And now on to the topic of the day 

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missile defense , missile defense 

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policy has shifted from a partisan 

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issue years ago . To one where there is 

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much more consensus today . One of the 

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driving factors behind this shift is 

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the aggressive actions and advancing 

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military capabilities of China and 

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Russia . It's challenging to argue as 

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some have that us missile defenses are 

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destabilizing when Russia's Moscow 

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missile defense system alone has 68 

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interceptors , more than the total 

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number of us ground based interceptors 

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and they are armed with nuclear 

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warheads . And just last week , China 

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claims to have conducted a successful 

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Midco intercept test . In addition to 

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China and Russia's actions , North 

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Korea and Iran are growing rogue 

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threats . North Korea just last week 

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conducted a flight test of a solid 

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fueled ICBM , a new capability for its 

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military . That is the result of its 

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unprecedented pace of missile tests 

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over the past year . And Iran has 

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multiple space launch vehicle programs 

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that in my opinion , are nothing more 

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than flimsy cover for an ICBM program . 

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Missile defense policy has evolved in 

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places like Ukraine and Israel as we 

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have seen how it is executed in real 

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world operations . This is especially 

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true given what Israel has been able to 

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do with iron dome to protect its 

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citizens and recent advancements it has 

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made with the iron beam directed energy 

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program in Ukraine . Vladimir Putin's 

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unprovoked and unsuccessful invasion 

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attempt has been stifled by missile 

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defenses of critical military assets 

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and population centers through both 

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conflicts . It's proven that missile 

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defenses save lives and buys time for 

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senior leaders to make decisions 

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regarding how to respond . Missile 

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defense of the American homeland 

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provides similar benefits . If for some 

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misguided reason , an adversary would 

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attack our territory . We need to be 

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able to take out as many incoming 

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missiles , incoming missiles as 

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possible , saving lives and providing 

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senior leaders additional time to 

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calibrate an appropriate response . 

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Furthermore , more knowing that we can 

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defend our country and our people 

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deters an adversary from even 

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considering an attack on our homeland 

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in the first place . This is inherently 

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stabilizing . There are some other 

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issues I hope our witnesses will 

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address today . I hope we will hear how 

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vital that spectrum is to our homeland 

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missile defenses . If we get the 

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current spectrum spectrum debate wrong , 

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there will be unfathomable consequences 

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on our missile defense capabilities . 

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These consequences include an 

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overwhelming financial cost that we 

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would shoulder to replace our current 

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systems and the unimaginable capability 

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gap that would occur in the interim . 

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With this in mind . I hope we get an 

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update on the next generation N G I 

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interceptor program and hear how dod 

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and Congress can work together to 

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accelerate it . Buying only 20 N G I s 

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doesn't make sense to me . And instead 

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we need to look at a full replacement 

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of the current fleet for a total of 64 . 

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I am also interested in having a 

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discussion about reenergizing plans to 

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field additional interceptors in 

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upstate New York which General Milley 

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gave his support to earlier . This 

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month . We can't wait for Iran to test 

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an I BC M ICBM . Before we begin 

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construction on an east coast site , we 

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know from site construction in Alaska 

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that this will be a multi year project . 

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So it is best to get started . Now on 

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Monday , I was able to attend the space 

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symposium in my home district of 

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Colorado Springs . I guess that was 

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just yesterday . Time flies based on 

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current trajectories in military 

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technology and the innovation of the 

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private sector . It's clear that the 

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future of missile defense is 

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increasingly becoming space based . I 

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hope we can address this issue sometime 

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during our classified session later 

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this afternoon . One example of this 

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that we can discuss here and now is a 

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high priority program for me and that 

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is the H BT S S constellation . This 

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will provide the sensing tracking and 

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fire control needed for hypersonic and 

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other missile defense . Two of these 

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payloads will launch this year while 

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the rest of the constellation will 

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follow in a few years . I also hope to 

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hear from our policy witnesses as to 

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why we are settling for President 

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Biden's limited budget request for the 

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glide phase interceptor or GP that 

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doesn't get us a capability until the 

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mid 2030 . S given the rapid pace 

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with which our adversaries are pursuing 

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and fielding hypersonic systems . I am 

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eager to hear ideas from both from dod 

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on how to pull both H BT S S and 

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GP I to the left on this issue , many 

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of us in Congress feel a sense of 

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urgency that does not seem to be shared 

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by the executive branch . And that is a 

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problem for our national security . 

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With that . I turn to the ranking 

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member for his opening remarks . 

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Thank you , Mr Chairman uh Vice Admiral 

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Hill . Uh During your 38 years of 

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service , you've been committed to the 

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development and deployment of at sea 

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and land based missile defense 

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capabilities for not only the United 

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States but for our allies and partners 

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around the world . You have played a 

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critical role across the army's 

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artillery and air , air and missile 

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defense communities to address the 

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growing threat to our forces and have 

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had a unique purview across both the 

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space and missile defense missions . 

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Your collective achievements for our 

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security , for the safety of every one 

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of us in this room have entailed 

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sacrifices for your families , not to 

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mention the professional burdens and 

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responsibilities that you have so often 

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uh carried heavily on your shoulders . 

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So , gentlemen , thank you . You have 

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my sincerest appreciation as you 

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culminate extraordinary military 

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careers . It's appropriate and 

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important to begin our discussion this 

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afternoon by acknowledging that unlike 

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your impeccable military careers , 

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missile defense and defeat has a mixed 

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legacy and continues to pose difficult 

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questions about what its purpose is and 

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should be under what conditions it 

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actually makes us safer and therefore 

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how much and what kind of it we need as 

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a committee , it is important for us to 

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evaluate these budget requests with a 

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clear understanding of the strategic 

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logic behind them . And so I think it's 

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helpful to frame the conversation with 

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the discussion of the scenarios or 

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levels in which we use or don't use 

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missile defense . I'm aided by this 

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chart behind me . The highest possible 

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level of missile defense is the 

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strategic level which means deterring 

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or defeating a nuclear attack on the 

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United States by a near peer adversary 

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as President Reagan's fanciful and 

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infamous star wars program envisioned 

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as both the chairman and I discussed 

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during a recent C SI S panel and as 

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affirmed by both the Trump and Biden 

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administrations in the 2019 and 2022 

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missile defense reviews . This is not 

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an area where the US is pursuing nor 

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should pursue missile defense going 

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down this road would not only be 

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prohibitively expensive but 

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fundamentally destabilizing . Of course , 

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the crazy logic of atomic peace is 

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achieved through mutual vulnerability 

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where no major nuclear power would 

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launch a nuclear attack because they 

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know we all know that the result would 

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be nuclear holocaust until we can 

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safely rid the world of nuclear weapons 

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which I believe is ultimately necessary 

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for the survival of humanity itself . 

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We can neither unilaterally disarm nor 

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unilaterally render useless . Our 

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adversaries arsenals . If we were to 

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try to render our adversaries missiles 

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incapable , they would simply develop 

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new ones to defeat our defenses . As we 

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have seen with our adversaries 

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deploying increasingly sophisticated 

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maneuvering weapons to evade current us 

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missile defense radars . We should 

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always remember that the US decision to 

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leave the anti ballistic missile treaty 

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in 2002 to develop a homeland missile 

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defense system in response to 

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advancements by the D . Pr K can almost 

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directly be tied to both the Chinese 

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Communist Party and Russia pursuing 

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more advanced ballistic cruise and 

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hypersonic missiles . And the result 

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has been to make the balance of power 

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between nuclear superpowers 

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fundamentally less stable as multiple 

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general officers have restated before 

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this committee . In the past month , we 

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deter our near peer nuclear adversaries 

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with our own safe , secure and reliable 

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nuclear forces . Now the next level 

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down to to the fourth level is the area 

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where there is the most debate and that 

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is limited the limited capability to 

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address rogue nations . This is where 

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our current ground based missile 

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defense system in the next generation 

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interceptor fit in . And this is where 

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we can argue that our advancements in 

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missile defense over the past two 

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decades since pulling out of the A B M 

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treaty have provided a security blanket 

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against aspiring nuclear powers like 

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North Korea and Iran . However , it 

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should not be lost on the subcommittee 

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that during the latest parade , North 

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Korea showcased 11 K N 22 ICBM S . The 

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publicly stated shot doctrine for the G 

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MD system is 4 to 5 interceptors per 

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one incoming ICBM . Given the fact that 

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we currently have 44 emplaced 

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interceptors . So 11 times four for 

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anyone rusty on elementary school 

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00:10:45,829 --> 00:10:48,390
arithmetic . If North Korea gets just 

278
00:10:48,400 --> 00:10:50,979
one more ICBM capable of reaching the 

279
00:10:50,989 --> 00:10:53,299
United States , we won't have enough 

280
00:10:53,309 --> 00:10:56,030
interceptors . We therefore are in an 

281
00:10:56,039 --> 00:10:58,250
arms race today with North Korea . 

282
00:10:58,260 --> 00:11:00,093
Exactly the arms race , the anti 

283
00:11:00,093 --> 00:11:02,204
ballistic missile treaty was designed 

284
00:11:02,204 --> 00:11:04,140
to stop and at some point , if we 

285
00:11:04,150 --> 00:11:06,317
continue to expand our current arsenal 

286
00:11:06,317 --> 00:11:09,039
of interceptors , we must ask not just 

287
00:11:09,049 --> 00:11:11,409
how North Korea will respond but how 

288
00:11:11,419 --> 00:11:13,530
Russia and the C C P will respond as 

289
00:11:13,539 --> 00:11:15,690
well as they see a pathway for our 

290
00:11:15,700 --> 00:11:17,539
missile shield to impact their 

291
00:11:17,549 --> 00:11:19,960
deterrent . I hope that in today's 

292
00:11:19,969 --> 00:11:21,802
discussion , Mr Hill can help us 

293
00:11:21,802 --> 00:11:23,636
understand how the Department of 

294
00:11:23,636 --> 00:11:25,580
Defense is weighing that important 

295
00:11:25,580 --> 00:11:27,802
question . At what point will this arms 

296
00:11:27,802 --> 00:11:30,299
race provoke a response from Russia and 

297
00:11:30,309 --> 00:11:32,460
the C C P ? And therefore , at what 

298
00:11:32,469 --> 00:11:34,636
point do we move North Korea's nuclear 

299
00:11:34,636 --> 00:11:37,359
arsenal from category four , category 

300
00:11:37,369 --> 00:11:39,349
five , which we deter with our own 

301
00:11:39,359 --> 00:11:42,940
nuclear response . We must all 

302
00:11:42,950 --> 00:11:45,006
recognize that decisions like that . 

303
00:11:45,006 --> 00:11:47,228
Indeed , decisions that we make on this 

304
00:11:47,228 --> 00:11:49,006
sub subcommittee this year have 

305
00:11:49,006 --> 00:11:50,894
implications not just for meeting 

306
00:11:50,894 --> 00:11:52,839
today's tactical threats , but for 

307
00:11:52,839 --> 00:11:54,929
ensuring the strategic stability of 

308
00:11:54,940 --> 00:11:57,299
America and the world for decades to 

309
00:11:57,309 --> 00:11:59,531
come . Now , the third level of missile 

310
00:11:59,531 --> 00:12:01,309
defense , the nuance I think is 

311
00:12:01,309 --> 00:12:03,420
important to distinguish from a rogue 

312
00:12:03,420 --> 00:12:05,531
nation because the size of a homeland 

313
00:12:05,531 --> 00:12:05,270
system required to deal with . It is 

314
00:12:05,280 --> 00:12:07,113
very different . And that is the 

315
00:12:07,113 --> 00:12:09,169
incidence of anyone including a near 

316
00:12:09,169 --> 00:12:10,836
peer adversary from having an 

317
00:12:10,836 --> 00:12:12,669
accidental launch . The chairman 

318
00:12:12,669 --> 00:12:14,836
referenced this in his testimony , his 

319
00:12:14,836 --> 00:12:16,780
statement as well . Any student of 

320
00:12:16,780 --> 00:12:18,891
history understands how close to this 

321
00:12:18,891 --> 00:12:18,690
possibility we have come in the past 

322
00:12:18,780 --> 00:12:20,669
and having some ability to defend 

323
00:12:20,669 --> 00:12:22,836
against a small even single accidental 

324
00:12:22,836 --> 00:12:25,460
launch should be maintained . Level two , 

325
00:12:25,469 --> 00:12:27,469
which we are seeing play out on the 

326
00:12:27,469 --> 00:12:29,358
battlefield today is what we call 

327
00:12:29,358 --> 00:12:31,413
regional missile defense . There's a 

328
00:12:31,413 --> 00:12:31,130
big difference between level three and 

329
00:12:31,140 --> 00:12:33,251
level two from taking out a strategic 

330
00:12:33,251 --> 00:12:35,196
intercontinental nuclear weapon to 

331
00:12:35,196 --> 00:12:37,140
stopping theater level missiles in 

332
00:12:37,140 --> 00:12:39,362
current conflicts . Systems such as the 

333
00:12:39,362 --> 00:12:41,599
patriot that and the A S B MD system 

334
00:12:41,780 --> 00:12:44,539
are the cornerstone of regional missile 

335
00:12:44,549 --> 00:12:47,979
defense . And uh and the the investment 

336
00:12:47,989 --> 00:12:50,045
being made in this budget request to 

337
00:12:50,045 --> 00:12:52,045
improve these systems are needed to 

338
00:12:52,045 --> 00:12:53,989
meet increasingly complex short to 

339
00:12:53,989 --> 00:12:55,989
intermediate weapons that have been 

340
00:12:55,989 --> 00:12:58,100
proliferated around the world . We've 

341
00:12:58,100 --> 00:13:00,045
seen these at work in action . The 

342
00:13:00,045 --> 00:13:02,267
incredible support Ukraine has received 

343
00:13:02,267 --> 00:13:04,267
from allies and partners in the air 

344
00:13:04,267 --> 00:13:04,080
missile defense has enabled them to 

345
00:13:04,090 --> 00:13:06,700
fight back against near non stop 

346
00:13:06,710 --> 00:13:08,877
Russian missile attacks . Missiles are 

347
00:13:08,877 --> 00:13:11,099
an integral part of modern way of war . 

348
00:13:11,099 --> 00:13:12,932
And so this too is important for 

349
00:13:12,932 --> 00:13:14,909
missile defense . Ukraine has also 

350
00:13:14,919 --> 00:13:16,929
reaffirmed the power of the higher 

351
00:13:16,940 --> 00:13:18,829
level strategic nuclear stability 

352
00:13:18,829 --> 00:13:21,051
between nations even in the presence of 

353
00:13:21,051 --> 00:13:23,273
regional missile defense because it has 

354
00:13:23,273 --> 00:13:25,989
not resulted in any strategic nuclear 

355
00:13:26,000 --> 00:13:28,599
exchange . But we must be cognizant of 

356
00:13:28,609 --> 00:13:30,720
the danger of crossing this line when 

357
00:13:30,720 --> 00:13:32,942
developing theater level defenses could 

358
00:13:32,942 --> 00:13:34,887
be interpreted to impact strategic 

359
00:13:34,887 --> 00:13:37,520
stability . The final piece of missile 

360
00:13:37,530 --> 00:13:39,863
defense is the foundation of all levels , 

361
00:13:39,863 --> 00:13:41,919
level one and that is the ability to 

362
00:13:41,919 --> 00:13:43,808
detect and track threats from the 

363
00:13:43,808 --> 00:13:43,770
moment they're launched throughout 

364
00:13:43,780 --> 00:13:45,947
their flight . And up until they reach 

365
00:13:45,947 --> 00:13:48,058
their , their target , our ability to 

366
00:13:48,058 --> 00:13:50,280
see an incoming threat is what gives us 

367
00:13:50,280 --> 00:13:52,336
decisions based to react and respond 

368
00:13:52,336 --> 00:13:54,558
either offensively or defensively . And 

369
00:13:54,558 --> 00:13:56,780
this is an area where this subcommittee 

370
00:13:56,780 --> 00:13:58,947
has consistently pushed the department 

371
00:13:58,947 --> 00:14:00,891
to address it's a place where more 

372
00:14:00,891 --> 00:14:02,836
investment and better capabilities 

373
00:14:02,836 --> 00:14:04,891
unquestionably make us more safe and 

374
00:14:04,891 --> 00:14:06,669
the world more stable . And I'm 

375
00:14:06,669 --> 00:14:08,836
encouraged that the administration has 

376
00:14:08,836 --> 00:14:10,669
requested over $6 billion across 

377
00:14:10,669 --> 00:14:12,780
several programs to develop , improve 

378
00:14:12,780 --> 00:14:14,780
and expand the capabilities of both 

379
00:14:14,780 --> 00:14:17,002
land and space based missile centers to 

380
00:14:17,002 --> 00:14:19,113
address more complex threats that our 

381
00:14:19,113 --> 00:14:21,169
adversaries are developing . When we 

382
00:14:21,169 --> 00:14:23,391
look at this complicated multilevel and 

383
00:14:23,391 --> 00:14:25,502
multi layered picture , it is easy to 

384
00:14:25,502 --> 00:14:27,836
be overwhelmed . This is esoteric stuff , 

385
00:14:27,836 --> 00:14:30,058
but it is vitally important that we get 

386
00:14:30,058 --> 00:14:31,836
it right , not just for our own 

387
00:14:31,836 --> 00:14:33,613
national security , but for the 

388
00:14:33,613 --> 00:14:35,669
security of humanity itself . Taking 

389
00:14:35,669 --> 00:14:38,659
the narrow view , it is an easy vote to 

390
00:14:38,669 --> 00:14:41,320
buy a few more interceptors , but it is 

391
00:14:41,330 --> 00:14:43,497
up to us in this room to recognize the 

392
00:14:43,497 --> 00:14:46,349
much longer term strategic implications 

393
00:14:46,570 --> 00:14:48,403
for the narrow authorization and 

394
00:14:48,403 --> 00:14:51,580
budgeting decisions we make today as an 

395
00:14:51,590 --> 00:14:54,559
American citizen , having a robust 

396
00:14:54,570 --> 00:14:56,792
layered missile defense system makes me 

397
00:14:56,792 --> 00:14:58,770
feel more safe and secure this 

398
00:14:58,780 --> 00:15:01,130
afternoon and buying a few more 

399
00:15:01,140 --> 00:15:03,140
interceptors would probably make me 

400
00:15:03,140 --> 00:15:05,084
feel a little bit more comfortable 

401
00:15:05,084 --> 00:15:07,196
tomorrow . But when I think about the 

402
00:15:07,196 --> 00:15:09,196
world , we will leave to my two and 

403
00:15:09,196 --> 00:15:11,196
four year old daughters . I am less 

404
00:15:11,196 --> 00:15:13,530
sure how will expanding us missile 

405
00:15:13,539 --> 00:15:16,390
defense today impact strategic 

406
00:15:16,400 --> 00:15:19,080
stability tomorrow . We are already in 

407
00:15:19,090 --> 00:15:21,530
an arms race . Will it make our world 

408
00:15:21,669 --> 00:15:24,650
more safe ? That is the discussion that 

409
00:15:24,659 --> 00:15:27,590
we have too often glossed over or left 

410
00:15:27,599 --> 00:15:29,750
for another day on this subcommittee 

411
00:15:29,760 --> 00:15:32,030
and in Congress and it is a discussion 

412
00:15:32,039 --> 00:15:34,679
in the debate that we must have the 

413
00:15:34,690 --> 00:15:37,400
political and intellectual courage to 

414
00:15:37,409 --> 00:15:40,479
resolve . Thanks , Chairman , our first 

415
00:15:40,489 --> 00:15:42,609
witness will be Mr John Hill , Deputy 

416
00:15:42,619 --> 00:15:44,563
Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

417
00:15:44,563 --> 00:15:46,675
Space and missile defense . The floor 

418
00:15:46,675 --> 00:15:49,010
is yours . Thank you , Chairman Lamborn , 

419
00:15:49,020 --> 00:15:50,687
ranking member , Moultrie and 

420
00:15:50,687 --> 00:15:52,964
distinguished members of the committee . 

421
00:15:52,964 --> 00:15:54,798
Thank you for the opportunity to 

422
00:15:54,798 --> 00:15:56,964
testify on behalf of the office of the 

423
00:15:56,964 --> 00:15:56,809
Secretary of Defense . I'm honored to 

424
00:15:56,820 --> 00:15:58,487
be alongside my distinguished 

425
00:15:58,487 --> 00:16:00,820
colleagues here on the panel . Uh Today , 

426
00:16:00,820 --> 00:16:02,764
I'm going to review recent missile 

427
00:16:02,764 --> 00:16:04,931
threat developments , provide a policy 

428
00:16:04,931 --> 00:16:07,153
update and explain how the department's 

429
00:16:07,153 --> 00:16:08,931
fiscal year 2024 budget request 

430
00:16:08,931 --> 00:16:11,250
implements our policy . Secretary 

431
00:16:11,260 --> 00:16:13,038
Austin and the national defense 

432
00:16:13,038 --> 00:16:15,149
strategy have made clear the People's 

433
00:16:15,149 --> 00:16:17,260
Republic of China is the department's 

434
00:16:17,260 --> 00:16:19,371
facing challenge while Russia remains 

435
00:16:19,371 --> 00:16:21,427
an acute threat over the past year , 

436
00:16:21,427 --> 00:16:23,538
the PRC continued to develop test and 

437
00:16:23,538 --> 00:16:25,669
field advanced missile systems of all 

438
00:16:25,679 --> 00:16:28,349
classes and ranges . It also launched 

439
00:16:28,359 --> 00:16:30,590
ballistic missiles in unsuccessful 

440
00:16:30,599 --> 00:16:32,766
attempts to intimidate and demonstrate 

441
00:16:32,766 --> 00:16:34,989
a capability to forcefully unify with 

442
00:16:35,000 --> 00:16:38,250
Taiwan Russia conducted thousands of 

443
00:16:38,260 --> 00:16:40,482
missile strikes in Ukraine to terrorize 

444
00:16:40,482 --> 00:16:42,340
the Ukrainian people and degrade 

445
00:16:42,349 --> 00:16:44,349
Ukraine's war fighting capability . 

446
00:16:44,469 --> 00:16:46,630
Iran launched missile attacks into 

447
00:16:46,640 --> 00:16:48,979
neighboring states and provided rockets 

448
00:16:48,989 --> 00:16:51,099
and un aerial systems to non state 

449
00:16:51,109 --> 00:16:53,349
actors who in turn used them to target 

450
00:16:53,359 --> 00:16:56,340
us forces and partners . And North 

451
00:16:56,349 --> 00:16:58,349
Korea showcased an array of missile 

452
00:16:58,349 --> 00:17:01,869
systems including 11 icbms and it 

453
00:17:01,880 --> 00:17:04,089
conducted yet another ICBM test just 

454
00:17:04,099 --> 00:17:07,790
last week . As outlined in the 2022 

455
00:17:07,800 --> 00:17:10,310
national defense strategy , integrated 

456
00:17:10,319 --> 00:17:11,875
deterrence incorporates the 

457
00:17:11,875 --> 00:17:13,763
department's efforts to deter and 

458
00:17:13,763 --> 00:17:16,239
defeat air and missile missile threats . 

459
00:17:16,900 --> 00:17:19,630
Our top two NDS priorities are to 

460
00:17:19,640 --> 00:17:21,920
defend the US homeland , pacing to the 

461
00:17:21,930 --> 00:17:24,670
PRC and to deter strategic attacks 

462
00:17:24,680 --> 00:17:26,780
against the United States allies and 

463
00:17:26,790 --> 00:17:29,869
partners . This includes staying ahead 

464
00:17:29,879 --> 00:17:32,046
of the threat from North Korea through 

465
00:17:32,046 --> 00:17:34,101
improvements to the ground based mid 

466
00:17:34,101 --> 00:17:36,046
course defense system as part of a 

467
00:17:36,046 --> 00:17:38,157
comprehensive missile defeat approach 

468
00:17:38,157 --> 00:17:40,323
complemented by the credible threat of 

469
00:17:40,323 --> 00:17:43,469
direct cost imposition . Our third 

470
00:17:43,479 --> 00:17:45,146
priority is to deter regional 

471
00:17:45,150 --> 00:17:47,206
aggression and prepare to prevail if 

472
00:17:47,206 --> 00:17:49,359
necessary . Prioritizing the PR C in 

473
00:17:49,369 --> 00:17:52,170
the , in the Indo Pacific and Russia in 

474
00:17:52,180 --> 00:17:55,310
Europe . The defense of Guam intersects 

475
00:17:55,319 --> 00:17:58,500
all three of these priorities to defend 

476
00:17:58,510 --> 00:18:00,979
our homeland . We requested $3.3 

477
00:18:00,989 --> 00:18:02,989
billion to improve our ground based 

478
00:18:02,989 --> 00:18:05,790
Midco defense including 2.2 billion for 

479
00:18:05,800 --> 00:18:07,689
the next generation interceptor . 

480
00:18:09,900 --> 00:18:12,122
Our homeland defense priorities include 

481
00:18:12,122 --> 00:18:14,233
1.5 billion for the defense of Guam . 

482
00:18:14,589 --> 00:18:16,760
An increase of over $600 million 

483
00:18:16,770 --> 00:18:20,199
compared to the F Y 23 request , $64 

484
00:18:20,209 --> 00:18:22,098
million to improve the defense of 

485
00:18:22,098 --> 00:18:23,987
Hawaii through investments in air 

486
00:18:23,987 --> 00:18:26,098
surveillance and other capabilities . 

487
00:18:26,098 --> 00:18:29,449
$423 million to continue fielding over 

488
00:18:29,459 --> 00:18:33,089
the horizon radars and nearly $5 

489
00:18:33,099 --> 00:18:34,988
billion for modernizing our space 

490
00:18:34,989 --> 00:18:37,211
capabilities with new missile warning , 

491
00:18:37,211 --> 00:18:39,267
missile tracking and next generation 

492
00:18:39,267 --> 00:18:40,989
overhead , persistent infrared 

493
00:18:40,989 --> 00:18:44,150
architectures for regional defense . 

494
00:18:44,160 --> 00:18:47,130
Our our key priorities include $259 

495
00:18:47,140 --> 00:18:49,307
million for hypersonic missile defense 

496
00:18:49,307 --> 00:18:51,362
sensors and development of the glide 

497
00:18:51,362 --> 00:18:53,418
phase interceptor . $2.2 billion for 

498
00:18:53,418 --> 00:18:55,790
the standard missile three thad and and 

499
00:18:55,800 --> 00:18:58,790
pack three interceptors 1.5 billion to 

500
00:18:58,800 --> 00:19:01,099
counter lower tier missile threats and 

501
00:19:01,109 --> 00:19:03,089
308 million for directed energy 

502
00:19:03,099 --> 00:19:06,069
development missile defense is a 

503
00:19:06,079 --> 00:19:08,859
notable element of our $35 billion of 

504
00:19:08,869 --> 00:19:11,000
support to Ukraine since Russia's 

505
00:19:11,010 --> 00:19:13,540
further invasion last year , Ukraine 

506
00:19:13,550 --> 00:19:15,979
endures today as a sovereign and free 

507
00:19:15,989 --> 00:19:18,390
nation in large part because it made 

508
00:19:18,400 --> 00:19:20,890
air and missile defense top priorities 

509
00:19:20,900 --> 00:19:22,956
as it leveraged extensive assistance 

510
00:19:22,956 --> 00:19:24,844
from the United States , our NATO 

511
00:19:24,844 --> 00:19:26,839
allies and many others . Our 

512
00:19:26,859 --> 00:19:28,526
international missile defense 

513
00:19:28,526 --> 00:19:30,581
cooperation also includes developing 

514
00:19:30,581 --> 00:19:32,526
testing and training together with 

515
00:19:32,526 --> 00:19:34,581
allies and partners around the world 

516
00:19:34,581 --> 00:19:36,637
and supporting them through sales of 

517
00:19:36,637 --> 00:19:40,270
equipment . So in conclusion , missiles 

518
00:19:40,280 --> 00:19:42,550
have become foundational to our 

519
00:19:42,560 --> 00:19:45,479
adversary's way of war . And missile 

520
00:19:45,489 --> 00:19:47,449
defense has become foundational to 

521
00:19:47,459 --> 00:19:49,599
integrated deterrence and defense of 

522
00:19:49,609 --> 00:19:52,199
the nation . To that end , the best 

523
00:19:52,209 --> 00:19:54,265
thing Congress can do to support the 

524
00:19:54,265 --> 00:19:56,369
war fighter is pass on time . The 

525
00:19:56,380 --> 00:19:58,269
Defense and Military Construction 

526
00:19:58,269 --> 00:20:00,680
Appropriations Act . Thank you for your 

527
00:20:00,689 --> 00:20:02,522
attention . I'm prepared to take 

528
00:20:02,522 --> 00:20:04,745
questions . Thank you . We'll next hear 

529
00:20:04,745 --> 00:20:06,911
from Vice Admiral John Hill , director 

530
00:20:06,911 --> 00:20:08,856
of the missile defense agency , uh 

531
00:20:08,856 --> 00:20:11,022
chairman Lamborn , uh ranking member , 

532
00:20:11,022 --> 00:20:12,633
uh Molton , distinguished uh 

533
00:20:12,633 --> 00:20:14,689
subcommittee members . Thank you for 

534
00:20:14,689 --> 00:20:14,619
the opportunity to talk to you about 

535
00:20:14,630 --> 00:20:16,630
missile defense today . I'd like to 

536
00:20:16,630 --> 00:20:18,797
take a quick moment to thank the women 

537
00:20:18,797 --> 00:20:20,908
and men of the missile defense agency 

538
00:20:20,908 --> 00:20:22,963
who focus on developing , delivering 

539
00:20:22,963 --> 00:20:25,186
and supporting the services to meet the 

540
00:20:25,186 --> 00:20:24,520
joint requirements of our command 

541
00:20:24,530 --> 00:20:26,829
commands with credible capabilities to 

542
00:20:26,839 --> 00:20:28,728
counter ballistic maneuvering and 

543
00:20:28,728 --> 00:20:30,950
hypersonic missile threats to summarize 

544
00:20:30,950 --> 00:20:33,061
the threat . I would call it uh large 

545
00:20:33,061 --> 00:20:35,006
numbers , uh high speeds and heavy 

546
00:20:35,006 --> 00:20:37,006
maneuver . Those are the challenges 

547
00:20:37,006 --> 00:20:38,880
today . And for tomorrow , we're 

548
00:20:38,890 --> 00:20:41,112
requesting 10.9 billion to continue our 

549
00:20:41,112 --> 00:20:43,168
mission to , to meet these threats . 

550
00:20:43,168 --> 00:20:45,112
And I'm going to talk to you about 

551
00:20:45,112 --> 00:20:47,057
three priorities . Uh The first is 

552
00:20:47,057 --> 00:20:49,223
homeland defense level four and then I 

553
00:20:49,223 --> 00:20:51,334
will talk about the priority for Guam 

554
00:20:51,334 --> 00:20:51,300
and then the priority for hypersonic 

555
00:20:51,310 --> 00:20:53,477
missile defense which are at the level 

556
00:20:53,477 --> 00:20:55,588
two of missile defense . So the first 

557
00:20:55,588 --> 00:20:57,366
party of homeland defense which 

558
00:20:57,366 --> 00:20:59,588
includes Alaska and Hawaii , the ground 

559
00:20:59,588 --> 00:21:01,532
based Midco defense , as mentioned 

560
00:21:01,532 --> 00:21:03,588
earlier , has protected the homeland 

561
00:21:03,588 --> 00:21:03,099
from rogue nation ballistic missile 

562
00:21:03,109 --> 00:21:05,510
attacks . Since 2004 . Our current 

563
00:21:05,520 --> 00:21:07,742
focus is on new capabilities to counter 

564
00:21:07,742 --> 00:21:09,909
the limited but advancing North Korean 

565
00:21:09,909 --> 00:21:12,020
long range ballistic missile threat . 

566
00:21:12,020 --> 00:21:14,187
The GMB system is undergoing a service 

567
00:21:14,187 --> 00:21:16,076
life extension program to improve 

568
00:21:16,076 --> 00:21:16,020
reliability and extend the GB I S 

569
00:21:16,030 --> 00:21:18,890
beyond 2030 . These upgrades mitigate 

570
00:21:18,900 --> 00:21:21,067
the risk until the nation fields . The 

571
00:21:21,067 --> 00:21:23,289
next generation interceptor which is on 

572
00:21:23,289 --> 00:21:25,456
track for first and placement no later 

573
00:21:25,456 --> 00:21:27,622
than the end of 2028 N G I development 

574
00:21:27,622 --> 00:21:29,456
is executing to deliver advanced 

575
00:21:29,456 --> 00:21:31,511
interceptors featuring multiple kill 

576
00:21:31,511 --> 00:21:33,733
vehicle technology which we will add to 

577
00:21:33,733 --> 00:21:35,789
the current fleet of interceptors at 

578
00:21:35,789 --> 00:21:35,469
Fort Greely , Alaska and Vandenberg 

579
00:21:35,479 --> 00:21:38,130
Space Force Base in California on to 

580
00:21:38,140 --> 00:21:40,307
priority two , which is the defense of 

581
00:21:40,307 --> 00:21:42,473
Guam . The department is developing an 

582
00:21:42,473 --> 00:21:44,418
integrated air and missile defense 

583
00:21:44,418 --> 00:21:44,140
system to defend against diverse 

584
00:21:44,150 --> 00:21:46,094
missile threats . Working with the 

585
00:21:46,094 --> 00:21:48,317
service and the agencies we are driving 

586
00:21:48,317 --> 00:21:50,039
to meet NCOS requirement for a 

587
00:21:50,039 --> 00:21:52,206
persistent 360 degrees layered defense 

588
00:21:52,206 --> 00:21:53,983
that capability on Guam against 

589
00:21:53,983 --> 00:21:56,206
simultaneous raids of crews , ballistic 

590
00:21:56,206 --> 00:21:58,428
maneuvering and hypersonic threats . We 

591
00:21:58,428 --> 00:22:00,594
are driving operational capability and 

592
00:22:00,594 --> 00:22:02,706
phases to meet the clear war fighting 

593
00:22:02,706 --> 00:22:04,817
needs as I go to the third priority , 

594
00:22:04,817 --> 00:22:06,650
which is also level two , uh the 

595
00:22:06,650 --> 00:22:08,706
priority of homeland of a hypersonic 

596
00:22:08,706 --> 00:22:10,761
missile defense . This is to counter 

597
00:22:10,761 --> 00:22:10,589
the hypersonic threat . We have 

598
00:22:10,599 --> 00:22:12,710
integrated tracking capabilities into 

599
00:22:12,710 --> 00:22:14,821
existing radars , both ground and sea 

600
00:22:14,821 --> 00:22:17,043
based . That capability is here today . 

601
00:22:17,043 --> 00:22:19,266
Today's sensor architecture and command 

602
00:22:19,266 --> 00:22:21,099
and control can track hypersonic 

603
00:22:21,099 --> 00:22:23,210
threats to support warning and domain 

604
00:22:23,210 --> 00:22:25,266
awareness level . One ships equipped 

605
00:22:25,266 --> 00:22:27,432
with the sea based terminal capability 

606
00:22:27,432 --> 00:22:27,050
can engage some hypersonic threats in 

607
00:22:27,060 --> 00:22:29,282
the terminal phase today . Now , due to 

608
00:22:29,282 --> 00:22:31,282
the global maneuver capabilities of 

609
00:22:31,282 --> 00:22:33,171
hypersonic missiles , space based 

610
00:22:33,171 --> 00:22:35,338
tracking and targeting capability is a 

611
00:22:35,338 --> 00:22:37,560
clear need . Later this year , the MD A 

612
00:22:37,560 --> 00:22:37,380
developed hypersonic and ballistic 

613
00:22:37,390 --> 00:22:39,501
tracking space sensor as mentioned by 

614
00:22:39,501 --> 00:22:41,699
the Chairman H BT S S will start on 

615
00:22:41,709 --> 00:22:43,876
orbit operations to demonstrate unique 

616
00:22:43,876 --> 00:22:45,820
tracking and targeting designed to 

617
00:22:45,820 --> 00:22:48,042
support hypersonic engagements . H BT S 

618
00:22:48,042 --> 00:22:50,209
S will participate in flight tests and 

619
00:22:50,209 --> 00:22:51,876
real world threat collections 

620
00:22:51,876 --> 00:22:53,987
throughout F Y 24 the capability will 

621
00:22:53,987 --> 00:22:55,987
be proliferated and operated by the 

622
00:22:55,987 --> 00:22:57,876
space force . We continue to work 

623
00:22:57,876 --> 00:22:59,931
closely with the Navy to upgrade sea 

624
00:22:59,931 --> 00:22:59,420
based terminal defenses to counter more 

625
00:22:59,430 --> 00:23:01,430
advanced maneuvering and hypersonic 

626
00:23:01,430 --> 00:23:03,652
threats and based on threat evolution , 

627
00:23:03,652 --> 00:23:05,708
we will deliver the next incremental 

628
00:23:05,708 --> 00:23:07,874
upgrade in 2025 . Sea base terminal is 

629
00:23:07,874 --> 00:23:10,097
the only active defense available today 

630
00:23:10,097 --> 00:23:12,208
to counter hypersonic threats . Now , 

631
00:23:12,208 --> 00:23:11,790
in order to expand the battle space 

632
00:23:11,800 --> 00:23:13,856
against hypersonic threats , we have 

633
00:23:13,856 --> 00:23:15,967
initiated the glide phase interceptor 

634
00:23:15,967 --> 00:23:18,244
to counter regional hypersonic threats . 

635
00:23:18,244 --> 00:23:20,244
GP I leverages proven weapon system 

636
00:23:20,244 --> 00:23:22,300
engage on network sensors to provide 

637
00:23:22,300 --> 00:23:24,356
the depth of fire needed to thin the 

638
00:23:24,356 --> 00:23:26,467
raid for terminal defenses , homeland 

639
00:23:26,467 --> 00:23:28,522
defense B MD against rogue nations , 

640
00:23:28,522 --> 00:23:28,270
defense of Guam against large raids of 

641
00:23:28,280 --> 00:23:30,169
high speed maneuvering threat and 

642
00:23:30,169 --> 00:23:32,058
building out the defense in depth 

643
00:23:32,058 --> 00:23:34,224
against hypersonic threats . Those are 

644
00:23:34,224 --> 00:23:36,447
priorities . Thank you . I look forward 

645
00:23:36,447 --> 00:23:35,939
to answering your questions and it has 

646
00:23:35,949 --> 00:23:38,005
been an honor to serve . Thank you . 

647
00:23:38,140 --> 00:23:39,973
Thank you . We'll next hear from 

648
00:23:39,973 --> 00:23:42,810
Lieutenant General Daniel KB US , Army 

649
00:23:42,819 --> 00:23:44,819
Space and Missile Defense Command . 

650
00:23:45,280 --> 00:23:47,169
Chairman Lamborn , ranking member 

651
00:23:47,169 --> 00:23:49,391
Molton and distinguished members of the 

652
00:23:49,391 --> 00:23:51,447
subcommittee . I am honored to again 

653
00:23:51,447 --> 00:23:53,613
testify before you and to represent an 

654
00:23:53,613 --> 00:23:55,829
incredible people . First organization 

655
00:23:55,890 --> 00:23:58,979
of 2600 soldiers and civilians across 

656
00:23:58,989 --> 00:24:01,479
13 time zones and 19 dispersed 

657
00:24:01,489 --> 00:24:04,880
locations . 20 if you count army 

658
00:24:04,890 --> 00:24:06,723
astronaut Frank Rubio aboard the 

659
00:24:06,723 --> 00:24:08,557
international space stations and 

660
00:24:08,557 --> 00:24:10,557
multiple time zones throughout this 

661
00:24:10,557 --> 00:24:12,446
hearing every day , these amazing 

662
00:24:12,446 --> 00:24:14,390
professionals provide space , high 

663
00:24:14,390 --> 00:24:16,612
altitude and missile defense forces and 

664
00:24:16,612 --> 00:24:18,557
capabilities to army and joint war 

665
00:24:18,557 --> 00:24:20,612
fighters . First , let me express my 

666
00:24:20,612 --> 00:24:22,834
sincere appreciation for your steadfast 

667
00:24:22,834 --> 00:24:24,612
support of our people and their 

668
00:24:24,612 --> 00:24:26,810
families . My role remains unchanged 

669
00:24:26,819 --> 00:24:28,986
from previous testimonies . I serve as 

670
00:24:28,986 --> 00:24:31,152
the commanding general for the US Army 

671
00:24:31,152 --> 00:24:33,375
Space and missile Defense Command , the 

672
00:24:33,375 --> 00:24:35,263
commander of the joint functional 

673
00:24:35,263 --> 00:24:35,199
component command for integrated 

674
00:24:35,209 --> 00:24:37,098
missile defense and as the army's 

675
00:24:37,098 --> 00:24:39,265
proponent for air missile defense or a 

676
00:24:39,265 --> 00:24:42,359
MD , I provide us Northern Command . 

677
00:24:42,369 --> 00:24:44,536
The soldiers who stand ready to defend 

678
00:24:44,536 --> 00:24:46,369
our nation from Intercontinental 

679
00:24:46,369 --> 00:24:48,591
ballistic missile attack , serve as the 

680
00:24:48,591 --> 00:24:50,591
army service component commander to 

681
00:24:50,591 --> 00:24:52,959
both us strategic Command and US Space 

682
00:24:52,969 --> 00:24:55,080
Command . And I am the chief of staff 

683
00:24:55,080 --> 00:24:57,030
of the army , a missile defense 

684
00:24:57,040 --> 00:24:59,859
enterprise Integrator in Europe . We 

685
00:24:59,869 --> 00:25:01,758
see a continuation of the largest 

686
00:25:01,758 --> 00:25:03,925
deployment of offensive missiles since 

687
00:25:03,925 --> 00:25:06,091
world war II and the unprecedented use 

688
00:25:06,091 --> 00:25:08,313
of attack UAVS in Russia's 14 month war 

689
00:25:08,319 --> 00:25:10,660
against Ukraine in the Pacific . 

690
00:25:10,670 --> 00:25:12,503
Against the backdrop of multiple 

691
00:25:12,503 --> 00:25:14,829
missile tests by the DPRK in China , 

692
00:25:14,920 --> 00:25:17,087
threats of regional and trans regional 

693
00:25:17,087 --> 00:25:19,790
complex missile attacks still loom . 

694
00:25:20,319 --> 00:25:22,569
And in the centcom , our adversaries 

695
00:25:22,579 --> 00:25:24,849
continue to attack partner nations and 

696
00:25:24,859 --> 00:25:28,150
us forces using missiles . UAV rockets , 

697
00:25:28,160 --> 00:25:32,040
artillery and mortars in short in my 

698
00:25:32,050 --> 00:25:34,170
36 years as an air defender , I have 

699
00:25:34,180 --> 00:25:36,780
never seen adversary threat activity 

700
00:25:36,930 --> 00:25:39,500
whether that be test or operational 

701
00:25:39,510 --> 00:25:41,790
used as great as I see it today . 

702
00:25:42,569 --> 00:25:44,680
Adversary actions in the space domain 

703
00:25:44,680 --> 00:25:46,729
are equally as aggressive as they 

704
00:25:46,739 --> 00:25:48,979
continue to challenge us across 

705
00:25:48,989 --> 00:25:52,020
multiple space enabled mission areas to 

706
00:25:52,030 --> 00:25:53,808
address these threats . We must 

707
00:25:53,808 --> 00:25:56,030
strengthen our capabilities to deny our 

708
00:25:56,030 --> 00:25:57,863
adversaries the benefit of their 

709
00:25:57,863 --> 00:25:59,530
aggression . We must continue 

710
00:25:59,530 --> 00:26:01,697
investment and sustainment of combat , 

711
00:26:01,697 --> 00:26:03,530
ready , capable and lethal ad 

712
00:26:03,540 --> 00:26:05,650
capabilities . Unfortunately , we do 

713
00:26:05,660 --> 00:26:07,827
not face these threats alone . We have 

714
00:26:07,827 --> 00:26:09,771
allies and partners who contribute 

715
00:26:09,771 --> 00:26:11,709
significantly to the ad and space 

716
00:26:11,719 --> 00:26:13,969
missions . Please allow me to briefly 

717
00:26:13,979 --> 00:26:16,130
outline a few milestones accomplished 

718
00:26:16,140 --> 00:26:17,973
by our space and missile defense 

719
00:26:17,973 --> 00:26:20,489
soldiers and civilians . This past year , 

720
00:26:20,500 --> 00:26:22,444
we have partnered with the US Army 

721
00:26:22,444 --> 00:26:24,500
Special Operations Command , an army 

722
00:26:24,500 --> 00:26:27,050
cyber command to create a space , cyber 

723
00:26:27,060 --> 00:26:29,489
soft triad to provide deterrents in 

724
00:26:29,500 --> 00:26:31,750
response options to the integrated use 

725
00:26:31,760 --> 00:26:33,810
of our unique capabilities . We've 

726
00:26:33,819 --> 00:26:35,930
continued to mature the triad through 

727
00:26:35,930 --> 00:26:37,819
multiple exercises to include the 

728
00:26:37,819 --> 00:26:40,329
army's project convergence . 22 in the 

729
00:26:40,339 --> 00:26:42,395
air defense enterprise , we recently 

730
00:26:42,395 --> 00:26:44,395
reached a historic milestone with a 

731
00:26:44,395 --> 00:26:46,561
full rate production system production 

732
00:26:46,561 --> 00:26:48,561
decision for the integrated air and 

733
00:26:48,561 --> 00:26:50,783
missile defense battle command system , 

734
00:26:50,783 --> 00:26:53,579
IBC S . This any sensor best shooter , 

735
00:26:53,589 --> 00:26:55,660
optimal command control construct 

736
00:26:55,670 --> 00:26:57,503
allows us to integrate the right 

737
00:26:57,503 --> 00:26:59,770
quantity and mix of A MD capabilities 

738
00:26:59,869 --> 00:27:01,989
across all echelons building an 

739
00:27:02,000 --> 00:27:04,520
effective tiered and layered defense . 

740
00:27:05,089 --> 00:27:07,033
This is the linchpin of the army's 

741
00:27:07,033 --> 00:27:08,969
broader A MD modernization effort 

742
00:27:09,069 --> 00:27:11,050
critical to transforming air and 

743
00:27:11,060 --> 00:27:13,459
missile defense capabilities well into 

744
00:27:13,469 --> 00:27:15,900
the future . In closing and on a 

745
00:27:15,910 --> 00:27:17,966
personal note , this will be my last 

746
00:27:17,966 --> 00:27:19,466
opportunity to address the 

747
00:27:19,466 --> 00:27:21,077
distinguished members of the 

748
00:27:21,077 --> 00:27:23,188
subcommittee . So I will retire later 

749
00:27:23,188 --> 00:27:25,077
this year . I am confident in the 

750
00:27:25,077 --> 00:27:27,132
direction and momentum of the army's 

751
00:27:27,132 --> 00:27:29,021
air and missile defense and space 

752
00:27:29,021 --> 00:27:28,800
enterprises . I look forward to 

753
00:27:28,810 --> 00:27:30,921
addressing your questions . Thank you 

754
00:27:31,369 --> 00:27:33,800
and thank you . And lastly , we'll hear 

755
00:27:33,810 --> 00:27:35,699
from Major General David Miller , 

756
00:27:35,699 --> 00:27:38,032
Director of Operations US Space Command . 

757
00:27:38,760 --> 00:27:40,927
Thank you , Chairman Lamborn , ranking 

758
00:27:40,927 --> 00:27:42,760
member Moulton and distinguished 

759
00:27:42,760 --> 00:27:44,538
members of the subcommittee . I 

760
00:27:44,538 --> 00:27:46,482
appreciate the opportunity to join 

761
00:27:46,482 --> 00:27:48,649
Deputy Assistant Secretary Hill , Vice 

762
00:27:48,649 --> 00:27:50,649
Admiral Hill and Lieutenant General 

763
00:27:50,649 --> 00:27:52,760
Carb . And I'm honored to speak today 

764
00:27:52,760 --> 00:27:52,510
on behalf of our commander , General 

765
00:27:52,520 --> 00:27:54,687
Jim Dickinson , as well as the men and 

766
00:27:54,687 --> 00:27:56,520
women of the United States Space 

767
00:27:56,520 --> 00:27:58,742
Command . Our strategic competitors are 

768
00:27:58,742 --> 00:28:00,353
expanding and evolving their 

769
00:28:00,353 --> 00:28:02,576
inventories of advanced weapons capable 

770
00:28:02,576 --> 00:28:04,798
of threatening both the US homeland and 

771
00:28:04,798 --> 00:28:04,569
our interests around the globe . As my 

772
00:28:04,579 --> 00:28:06,839
panelists have also stated our 

773
00:28:06,849 --> 00:28:09,016
challenge and my focus here today will 

774
00:28:09,016 --> 00:28:11,160
be mainly in level one discussion of 

775
00:28:11,170 --> 00:28:13,337
the domain awareness warning targeting 

776
00:28:13,337 --> 00:28:15,479
and tracking capabilities needed to 

777
00:28:15,489 --> 00:28:17,378
quickly identify characterize and 

778
00:28:17,378 --> 00:28:19,439
defeat these threats to accomplish . 

779
00:28:19,449 --> 00:28:21,560
This task requires joint combined and 

780
00:28:21,560 --> 00:28:23,671
partnered solution involving an array 

781
00:28:23,671 --> 00:28:25,616
of traditional and non traditional 

782
00:28:25,616 --> 00:28:27,616
sensors capable of delivering Space 

783
00:28:27,616 --> 00:28:29,782
Domain awareness , missile warning and 

784
00:28:29,782 --> 00:28:31,838
missile defense . Us . Space command 

785
00:28:31,838 --> 00:28:33,560
has made tremendous strides in 

786
00:28:33,560 --> 00:28:33,400
optimizing our legacy space 

787
00:28:33,410 --> 00:28:35,729
architectures as the global sensor 

788
00:28:35,739 --> 00:28:37,961
manager and integrating non traditional 

789
00:28:37,961 --> 00:28:40,183
sensors capable of contributing to this 

790
00:28:40,183 --> 00:28:42,128
mission set . While we are excited 

791
00:28:42,128 --> 00:28:44,183
about the future space based sensors 

792
00:28:44,183 --> 00:28:46,239
and architectures being delivered by 

793
00:28:46,239 --> 00:28:45,939
the space force as well as by our 

794
00:28:45,949 --> 00:28:48,099
missile defense agency teammates . We 

795
00:28:48,109 --> 00:28:50,109
are focusing now on maintaining our 

796
00:28:50,109 --> 00:28:52,331
advantage in the space and cyber domain 

797
00:28:52,331 --> 00:28:54,498
and providing the space enabled combat 

798
00:28:54,498 --> 00:28:56,665
edge that the joint and combined force 

799
00:28:56,665 --> 00:28:58,887
enjoys today . The complexity and scale 

800
00:28:58,887 --> 00:29:01,053
of the threat environment demands that 

801
00:29:01,053 --> 00:29:03,165
we integrate these sensors and enable 

802
00:29:03,165 --> 00:29:02,939
timely decision making and response . 

803
00:29:03,579 --> 00:29:05,579
Additionally , our missions are not 

804
00:29:05,579 --> 00:29:07,468
confined to one region . They are 

805
00:29:07,468 --> 00:29:09,690
inherently global . This only increases 

806
00:29:09,690 --> 00:29:11,857
the need for close coordination across 

807
00:29:11,857 --> 00:29:13,857
all combatant commands , supporting 

808
00:29:13,857 --> 00:29:16,023
agencies as well as our allies and our 

809
00:29:16,023 --> 00:29:18,190
commercial partners . This environment 

810
00:29:18,190 --> 00:29:20,246
demands integrated missile warning , 

811
00:29:20,246 --> 00:29:19,949
space , domain awareness and missile 

812
00:29:19,959 --> 00:29:22,060
defense solutions to enable globally 

813
00:29:22,069 --> 00:29:24,069
persistent space and missile threat 

814
00:29:24,069 --> 00:29:25,791
tracking along with many other 

815
00:29:25,791 --> 00:29:27,958
responsibilities . The unified command 

816
00:29:27,958 --> 00:29:30,069
plan assigned to General Dickinson as 

817
00:29:30,069 --> 00:29:31,847
the United States Space Command 

818
00:29:31,847 --> 00:29:33,791
commander , as the nation's global 

819
00:29:33,791 --> 00:29:36,013
sensor manager . He is required to plan 

820
00:29:36,013 --> 00:29:37,989
manage and execute the Dod's Space 

821
00:29:38,000 --> 00:29:40,167
Domain Awareness , missile defense and 

822
00:29:40,167 --> 00:29:42,000
missile warning sensors . Recent 

823
00:29:42,000 --> 00:29:44,111
successes in the integration of these 

824
00:29:44,111 --> 00:29:46,222
operations activities and investments 

825
00:29:46,222 --> 00:29:48,167
is a direct result of assigning us 

826
00:29:48,167 --> 00:29:50,222
Space Command . As the global sensor 

827
00:29:50,222 --> 00:29:52,000
manager , we have developed the 

828
00:29:52,000 --> 00:29:54,056
synergies among disparate missions , 

829
00:29:54,056 --> 00:29:56,167
functions and systems . Significantly 

830
00:29:56,167 --> 00:29:55,609
enhancing the joint forces 

831
00:29:55,619 --> 00:29:57,786
effectiveness in protecting the United 

832
00:29:57,786 --> 00:29:59,810
States and our allies . Since all 

833
00:29:59,819 --> 00:30:02,041
missile defense traveled in through and 

834
00:30:02,041 --> 00:30:04,152
from the space domain , it made sense 

835
00:30:04,152 --> 00:30:06,319
to assign us Space Command as a global 

836
00:30:06,319 --> 00:30:08,375
sensor manager . We have the tools , 

837
00:30:08,375 --> 00:30:10,375
tactics , training and expertise to 

838
00:30:10,375 --> 00:30:12,375
accomplish this mission . Thank you 

839
00:30:12,375 --> 00:30:14,375
again for the opportunity to appear 

840
00:30:14,375 --> 00:30:16,541
before you today . I submit my written 

841
00:30:16,541 --> 00:30:18,708
testimony for the record and I welcome 

842
00:30:18,708 --> 00:30:18,219
the subcommittee's questions on this 

843
00:30:18,229 --> 00:30:19,896
critical topic as well as the 

844
00:30:19,896 --> 00:30:21,785
collaboration with these agencies 

845
00:30:21,785 --> 00:30:24,119
represented here . OK . Thank you and 

846
00:30:24,130 --> 00:30:26,241
thank all of you for being here today 

847
00:30:26,241 --> 00:30:28,297
and for your opening statements . We 

848
00:30:28,297 --> 00:30:30,408
will now have a series of questions . 

849
00:30:30,408 --> 00:30:33,189
Uh I'm gonna ask a specific one of you , 

850
00:30:33,199 --> 00:30:35,739
General Carb and then a couple on 

851
00:30:35,750 --> 00:30:38,400
hypersonic defense and a couple on N G 

852
00:30:38,410 --> 00:30:40,577
I s and then I'm gonna turn it over to 

853
00:30:40,577 --> 00:30:42,799
my ranking member , General Carb . When 

854
00:30:42,799 --> 00:30:44,854
we were here last year , you told me 

855
00:30:44,854 --> 00:30:46,688
that our soldiers working in the 

856
00:30:46,688 --> 00:30:48,854
missile defense mission , particularly 

857
00:30:48,854 --> 00:30:50,966
patriot and Thad were going through a 

858
00:30:50,966 --> 00:30:53,099
meat grinder . In other words , the 

859
00:30:53,109 --> 00:30:55,239
dwell times were nine months at home 

860
00:30:55,250 --> 00:30:57,699
for every year deployed , you know , 

861
00:30:57,709 --> 00:30:59,820
less than the time deployed ? What is 

862
00:30:59,820 --> 00:31:02,042
the current dwell time for army missile 

863
00:31:02,042 --> 00:31:04,153
defenders ? And has the army made any 

864
00:31:04,153 --> 00:31:06,376
progress reducing dwell times for these 

865
00:31:06,376 --> 00:31:09,420
soldiers ? Chairman , yes , the army 

866
00:31:09,430 --> 00:31:11,680
recognized this as a challenge . The 

867
00:31:11,689 --> 00:31:13,689
high tempo for our army air defense 

868
00:31:13,689 --> 00:31:15,829
soldiers was such a priority for the 

869
00:31:15,839 --> 00:31:17,839
chief of staff and secretary . They 

870
00:31:17,839 --> 00:31:19,783
commissioned a health of the force 

871
00:31:19,783 --> 00:31:22,739
study specific to address the temple 

872
00:31:22,750 --> 00:31:25,410
challenges for our air defense soldiers . 

873
00:31:26,510 --> 00:31:28,843
That study encompassed multiple surveys , 

874
00:31:28,843 --> 00:31:30,954
families , soldiers officers , N C OS 

875
00:31:30,954 --> 00:31:33,579
across the entire air defense force got 

876
00:31:33,589 --> 00:31:36,560
back great feedback and then the army 

877
00:31:36,569 --> 00:31:38,402
made recommendations and now has 

878
00:31:38,402 --> 00:31:40,291
implemented those recommendations 

879
00:31:40,291 --> 00:31:41,736
really over the past year 

880
00:31:41,829 --> 00:31:43,551
recommendations that stem from 

881
00:31:43,551 --> 00:31:45,440
everything from pay incentives to 

882
00:31:45,440 --> 00:31:47,319
professional military education 

883
00:31:47,329 --> 00:31:49,440
opportunities for N C OS because they 

884
00:31:49,440 --> 00:31:51,551
were deployed didn't have a chance to 

885
00:31:51,551 --> 00:31:53,385
go to a different school and our 

886
00:31:53,385 --> 00:31:55,440
officers as well . Uh Mid tour , for 

887
00:31:55,440 --> 00:31:57,273
example , just all those , those 

888
00:31:57,273 --> 00:31:59,440
different uh opportunities and we also 

889
00:31:59,440 --> 00:32:02,589
decrease the demand uh across our force 

890
00:32:02,599 --> 00:32:05,280
over um specifically in the Centcom A O 

891
00:32:05,290 --> 00:32:08,750
R . So when we went from 1 to 10.9 

892
00:32:09,459 --> 00:32:12,680
dwell to deploy , we've gone now from 

893
00:32:12,689 --> 00:32:16,660
uh 1 to 1.9 . So it's almost 1 to 

894
00:32:16,670 --> 00:32:18,837
2 . So the current battalions that are 

895
00:32:18,837 --> 00:32:21,003
over there , one battalion is deployed 

896
00:32:21,003 --> 00:32:22,948
to dwell is 1 to 1.9 and the other 

897
00:32:22,948 --> 00:32:26,199
battalion is , is 1 to 2.2 . So you can 

898
00:32:26,209 --> 00:32:28,431
see that in that year we have , we have 

899
00:32:28,431 --> 00:32:30,653
really made a significant change in the 

900
00:32:30,653 --> 00:32:32,987
red lines for deploy to dwell is 1 to 2 . 

901
00:32:32,987 --> 00:32:35,098
So we're , we're getting right within 

902
00:32:35,098 --> 00:32:37,431
the Secretary of Defense's uh red lines . 

903
00:32:37,431 --> 00:32:41,189
And , and quantitatively , we also 

904
00:32:41,199 --> 00:32:43,143
uh have , have proven that this is 

905
00:32:43,143 --> 00:32:45,366
making a difference . The 32nd army air 

906
00:32:45,366 --> 00:32:47,477
missile defense command , the command 

907
00:32:47,477 --> 00:32:47,319
that's responsible for providing those 

908
00:32:47,329 --> 00:32:50,560
soldiers to centcom uh last year led 

909
00:32:50,569 --> 00:32:53,599
the army for division sized retention 

910
00:32:54,089 --> 00:32:58,030
with 100 and 709.7% exceeding their 

911
00:32:58,040 --> 00:33:01,229
retention rate . And this year they are 

912
00:33:01,239 --> 00:33:03,770
70 they have met 70% of their annual 

913
00:33:03,780 --> 00:33:06,280
retention goal already . And they also 

914
00:33:06,290 --> 00:33:09,900
have a 39% stabilization request of the 

915
00:33:09,910 --> 00:33:12,132
soldiers within that formation . So the 

916
00:33:12,132 --> 00:33:14,354
soldiers are voting with their feet and 

917
00:33:14,354 --> 00:33:16,521
they're voting with their feet to stay 

918
00:33:16,521 --> 00:33:18,799
where they're at right now . Thank you . 

919
00:33:18,799 --> 00:33:20,966
OK . Thank you for your great progress 

920
00:33:20,966 --> 00:33:23,243
in that area . So , on the first issue , 

921
00:33:23,243 --> 00:33:25,521
I want to ask about hypersonic defense . 

922
00:33:25,521 --> 00:33:25,510
Uh My top priority this year is 

923
00:33:25,520 --> 00:33:27,949
accelerating our nation's hypersonic 

924
00:33:27,959 --> 00:33:29,570
capabilities . There are two 

925
00:33:29,570 --> 00:33:32,869
capabilities for hypersonic defense 

926
00:33:32,880 --> 00:33:34,824
that I want to dwell on here for a 

927
00:33:34,824 --> 00:33:37,520
moment . The H BT S S for sensing , 

928
00:33:37,530 --> 00:33:40,500
tracking and fire control and the glide 

929
00:33:40,510 --> 00:33:43,599
phase interceptor . The first two H BT 

930
00:33:43,609 --> 00:33:45,800
S S payloads are set to launch later 

931
00:33:45,810 --> 00:33:47,619
this year . But the rest of the 

932
00:33:47,630 --> 00:33:49,408
constellation to get us to full 

933
00:33:49,408 --> 00:33:51,352
coverage is not expected to launch 

934
00:33:51,352 --> 00:33:53,074
until the end of this decade . 

935
00:33:53,189 --> 00:33:55,189
Additionally , the administration's 

936
00:33:55,189 --> 00:33:58,000
proposed budget does not get us even an 

937
00:33:58,010 --> 00:34:00,630
initial capability for the glide phase 

938
00:34:00,640 --> 00:34:03,530
interceptor against hypersonic until 

939
00:34:03,540 --> 00:34:06,819
around 2035 . Uh 

940
00:34:06,829 --> 00:34:09,199
Only in Washington DC does a missile 

941
00:34:09,209 --> 00:34:11,850
development program take 13 years and I 

942
00:34:11,860 --> 00:34:13,749
don't think it takes that long in 

943
00:34:13,749 --> 00:34:16,840
Beijing , Moscow or Pyongyang . So Vice 

944
00:34:16,850 --> 00:34:19,969
Admiral Hill given sufficient funding . 

945
00:34:19,979 --> 00:34:22,199
What's the earliest that MD A believes 

946
00:34:22,209 --> 00:34:24,520
it could get a glide phase interceptor 

947
00:34:24,530 --> 00:34:27,550
program to initial operational 

948
00:34:27,560 --> 00:34:29,671
capability ? Yes . Uh Thanks , thanks 

949
00:34:29,671 --> 00:34:32,020
uh Chairman uh Lembo . The uh glide 

950
00:34:32,030 --> 00:34:33,974
phase interceptor , as I mentioned 

951
00:34:33,974 --> 00:34:35,808
earlier is based on uh just fire 

952
00:34:35,808 --> 00:34:37,863
control . Uh So we're gonna leverage 

953
00:34:37,863 --> 00:34:39,863
the existing engage on remote which 

954
00:34:39,863 --> 00:34:41,863
today we can do from a forward base 

955
00:34:41,863 --> 00:34:43,974
ship . We can leverage existing space 

956
00:34:43,974 --> 00:34:43,870
based sensors , we can fuse that 

957
00:34:43,879 --> 00:34:45,823
through command and control battle 

958
00:34:45,823 --> 00:34:47,879
management communications today that 

959
00:34:47,879 --> 00:34:49,823
drives sea base terminal . So glad 

960
00:34:49,823 --> 00:34:51,879
interceptor really is providing that 

961
00:34:51,879 --> 00:34:54,101
area level defense . Uh It really thins 

962
00:34:54,101 --> 00:34:56,323
the raid before we deal with it down in 

963
00:34:56,323 --> 00:34:58,490
terminal , which is the worst place uh 

964
00:34:58,490 --> 00:35:00,379
to do those sort of uh intercepts 

965
00:35:00,379 --> 00:34:59,760
particularly in the sea base when the 

966
00:34:59,770 --> 00:35:01,937
debris uh just just comes forward onto 

967
00:35:01,937 --> 00:35:04,250
the ship . Um We uh laid out the plan 

968
00:35:04,260 --> 00:35:05,982
uh and we worked uh within the 

969
00:35:05,982 --> 00:35:08,204
department . Uh We're very early in the 

970
00:35:08,204 --> 00:35:10,316
program . Uh Chairman . So just so so 

971
00:35:10,316 --> 00:35:12,538
you to kind of level set where we are , 

972
00:35:12,538 --> 00:35:12,500
we're not at milestone a yet . We 

973
00:35:12,510 --> 00:35:14,689
should be uh kicking into that next 

974
00:35:14,699 --> 00:35:16,699
phase , which is all about the risk 

975
00:35:16,699 --> 00:35:18,699
reduction and that , that is , uh , 

976
00:35:18,699 --> 00:35:20,477
where we would really build our 

977
00:35:20,477 --> 00:35:20,389
confidence to , to be able to 

978
00:35:20,399 --> 00:35:22,621
accelerate the program . Um , I believe 

979
00:35:22,621 --> 00:35:24,843
that we can pull it uh , earlier . Uh , 

980
00:35:24,843 --> 00:35:26,677
it is certainly a , uh , funding 

981
00:35:26,677 --> 00:35:28,566
challenge . Um , but , uh , we'll 

982
00:35:28,566 --> 00:35:30,566
continue to work closely within the 

983
00:35:30,566 --> 00:35:32,399
department to pull it as left as 

984
00:35:32,399 --> 00:35:34,510
possible because I , I agree with you 

985
00:35:34,510 --> 00:35:34,149
that , uh , out in the mid thirties , 

986
00:35:34,159 --> 00:35:36,437
uh , is , you know , almost irrelevant . 

987
00:35:36,437 --> 00:35:38,659
Uh We , we are not meeting the threat . 

988
00:35:38,659 --> 00:35:40,715
Thank you . I really appreciate that 

989
00:35:40,715 --> 00:35:42,937
and I know it's based on years of great 

990
00:35:42,937 --> 00:35:44,826
uh service . So I appreciate that 

991
00:35:44,826 --> 00:35:46,715
answer uh for you and for General 

992
00:35:46,719 --> 00:35:48,941
Miller , what is the importance to both 

993
00:35:48,941 --> 00:35:51,459
of you to field the full H BT S S 

994
00:35:51,469 --> 00:35:53,830
constellation as quickly as possible ? 

995
00:35:55,489 --> 00:35:57,600
I I'll go in and just kind of go back 

996
00:35:57,600 --> 00:35:59,767
to why we , why we should do that . Uh 

997
00:35:59,767 --> 00:36:01,711
It really is about the maneuvering 

998
00:36:01,711 --> 00:36:03,378
threat . Uh We no longer have 

999
00:36:03,378 --> 00:36:05,600
predictable trajectories that go down a 

1000
00:36:05,600 --> 00:36:07,489
threat axis where your land based 

1001
00:36:07,489 --> 00:36:09,600
sensors would typically be located to 

1002
00:36:09,600 --> 00:36:11,822
look in that one direction with limited 

1003
00:36:11,822 --> 00:36:13,989
field of view . By being in space . We 

1004
00:36:13,989 --> 00:36:13,679
have the ability to catch these 

1005
00:36:13,689 --> 00:36:15,745
maneuvering threats and then provide 

1006
00:36:15,745 --> 00:36:17,856
the fire control quality data and the 

1007
00:36:17,856 --> 00:36:20,022
latency that's required . Uh The first 

1008
00:36:20,022 --> 00:36:22,245
two that go up uh later this year , the 

1009
00:36:22,245 --> 00:36:24,411
launch time is roughly uh September uh 

1010
00:36:24,411 --> 00:36:24,310
depending on the manifest and then 

1011
00:36:24,320 --> 00:36:26,487
we'll be collecting data throughout 24 

1012
00:36:26,487 --> 00:36:28,487
to prove out uh in space what we've 

1013
00:36:28,487 --> 00:36:30,709
already proven on the ground . Uh We're 

1014
00:36:30,709 --> 00:36:32,709
working very closely with the space 

1015
00:36:32,709 --> 00:36:34,709
force to integrate into the overall 

1016
00:36:34,709 --> 00:36:36,876
architecture to proliferate H BT S S . 

1017
00:36:36,876 --> 00:36:39,153
So I'll hand it over to uh Rock Miller . 

1018
00:36:39,600 --> 00:36:41,711
Thank you , Mr Chairman . I just echo 

1019
00:36:41,800 --> 00:36:44,350
points a couple key things I think . Um 

1020
00:36:44,360 --> 00:36:46,570
The first is the , you know , the H BT 

1021
00:36:46,580 --> 00:36:48,691
S S capability provides two things in 

1022
00:36:48,691 --> 00:36:50,858
particular , certainly the maneuvering 

1023
00:36:50,858 --> 00:36:53,024
threat um and the custody they're in , 

1024
00:36:53,024 --> 00:36:52,649
but it also provides a level of 

1025
00:36:52,659 --> 00:36:54,603
discrimination that's essential if 

1026
00:36:54,603 --> 00:36:56,826
you're going to provide quality missile 

1027
00:36:56,826 --> 00:36:58,826
defense across the regime of threat 

1028
00:36:58,826 --> 00:37:00,937
areas that we see . So I think within 

1029
00:37:00,937 --> 00:37:03,103
both the COCO as well as uh you know , 

1030
00:37:03,103 --> 00:37:05,048
we have to talk to the service for 

1031
00:37:05,048 --> 00:37:07,381
their specific integration requirements . 

1032
00:37:07,381 --> 00:37:07,219
I think it's absolutely essential to 

1033
00:37:07,229 --> 00:37:09,396
complement what we already have in the 

1034
00:37:09,396 --> 00:37:11,673
budget in terms of the missile warning , 

1035
00:37:11,673 --> 00:37:13,785
missile tracking architecture . Thank 

1036
00:37:13,785 --> 00:37:15,896
you . And lastly on this subject , uh 

1037
00:37:15,896 --> 00:37:18,007
Secretary Hill , don't you think that 

1038
00:37:18,007 --> 00:37:21,739
um providing the GP I or the 

1039
00:37:21,750 --> 00:37:25,290
H BT S S faster in both cases 

1040
00:37:25,300 --> 00:37:28,929
should be a higher priority ? I 

1041
00:37:28,939 --> 00:37:30,717
think we're gonna have a lot of 

1042
00:37:30,717 --> 00:37:32,828
learning this year as Admiral Hill uh 

1043
00:37:32,828 --> 00:37:34,995
spoke to in terms of the , of the GP I 

1044
00:37:34,995 --> 00:37:37,050
program and the uh we're moving into 

1045
00:37:37,050 --> 00:37:39,106
this risk reduction and that's gonna 

1046
00:37:39,106 --> 00:37:41,106
give us information that would help 

1047
00:37:41,106 --> 00:37:43,328
make a a more confident decision if you 

1048
00:37:43,328 --> 00:37:42,669
want to move it to the left , we still 

1049
00:37:42,679 --> 00:37:44,901
have the space to move it to the left . 

1050
00:37:44,901 --> 00:37:46,957
Uh So coming forward in that program 

1051
00:37:46,957 --> 00:37:49,179
and that , that's an option you want to 

1052
00:37:49,179 --> 00:37:51,401
keep open to do that as you look at the 

1053
00:37:51,401 --> 00:37:53,401
threat . Likewise , with the H BS S 

1054
00:37:53,401 --> 00:37:53,090
with these launches that are gonna be 

1055
00:37:53,100 --> 00:37:55,267
happening this year . Now you get that 

1056
00:37:55,267 --> 00:37:57,211
space based data uh to inform your 

1057
00:37:57,211 --> 00:37:59,156
decision as you move to the actual 

1058
00:37:59,156 --> 00:38:01,267
fielding time frame . And I think you 

1059
00:38:01,267 --> 00:38:03,489
still have maintaining that flexibility 

1060
00:38:03,489 --> 00:38:05,433
to do to make the kind of decision 

1061
00:38:05,433 --> 00:38:07,711
you're suggesting chairman . Ok . Well , 

1062
00:38:07,711 --> 00:38:10,689
let's work on making this the highest 

1063
00:38:10,699 --> 00:38:12,866
priority so that we can move it to the 

1064
00:38:12,866 --> 00:38:15,760
left as we've all just talked about um 

1065
00:38:15,770 --> 00:38:19,550
on the next generation interceptor N G 

1066
00:38:19,560 --> 00:38:23,540
I , the current plan is to buy 20 and 

1067
00:38:23,550 --> 00:38:27,229
these will come online around 2028 I've 

1068
00:38:27,239 --> 00:38:30,360
heard 2027 a little bit uh which is 

1069
00:38:30,370 --> 00:38:32,550
even better . But in any case , this 

1070
00:38:32,560 --> 00:38:35,300
will give us a mix of approximately 44 

1071
00:38:35,540 --> 00:38:39,540
older GB I S in 20 newer N 

1072
00:38:39,550 --> 00:38:42,270
G ISA at the end of this decade . Vice 

1073
00:38:42,280 --> 00:38:44,330
Admiral Hill , what's your best 

1074
00:38:44,439 --> 00:38:47,669
military advice ? Uh Would it make 

1075
00:38:47,679 --> 00:38:50,020
sense to eventually start replacing 

1076
00:38:50,209 --> 00:38:53,959
aging GB I S with N G I S if , 

1077
00:38:53,969 --> 00:38:56,136
if the funding was there ? Uh Chairman 

1078
00:38:56,136 --> 00:38:58,358
Landlord a great question . And uh when 

1079
00:38:58,358 --> 00:39:00,580
we laid out the acquisition plan , we , 

1080
00:39:00,580 --> 00:39:02,580
we thought through all of that , we 

1081
00:39:02,580 --> 00:39:04,302
want to leave ourselves enough 

1082
00:39:04,302 --> 00:39:06,580
flexibility to give the nation options . 

1083
00:39:06,580 --> 00:39:05,899
So we have two companies that are 

1084
00:39:05,909 --> 00:39:08,020
competing now and that's why you hear 

1085
00:39:08,020 --> 00:39:10,076
different timelines . The government 

1086
00:39:10,076 --> 00:39:12,131
reference architecture for first and 

1087
00:39:12,131 --> 00:39:14,298
placement is 2028 . Both companies are 

1088
00:39:14,298 --> 00:39:16,409
running towards a 27 time frame which 

1089
00:39:16,409 --> 00:39:18,409
is great , the power of competition 

1090
00:39:18,409 --> 00:39:20,631
does work . Um And then along the way , 

1091
00:39:20,631 --> 00:39:22,631
we will make decisions on inventory 

1092
00:39:22,631 --> 00:39:24,687
right now , the acquisition plan was 

1093
00:39:24,687 --> 00:39:24,600
basically what it was uh you know , 

1094
00:39:24,610 --> 00:39:27,060
four years ago , which was to add 20 . 

1095
00:39:27,129 --> 00:39:29,240
And so that's , that was the starting 

1096
00:39:29,240 --> 00:39:31,296
point for the acquisition plan . But 

1097
00:39:31,296 --> 00:39:33,296
what great about carrying two , the 

1098
00:39:33,296 --> 00:39:35,518
nation has the ability to go beyond the 

1099
00:39:35,518 --> 00:39:37,740
critical design review . You could have 

1100
00:39:37,740 --> 00:39:37,479
two production lines . If you want to 

1101
00:39:37,489 --> 00:39:39,489
really build out capacity , you can 

1102
00:39:39,500 --> 00:39:41,570
neck down to one uh supplier at that 

1103
00:39:41,580 --> 00:39:43,913
point and have a single production line . 

1104
00:39:43,913 --> 00:39:46,136
You can build the 20 you can add to the 

1105
00:39:46,136 --> 00:39:48,830
44 or you can replace some numbers of 

1106
00:39:48,840 --> 00:39:51,118
those and then increase more as you go . 

1107
00:39:51,118 --> 00:39:52,729
So it's it's a very flexible 

1108
00:39:52,729 --> 00:39:54,896
acquisition strategy and I think those 

1109
00:39:54,896 --> 00:39:57,173
decisions do not have to be made today . 

1110
00:39:57,173 --> 00:40:00,399
And if I said hi could the flexibility 

1111
00:40:00,409 --> 00:40:02,679
also encompass not just having two 

1112
00:40:02,689 --> 00:40:05,159
contractors through critical design 

1113
00:40:05,169 --> 00:40:08,790
review but into production . So so that 

1114
00:40:08,800 --> 00:40:12,159
we have two perhaps varying capability , 

1115
00:40:12,169 --> 00:40:15,709
maybe one for a particular threat , one 

1116
00:40:15,719 --> 00:40:17,941
for another threat that's better suited 

1117
00:40:17,941 --> 00:40:19,997
over here . And we have , we can mix 

1118
00:40:19,997 --> 00:40:22,108
and match . Yeah . Yes , sir . And in 

1119
00:40:22,108 --> 00:40:24,219
fact , uh whenever we talk about just 

1120
00:40:24,219 --> 00:40:23,939
interceptors , I always like to go back 

1121
00:40:23,949 --> 00:40:26,116
to the total system . The ground based 

1122
00:40:26,116 --> 00:40:28,282
uh weapon system itself is designed to 

1123
00:40:28,282 --> 00:40:30,282
handle basically the three variants 

1124
00:40:30,282 --> 00:40:32,393
that are in the ground today plus two 

1125
00:40:32,393 --> 00:40:34,629
new variants . And so again , we built 

1126
00:40:34,639 --> 00:40:36,806
in the flexibility so that we can make 

1127
00:40:36,806 --> 00:40:38,917
decisions at the right time . I would 

1128
00:40:38,917 --> 00:40:41,083
say we got to come through preliminary 

1129
00:40:41,083 --> 00:40:40,679
design review later this year , have 

1130
00:40:40,689 --> 00:40:42,689
high confidence that we can in fact 

1131
00:40:42,689 --> 00:40:44,578
close the design and then move to 

1132
00:40:44,578 --> 00:40:46,578
critical design review where we can 

1133
00:40:46,578 --> 00:40:48,467
either down select or not , those 

1134
00:40:48,467 --> 00:40:50,578
decisions are open uh to the nation . 

1135
00:40:50,578 --> 00:40:52,578
Thank you , sir , ranking member of 

1136
00:40:52,578 --> 00:40:54,522
Molton , right ? Uh Thank you , Mr 

1137
00:40:54,522 --> 00:40:56,689
Chairman and I , I wanna start by just 

1138
00:40:56,689 --> 00:40:58,800
um really hammering home one of the , 

1139
00:40:58,800 --> 00:41:00,967
the points that you were uh addressing 

1140
00:41:00,967 --> 00:41:02,911
here . Um If I can attempt to , to 

1141
00:41:02,911 --> 00:41:05,669
quote Major General Miller , the H BT S 

1142
00:41:05,679 --> 00:41:08,090
S , uh not only detects a maneuvering 

1143
00:41:08,100 --> 00:41:10,439
threat and maintains custody there in 

1144
00:41:10,649 --> 00:41:13,870
uh but also provides discrimination so 

1145
00:41:13,879 --> 00:41:16,101
that you can actually , so that you can 

1146
00:41:16,101 --> 00:41:18,212
accurately prosecute that threat . Um 

1147
00:41:18,212 --> 00:41:20,323
That's a very difficult statement for 

1148
00:41:20,323 --> 00:41:22,323
anyone watching C SPAN right now to 

1149
00:41:22,323 --> 00:41:24,435
understand , it's probably probably a 

1150
00:41:24,435 --> 00:41:26,546
difficult statement for many of us on 

1151
00:41:26,546 --> 00:41:28,601
the committee to , to decipher and , 

1152
00:41:28,601 --> 00:41:30,823
and pull apart . But what we're talking 

1153
00:41:30,823 --> 00:41:33,046
about is is fundamentally important and 

1154
00:41:33,046 --> 00:41:34,990
it's something that every American 

1155
00:41:34,990 --> 00:41:37,101
should actually understand . Uh which 

1156
00:41:37,101 --> 00:41:40,540
is that if uh Russia or China were to 

1157
00:41:40,550 --> 00:41:42,370
launch a hypersonic missile on 

1158
00:41:42,379 --> 00:41:44,601
Washington DC , where we're all sitting 

1159
00:41:44,601 --> 00:41:47,399
this afternoon , how much advanced 

1160
00:41:47,409 --> 00:41:49,576
warning would we have of that attack ? 

1161
00:41:50,479 --> 00:41:53,979
Vice Admiral Hill Moulton . Thank , 

1162
00:41:53,989 --> 00:41:56,620
thanks . Great question . Um And so 

1163
00:41:56,629 --> 00:41:58,685
what I'll do is I'll go back to your 

1164
00:41:58,685 --> 00:42:00,907
levels chart . Right . Right . Now , uh 

1165
00:42:00,907 --> 00:42:02,907
when it comes to hypersonic threats 

1166
00:42:02,907 --> 00:42:04,851
from a uh engagement perspective , 

1167
00:42:04,851 --> 00:42:06,740
we're , we're pursuing a regional 

1168
00:42:06,740 --> 00:42:08,685
capability . Uh But you're exactly 

1169
00:42:08,685 --> 00:42:11,018
right from a sensing capability . We're , 

1170
00:42:11,018 --> 00:42:13,129
we're at that level one piece , which 

1171
00:42:13,129 --> 00:42:12,040
is , you know , you want to cover 

1172
00:42:12,050 --> 00:42:14,272
everything , right ? So you wanna see a 

1173
00:42:14,272 --> 00:42:16,494
strategic attack on the states that for 

1174
00:42:16,494 --> 00:42:18,494
sure . Um Just to kind of add on to 

1175
00:42:18,494 --> 00:42:20,606
what uh uh general Miller mentioned . 

1176
00:42:20,606 --> 00:42:22,919
Uh when I say latency and fire control 

1177
00:42:22,929 --> 00:42:25,151
quality data , if I was explaining that 

1178
00:42:25,151 --> 00:42:27,207
to my daughter , I would say latency 

1179
00:42:27,207 --> 00:42:29,318
means timely , right . We want timely 

1180
00:42:29,318 --> 00:42:31,262
information going to any defensive 

1181
00:42:31,262 --> 00:42:33,207
system or to a warning system . So 

1182
00:42:33,207 --> 00:42:33,030
that's what I mean by latency when we 

1183
00:42:33,040 --> 00:42:34,984
say fire control , what we mean is 

1184
00:42:34,984 --> 00:42:36,984
position and velocity accuracy at a 

1185
00:42:36,984 --> 00:42:38,984
level that can support a missile on 

1186
00:42:38,984 --> 00:42:41,207
target . Uh So that's what we mean when 

1187
00:42:41,207 --> 00:42:43,429
we say fire control quality against the 

1188
00:42:43,429 --> 00:42:45,596
hypersonic threat . The other piece is 

1189
00:42:45,596 --> 00:42:47,929
the B and H BT S S , right . So , and I , 

1190
00:42:47,929 --> 00:42:47,600
I didn't mention that in my opening 

1191
00:42:47,610 --> 00:42:49,777
statement , but the B really means the 

1192
00:42:49,777 --> 00:42:51,832
dim targets of ballistic missiles So 

1193
00:42:51,832 --> 00:42:53,943
what we're seeing in the North Korean 

1194
00:42:53,943 --> 00:42:53,879
shots and you see it with other 

1195
00:42:53,889 --> 00:42:55,778
countries too is they shift their 

1196
00:42:55,778 --> 00:42:57,667
propulsion types and they're much 

1197
00:42:57,667 --> 00:43:00,000
dimmer uh up in the uh the upper stages . 

1198
00:43:00,000 --> 00:43:02,000
And so when they go there , we lose 

1199
00:43:02,000 --> 00:43:04,222
them with radars , they're very hard to 

1200
00:43:04,222 --> 00:43:06,333
see with other infrared systems . And 

1201
00:43:06,333 --> 00:43:08,500
so you need a sensor that can see that 

1202
00:43:08,500 --> 00:43:08,000
as well . So it's not just the 

1203
00:43:08,010 --> 00:43:10,066
hypersonic maneuvering threat that's 

1204
00:43:10,066 --> 00:43:12,121
gone global , but it these different 

1205
00:43:12,121 --> 00:43:14,232
propulsion types that are very , very 

1206
00:43:14,232 --> 00:43:16,399
hard to see and it's what H BT S S was 

1207
00:43:16,399 --> 00:43:18,621
designed to actually detect and provide 

1208
00:43:18,621 --> 00:43:20,621
either warning or weapons control . 

1209
00:43:20,621 --> 00:43:22,621
It's very helpful . But to just get 

1210
00:43:22,621 --> 00:43:24,621
back to my , my question , how much 

1211
00:43:24,621 --> 00:43:26,843
advanced warning would we have ? Uh I , 

1212
00:43:26,843 --> 00:43:29,010
I'm probably not the right guy to , to 

1213
00:43:29,010 --> 00:43:28,199
do that . I , do you wanna talk about 

1214
00:43:28,209 --> 00:43:32,149
or so for the , for the current threats 

1215
00:43:32,159 --> 00:43:34,326
that we're looking at boosted on the , 

1216
00:43:34,326 --> 00:43:36,603
the vehicles that you're talking about , 

1217
00:43:36,603 --> 00:43:38,659
you'll get warning within seconds to 

1218
00:43:38,659 --> 00:43:40,820
minutes of that threat activity . And 

1219
00:43:40,830 --> 00:43:42,997
depending on where a threat is located 

1220
00:43:42,997 --> 00:43:45,163
will dictate how much advanced warning 

1221
00:43:45,163 --> 00:43:46,997
that you have obviously a threat 

1222
00:43:46,997 --> 00:43:49,052
immediately off the coast has always 

1223
00:43:49,052 --> 00:43:50,941
been talked about over years as a 

1224
00:43:50,941 --> 00:43:52,830
challenge in a submarine launched 

1225
00:43:52,830 --> 00:43:54,941
environment . Um But given the launch 

1226
00:43:54,941 --> 00:43:57,052
time lines that you have talked about 

1227
00:43:57,052 --> 00:43:59,219
um from the PR C or your example , you 

1228
00:43:59,219 --> 00:43:58,379
provided , we'll certainly have 

1229
00:43:58,389 --> 00:44:00,556
adequate warning for decision making . 

1230
00:44:00,969 --> 00:44:02,691
Well , I think , you know , my 

1231
00:44:02,691 --> 00:44:04,858
understanding is that part of the need 

1232
00:44:04,858 --> 00:44:07,080
to really develop our level one sensing 

1233
00:44:07,080 --> 00:44:09,247
capabilities is that , you know , this 

1234
00:44:09,247 --> 00:44:10,858
is not like dealing with the 

1235
00:44:10,858 --> 00:44:12,913
traditional ICBM S and that we could 

1236
00:44:12,913 --> 00:44:15,025
essentially have an attack on a place 

1237
00:44:15,025 --> 00:44:17,247
like Washington DC without getting much 

1238
00:44:17,247 --> 00:44:19,413
advanced warning at all . I understand 

1239
00:44:19,413 --> 00:44:21,691
you might be able to detect the launch , 

1240
00:44:21,691 --> 00:44:23,913
but you wouldn't necessarily know where 

1241
00:44:23,913 --> 00:44:25,913
that missile is headed . That's why 

1242
00:44:25,913 --> 00:44:28,025
investing in these capabilities is so 

1243
00:44:28,025 --> 00:44:27,600
important . And I also think that 

1244
00:44:27,610 --> 00:44:30,060
you're gonna hear from uh well , he may 

1245
00:44:30,070 --> 00:44:32,181
have just disappeared but uh Mr Bacon 

1246
00:44:32,181 --> 00:44:34,969
about uh uh the need to maintain 

1247
00:44:34,979 --> 00:44:38,389
command and control uh until we have 

1248
00:44:38,399 --> 00:44:40,610
those capabilities , which is another 

1249
00:44:40,620 --> 00:44:42,842
uh I think really important question uh 

1250
00:44:42,842 --> 00:44:45,009
for us to address and something that I 

1251
00:44:45,009 --> 00:44:47,342
hope that you will uh be considering as , 

1252
00:44:47,342 --> 00:44:49,398
as we go forward at a S D hill . You 

1253
00:44:49,398 --> 00:44:51,620
know , back to my opening statement , I 

1254
00:44:51,620 --> 00:44:53,731
want to ask how the department thinks 

1255
00:44:53,731 --> 00:44:55,898
about missile defense requirements for 

1256
00:44:55,898 --> 00:44:57,953
North Korea and specifically how you 

1257
00:44:57,953 --> 00:44:59,731
can weigh the trade off between 

1258
00:44:59,731 --> 00:45:01,953
continuing to try to keep pace with the 

1259
00:45:01,953 --> 00:45:04,064
North Korean missile threat . And the 

1260
00:45:04,064 --> 00:45:06,287
reality that at some point , it becomes 

1261
00:45:06,287 --> 00:45:08,564
not only at arms race with North Korea , 

1262
00:45:08,564 --> 00:45:07,949
but also might influence Russia and 

1263
00:45:07,959 --> 00:45:10,030
China's behavior in ways that are 

1264
00:45:10,040 --> 00:45:12,318
counterproductive to nuclear stability . 

1265
00:45:12,318 --> 00:45:14,419
So under what conditions would North 

1266
00:45:14,429 --> 00:45:17,000
Korea become a nuclear power that we 

1267
00:45:17,010 --> 00:45:19,929
deter with our own nuclear response ? 

1268
00:45:19,939 --> 00:45:21,800
Instead of with missile defense 

1269
00:45:21,810 --> 00:45:23,810
essentially moving North Korea from 

1270
00:45:23,810 --> 00:45:27,540
level four to level five . Thank you , 

1271
00:45:27,550 --> 00:45:30,340
ranking member Molton . Um We described 

1272
00:45:30,350 --> 00:45:33,219
in the missile defense review uh that 

1273
00:45:33,229 --> 00:45:35,439
the North Korea challenge what we deal 

1274
00:45:35,449 --> 00:45:37,671
with , we have the missile defense that 

1275
00:45:37,671 --> 00:45:39,616
we've talked about already today , 

1276
00:45:39,616 --> 00:45:41,616
missile defeat , which is about the 

1277
00:45:41,616 --> 00:45:43,505
things you can do to reduce their 

1278
00:45:43,505 --> 00:45:45,449
confidence and how their system is 

1279
00:45:45,449 --> 00:45:47,671
going to work . And then we have always 

1280
00:45:47,671 --> 00:45:49,671
had and this has been consistent in 

1281
00:45:49,671 --> 00:45:49,239
dealing with the North Korea threat , 

1282
00:45:50,540 --> 00:45:52,659
the ability of the US to cost in 

1283
00:45:52,669 --> 00:45:54,836
positions that can be nuclear response 

1284
00:45:54,836 --> 00:45:56,891
as well . That's always been part of 

1285
00:45:56,891 --> 00:45:59,250
our posture with respect to North Korea 

1286
00:45:59,260 --> 00:46:01,260
and deterrence there . I think with 

1287
00:46:01,260 --> 00:46:03,427
your question though of as North Korea 

1288
00:46:03,427 --> 00:46:05,593
continues to just deploy more and more 

1289
00:46:05,593 --> 00:46:07,816
missiles , more advanced missiles , how 

1290
00:46:07,816 --> 00:46:10,038
far do you go ? And your question , how 

1291
00:46:10,038 --> 00:46:12,316
that relates to Russians at some point , 

1292
00:46:12,316 --> 00:46:14,482
you decide the missile defense we have 

1293
00:46:14,482 --> 00:46:17,409
is enough interceptors and the 

1294
00:46:17,419 --> 00:46:20,360
interceptors are improved . The warning 

1295
00:46:20,370 --> 00:46:22,592
that you're talking about is improved , 

1296
00:46:22,592 --> 00:46:24,703
we will deal with the missile defense 

1297
00:46:24,703 --> 00:46:26,870
problem there . If North Korea were to 

1298
00:46:26,870 --> 00:46:29,037
take that shot , that will be the time 

1299
00:46:29,037 --> 00:46:30,981
when the nuclear retaliation . The 

1300
00:46:30,981 --> 00:46:33,500
strategic deterrence portion also has 

1301
00:46:33,510 --> 00:46:35,649
to play its part . It's real that is 

1302
00:46:35,659 --> 00:46:37,881
the foundation of all deterrent for the 

1303
00:46:37,881 --> 00:46:39,881
United States . So it's part of the 

1304
00:46:39,881 --> 00:46:41,937
North Korea challenge too . Well , I 

1305
00:46:41,937 --> 00:46:43,826
think it would be helpful for the 

1306
00:46:43,826 --> 00:46:45,992
department to understand where we make 

1307
00:46:45,992 --> 00:46:45,260
this transition because if we're just 

1308
00:46:45,270 --> 00:46:47,437
sort of blindly , you know , producing 

1309
00:46:47,437 --> 00:46:49,659
more interceptors to try to keep , keep 

1310
00:46:49,659 --> 00:46:51,714
up when that's actually not the main 

1311
00:46:51,714 --> 00:46:53,714
deterrent strategy that we have for 

1312
00:46:53,714 --> 00:46:55,826
this particular threat , then we risk 

1313
00:46:55,826 --> 00:46:57,937
other consequences as , as we've just 

1314
00:46:57,937 --> 00:47:00,159
discussed . Um Can , can you just , the 

1315
00:47:00,159 --> 00:47:02,800
last question is , um , look if we were 

1316
00:47:02,810 --> 00:47:05,800
to get into the realm of miss of level 

1317
00:47:05,810 --> 00:47:08,489
five missile defense deterring a near 

1318
00:47:08,500 --> 00:47:12,370
peer adversary . Uh in theory by 

1319
00:47:12,379 --> 00:47:14,490
saying that we're going to shoot down 

1320
00:47:14,490 --> 00:47:16,490
all your missiles . Uh I mean , how 

1321
00:47:16,490 --> 00:47:18,323
many G MD interceptors would you 

1322
00:47:18,323 --> 00:47:20,379
estimate we would need if we were to 

1323
00:47:20,379 --> 00:47:24,290
trying to deter or defeat uh 

1324
00:47:24,300 --> 00:47:28,010
an all out Chinese or Russian nuclear 

1325
00:47:28,020 --> 00:47:31,879
attack on the United States ? I 

1326
00:47:31,889 --> 00:47:34,750
think in any realm of warfare , from 

1327
00:47:34,760 --> 00:47:36,871
the lowest conventional levels to the 

1328
00:47:36,871 --> 00:47:39,100
highest nuclear levels , defense has a 

1329
00:47:39,110 --> 00:47:42,649
role . But the key role of the fence 

1330
00:47:42,659 --> 00:47:45,169
is you're denying people the advantage 

1331
00:47:45,179 --> 00:47:47,401
of the attack that you were launched in 

1332
00:47:47,401 --> 00:47:49,401
the first place and you're assuring 

1333
00:47:49,401 --> 00:47:51,623
your ability to impose costs that would 

1334
00:47:51,623 --> 00:47:53,735
make them regret having started it in 

1335
00:47:53,735 --> 00:47:55,901
the first place . So whether that's at 

1336
00:47:55,901 --> 00:47:57,735
the conventional level or at the 

1337
00:47:57,735 --> 00:47:59,846
nuclear level , your defense is there 

1338
00:47:59,846 --> 00:48:01,901
to assure your command and control . 

1339
00:48:01,901 --> 00:48:04,123
You mentioned in Washington DC . One of 

1340
00:48:04,123 --> 00:48:06,346
the things that we've been investing in 

1341
00:48:06,346 --> 00:48:08,457
last year's budget continuing in this 

1342
00:48:08,457 --> 00:48:10,568
is over the horizon radar , that's to 

1343
00:48:10,568 --> 00:48:12,735
improve warning against cruise missile 

1344
00:48:12,735 --> 00:48:14,790
threats that are a concern as well . 

1345
00:48:14,790 --> 00:48:16,957
The space based sensors , we've talked 

1346
00:48:16,957 --> 00:48:16,800
about dealing with some of the 

1347
00:48:16,810 --> 00:48:19,139
hypersonic and the dimmer targets , the 

1348
00:48:19,149 --> 00:48:21,260
dimmer threats we're seeing . So it's 

1349
00:48:21,260 --> 00:48:24,030
that combination of saying I can sense 

1350
00:48:24,040 --> 00:48:26,262
and see what you're doing . I will have 

1351
00:48:26,262 --> 00:48:28,510
means to intercept , to defend myself , 

1352
00:48:28,520 --> 00:48:30,576
to assure critical capabilities like 

1353
00:48:30,576 --> 00:48:32,631
command and control and response and 

1354
00:48:32,631 --> 00:48:34,742
power projection . And I will have my 

1355
00:48:34,742 --> 00:48:36,964
nuclear deterrent if I need to use that 

1356
00:48:36,964 --> 00:48:39,020
as well . Uh At some point , this is 

1357
00:48:39,020 --> 00:48:41,020
just maths A S D Hill . What is the 

1358
00:48:41,020 --> 00:48:45,010
answer ? How many do we need ? I don't 

1359
00:48:45,020 --> 00:48:48,790
think we've , what we've said is what 

1360
00:48:48,820 --> 00:48:51,120
right now we have uh the 44 that you 

1361
00:48:51,129 --> 00:48:53,351
mentioned . There's 20 more uh that are 

1362
00:48:53,351 --> 00:48:55,518
part of the N G I program . That's for 

1363
00:48:55,518 --> 00:48:57,830
64 . That's what we covered in the 

1364
00:48:57,840 --> 00:48:59,899
missile defense review and in the 

1365
00:48:59,909 --> 00:49:02,389
missile defense review to come back to 

1366
00:49:02,399 --> 00:49:04,566
uh uh Chairman Landwards question . We 

1367
00:49:04,566 --> 00:49:07,560
also left open the possibility looking 

1368
00:49:07,570 --> 00:49:10,280
at as the N G I program develops . Do 

1369
00:49:10,290 --> 00:49:13,780
we um do we replace the existing uh 

1370
00:49:15,649 --> 00:49:17,705
if you could just take this question 

1371
00:49:17,705 --> 00:49:19,760
for the record , I'd appreciate it . 

1372
00:49:19,760 --> 00:49:21,871
Thank you , Chairman , Representative 

1373
00:49:21,871 --> 00:49:23,927
Wilson . Thank you , Mr Chairman and 

1374
00:49:23,927 --> 00:49:26,093
thank each of you for being here today 

1375
00:49:26,093 --> 00:49:28,316
and Admiral Hill uh general , thank you 

1376
00:49:28,316 --> 00:49:30,205
for your service . Um You've been 

1377
00:49:30,205 --> 00:49:32,427
instrumental with your colleagues in uh 

1378
00:49:32,427 --> 00:49:34,649
promoting peace through strength and as 

1379
00:49:34,649 --> 00:49:36,705
a uh uh retiree myself from military 

1380
00:49:36,705 --> 00:49:38,927
service , I know you'll be looking back 

1381
00:49:38,927 --> 00:49:41,229
uh on the uh successes that you've had 

1382
00:49:41,239 --> 00:49:43,461
and , and they're so meaningful for our 

1383
00:49:43,461 --> 00:49:45,899
country . Thank you . Uh Secretary Hill 

1384
00:49:45,909 --> 00:49:48,270
facing the threats of the Chinese 

1385
00:49:48,280 --> 00:49:50,520
Communist Party , the murderous threat 

1386
00:49:50,530 --> 00:49:53,340
of war criminal Putin , the unstable 

1387
00:49:53,350 --> 00:49:55,128
North Korean government and the 

1388
00:49:55,128 --> 00:49:59,090
irrational threat of the regime in Iran 

1389
00:49:59,320 --> 00:50:02,229
as they continue to develop a capacity 

1390
00:50:02,239 --> 00:50:04,540
to conduct long range missile threats 

1391
00:50:04,550 --> 00:50:06,949
with greater capability , capacity and 

1392
00:50:06,959 --> 00:50:09,030
intent to challenge America and our 

1393
00:50:09,040 --> 00:50:13,020
allies and our partners by being part 

1394
00:50:13,030 --> 00:50:15,479
of a author authoritarians promoting 

1395
00:50:15,489 --> 00:50:18,350
rule of gun . How concerned are you 

1396
00:50:18,360 --> 00:50:20,193
that there are continued missile 

1397
00:50:20,193 --> 00:50:22,330
development and production ? Uh What 

1398
00:50:22,340 --> 00:50:24,719
steps is the missile defense agency 

1399
00:50:24,729 --> 00:50:27,500
taking to adequately detect , deter , 

1400
00:50:27,510 --> 00:50:29,669
deny and protect the homeland and 

1401
00:50:29,679 --> 00:50:31,846
regional partners from these threats ? 

1402
00:50:37,409 --> 00:50:41,010
I think the covered 

1403
00:50:41,020 --> 00:50:43,330
Russia and China and a whole range of 

1404
00:50:43,340 --> 00:50:45,580
threats , I believe in there . And so 

1405
00:50:45,590 --> 00:50:47,757
the budget that we've put forward this 

1406
00:50:47,757 --> 00:50:50,629
year focusing on significant 

1407
00:50:50,639 --> 00:50:52,583
investments in the missile defense 

1408
00:50:52,583 --> 00:50:54,830
agency alone , about $10.9 billion in 

1409
00:50:54,840 --> 00:50:56,673
their programs covering the next 

1410
00:50:56,673 --> 00:50:58,784
generation interceptor , covering the 

1411
00:50:58,784 --> 00:51:00,951
uh the space based sensors . We talked 

1412
00:51:00,951 --> 00:51:03,007
about the H P T S S A discriminating 

1413
00:51:03,007 --> 00:51:05,007
space sensor as well as well as the 

1414
00:51:05,007 --> 00:51:07,118
regional programs . And we're , we're 

1415
00:51:07,118 --> 00:51:09,062
covering it from both the homeland 

1416
00:51:09,062 --> 00:51:12,219
missile defense perspective as well as 

1417
00:51:12,229 --> 00:51:14,229
all of the regional defense for our 

1418
00:51:14,229 --> 00:51:17,360
forces for deployed uh in , in those 

1419
00:51:17,370 --> 00:51:19,750
conflicts that is there is also 

1420
00:51:19,760 --> 00:51:21,593
investments going in through the 

1421
00:51:21,593 --> 00:51:23,704
services . So for example , the space 

1422
00:51:23,704 --> 00:51:26,629
force budget , deploying the missile 

1423
00:51:26,639 --> 00:51:28,750
warning and missile tracking layers . 

1424
00:51:28,750 --> 00:51:30,806
Another nearly $5 billion there . Uh 

1425
00:51:30,806 --> 00:51:34,669
total total expenditure is about $29.8 

1426
00:51:34,679 --> 00:51:36,846
billion in the total budget that we're 

1427
00:51:36,846 --> 00:51:39,090
looking at for the ranges of defenses 

1428
00:51:39,100 --> 00:51:41,100
against the threats you described ? 

1429
00:51:41,469 --> 00:51:43,810
Thank you very much . And uh Admiral 

1430
00:51:43,820 --> 00:51:46,610
Hill , the defense of Guam , uh it's 

1431
00:51:46,620 --> 00:51:49,129
such a strategic location uh for the 

1432
00:51:49,139 --> 00:51:51,209
defense of our country , Uh Such a 

1433
00:51:51,219 --> 00:51:53,879
appreciated American territory , uh 

1434
00:51:53,889 --> 00:51:56,760
such patriotic people uh uh living 

1435
00:51:56,770 --> 00:52:00,600
there and uh who uh we so cherish 

1436
00:52:00,610 --> 00:52:02,777
as to their importance in our national 

1437
00:52:02,777 --> 00:52:04,999
security strategy . The missile defense 

1438
00:52:04,999 --> 00:52:07,054
agency is responsible for efforts of 

1439
00:52:07,054 --> 00:52:09,166
integrating the army , integrated air 

1440
00:52:09,166 --> 00:52:10,999
and missile defense and navy , a 

1441
00:52:10,999 --> 00:52:13,379
ballistic missile defense in support of 

1442
00:52:13,389 --> 00:52:15,870
the defense of Guam through the command 

1443
00:52:15,879 --> 00:52:19,010
and control battle management and 

1444
00:52:19,020 --> 00:52:21,320
communications . The current plan would 

1445
00:52:21,330 --> 00:52:24,879
demonstrate an initial capability in 

1446
00:52:24,889 --> 00:52:28,850
Guam in 2024 followed by the delivery 

1447
00:52:28,860 --> 00:52:32,429
of an enhanced capability by 2029 . Are 

1448
00:52:32,439 --> 00:52:34,495
there any additional requirements or 

1449
00:52:34,495 --> 00:52:36,439
resources that the missile defense 

1450
00:52:36,439 --> 00:52:39,580
agency may need to ensure this function 

1451
00:52:39,590 --> 00:52:42,659
is established on the vitally located 

1452
00:52:42,669 --> 00:52:45,659
and patriotic territory of Guam ? Can 

1453
00:52:45,669 --> 00:52:47,502
you highlight the challenges and 

1454
00:52:47,502 --> 00:52:50,409
limitations on this current plan ? Yes , 

1455
00:52:50,419 --> 00:52:53,570
sir . Uh Thank you . Um This is really 

1456
00:52:53,580 --> 00:52:56,270
our first year uh in 23 starting the 

1457
00:52:56,280 --> 00:52:58,879
program . Uh Our total focus right now 

1458
00:52:58,889 --> 00:53:01,479
is on establishing the sites . Uh We 

1459
00:53:01,489 --> 00:53:03,656
know what they are . Uh We've done the 

1460
00:53:03,656 --> 00:53:05,878
early environmental work there . And as 

1461
00:53:05,878 --> 00:53:07,933
you mentioned , at the end of 24 our 

1462
00:53:07,933 --> 00:53:10,045
intent is to have the first radar , a 

1463
00:53:10,045 --> 00:53:12,211
engineering version of the command and 

1464
00:53:12,211 --> 00:53:14,156
control suite and , and a launcher 

1465
00:53:14,156 --> 00:53:16,045
system so that we can test in the 

1466
00:53:16,045 --> 00:53:18,100
environment , you know , just beyond 

1467
00:53:18,100 --> 00:53:20,211
signals and checkouts and those sorts 

1468
00:53:20,211 --> 00:53:22,433
of things . Uh So we'll be on island uh 

1469
00:53:22,433 --> 00:53:24,545
with capability uh at the end of 24 . 

1470
00:53:24,545 --> 00:53:26,656
And then , as you mentioned , there's 

1471
00:53:26,656 --> 00:53:26,655
an enhanced capability as , as we move 

1472
00:53:26,665 --> 00:53:28,832
forward , if you ask me what I know we 

1473
00:53:28,832 --> 00:53:30,445
need , uh it is really the 

1474
00:53:30,455 --> 00:53:33,094
infrastructure on the island . Um So as 

1475
00:53:33,104 --> 00:53:35,382
uh you know , General Carlin mentioned , 

1476
00:53:35,382 --> 00:53:37,604
the army's I B CS system is a core part 

1477
00:53:37,614 --> 00:53:39,558
that will integrate uh with the uh 

1478
00:53:39,558 --> 00:53:41,614
capabilities on the island is really 

1479
00:53:41,614 --> 00:53:43,558
about quality of life uh for those 

1480
00:53:43,558 --> 00:53:45,614
soldiers and for the other operators 

1481
00:53:45,614 --> 00:53:47,725
that will be on the island . Uh There 

1482
00:53:47,725 --> 00:53:47,639
are some other capabilities that are 

1483
00:53:47,649 --> 00:53:49,816
meant for a uh a different environment 

1484
00:53:49,816 --> 00:53:51,760
that Em Alino has challenged us to 

1485
00:53:51,760 --> 00:53:53,705
ensure that we have the ability to 

1486
00:53:53,705 --> 00:53:55,871
integrate those in as well . Uh And so 

1487
00:53:55,871 --> 00:53:57,593
that's what the program really 

1488
00:53:57,593 --> 00:53:59,760
encompasses primarily and I B CS along 

1489
00:53:59,760 --> 00:54:01,927
with some additional capabilities that 

1490
00:54:01,927 --> 00:54:04,260
uh we'll save for another session . And , 

1491
00:54:04,260 --> 00:54:06,260
and very briefly , general , uh the 

1492
00:54:06,260 --> 00:54:07,982
people of Ukraine have been so 

1493
00:54:07,982 --> 00:54:09,982
courageous , resisting war criminal 

1494
00:54:09,982 --> 00:54:12,350
Putin in his invasion . Have we learned , 

1495
00:54:12,360 --> 00:54:14,249
what have we learned from missile 

1496
00:54:14,249 --> 00:54:16,138
defense in the war ? In Ukraine , 

1497
00:54:18,629 --> 00:54:20,851
sir . Uh I had the opportunity to go to 

1498
00:54:20,851 --> 00:54:23,020
Fort Oklahoma and watch the Ukrainian 

1499
00:54:23,030 --> 00:54:25,030
soldiers uh train in our US patriot 

1500
00:54:25,030 --> 00:54:27,850
system . And uh I'd like to talk about 

1501
00:54:27,860 --> 00:54:30,082
that in the closest and I could have my 

1502
00:54:30,082 --> 00:54:32,082
assessment and observations of , of 

1503
00:54:32,082 --> 00:54:34,138
their training and their abilities . 

1504
00:54:34,138 --> 00:54:35,638
Thank you . Are you back , 

1505
00:54:35,638 --> 00:54:38,159
Representative Holand ? Thank you , Mr 

1506
00:54:38,169 --> 00:54:40,002
Chair and thank you all for your 

1507
00:54:40,002 --> 00:54:42,169
testimony today . My first question is 

1508
00:54:42,169 --> 00:54:45,260
for General Miller uh General . You are 

1509
00:54:45,270 --> 00:54:47,510
uh have written in your uh in your 

1510
00:54:47,520 --> 00:54:49,742
written testimony that us space comms , 

1511
00:54:49,742 --> 00:54:52,219
commercial integration strategy uh and 

1512
00:54:52,229 --> 00:54:54,285
American commercial innovation is an 

1513
00:54:54,285 --> 00:54:56,062
asymmetrical advantage that our 

1514
00:54:56,062 --> 00:54:58,229
competitors don't possess . And I 

1515
00:54:58,239 --> 00:55:00,406
certainly agree with you on that . And 

1516
00:55:00,406 --> 00:55:02,905
I've led efforts in the past N D A A um 

1517
00:55:02,915 --> 00:55:05,175
years to ensure that programs like S B 

1518
00:55:05,185 --> 00:55:08,445
I R and S TT R operate unimpeded . And 

1519
00:55:08,455 --> 00:55:10,399
uh and I'm again leading a similar 

1520
00:55:10,399 --> 00:55:12,511
effort to bridge the so called Valley 

1521
00:55:12,511 --> 00:55:14,344
of Death this year between small 

1522
00:55:14,344 --> 00:55:14,245
businesses and the Department of 

1523
00:55:14,254 --> 00:55:16,310
Defense . So my question to you is , 

1524
00:55:16,310 --> 00:55:18,476
could you talk a little bit more about 

1525
00:55:18,476 --> 00:55:20,643
the commercial integration strategy at 

1526
00:55:20,643 --> 00:55:22,754
space comm ? And do you think that we 

1527
00:55:22,754 --> 00:55:24,698
are doing enough both here on this 

1528
00:55:24,698 --> 00:55:26,532
committee and also at the dod to 

1529
00:55:26,532 --> 00:55:28,698
leverage our asymmetrical advantage of 

1530
00:55:28,698 --> 00:55:30,698
commercial innovation and what more 

1531
00:55:30,698 --> 00:55:32,810
should we be doing if we aren't doing 

1532
00:55:32,810 --> 00:55:34,976
enough ? Yes , ma'am . And , and thank 

1533
00:55:34,976 --> 00:55:37,143
you for your support on those programs 

1534
00:55:37,143 --> 00:55:39,198
in particular . Um So I think the uh 

1535
00:55:39,198 --> 00:55:40,976
start with the the relationship 

1536
00:55:40,976 --> 00:55:43,143
particularly with us space command and 

1537
00:55:43,143 --> 00:55:45,087
even the predecessor Stratcom with 

1538
00:55:45,087 --> 00:55:47,143
commercial industry is , has gone on 

1539
00:55:47,143 --> 00:55:47,000
for quite some time . It is typically 

1540
00:55:47,010 --> 00:55:49,419
started in the commercial arena . What 

1541
00:55:49,429 --> 00:55:52,239
you've seen in recent years is expand 

1542
00:55:52,250 --> 00:55:54,850
into other mission sets as well . One 

1543
00:55:54,860 --> 00:55:57,082
area in in particular that has expanded 

1544
00:55:57,082 --> 00:55:59,193
into is in the space domain awareness 

1545
00:55:59,193 --> 00:56:01,193
area . We have leveraged commercial 

1546
00:56:01,199 --> 00:56:03,659
sensors at a scale that we had not 

1547
00:56:03,669 --> 00:56:06,280
really anticipated just years ago to 

1548
00:56:06,290 --> 00:56:08,512
fill in potential gaps in locations for 

1549
00:56:08,512 --> 00:56:10,401
coverage , provide new technology 

1550
00:56:10,401 --> 00:56:12,149
developments and also provide 

1551
00:56:12,159 --> 00:56:14,350
synchronization and integration and 

1552
00:56:14,360 --> 00:56:16,582
more accuracy in some of the capability 

1553
00:56:16,582 --> 00:56:18,860
that we see for Space Domain awareness . 

1554
00:56:18,860 --> 00:56:20,527
What the commander did in the 

1555
00:56:20,527 --> 00:56:20,459
commercial integration strategy was a 

1556
00:56:20,469 --> 00:56:22,636
focus to try to get a couple of things 

1557
00:56:22,636 --> 00:56:24,802
in particular one , he wanted a single 

1558
00:56:24,802 --> 00:56:26,969
point of entry and that's our combined 

1559
00:56:26,969 --> 00:56:28,913
joint integrated commercial office 

1560
00:56:28,913 --> 00:56:31,025
within our J eight staff to provide a 

1561
00:56:31,025 --> 00:56:33,360
single face to all our commercial 

1562
00:56:33,370 --> 00:56:35,840
partners on what our requirements are . 

1563
00:56:35,949 --> 00:56:38,005
The second piece was to lay out some 

1564
00:56:38,005 --> 00:56:40,620
key priority mission sets and devolve 

1565
00:56:40,629 --> 00:56:42,850
down into some specific capabilities 

1566
00:56:42,860 --> 00:56:44,749
that we're looking at so that our 

1567
00:56:44,749 --> 00:56:46,804
commercial partners are not guessing 

1568
00:56:46,804 --> 00:56:48,860
what they're looking for . In fact , 

1569
00:56:48,860 --> 00:56:48,540
they have specific asks and 

1570
00:56:48,550 --> 00:56:50,717
requirements that we've defined to the 

1571
00:56:50,717 --> 00:56:52,772
extent that we can . Um There's some 

1572
00:56:52,772 --> 00:56:54,883
examples of goodness though that have 

1573
00:56:54,883 --> 00:56:57,161
already shown up in the last few years , 

1574
00:56:57,161 --> 00:56:59,161
you probably have heard about joint 

1575
00:56:59,161 --> 00:57:01,050
task force space defenses , joint 

1576
00:57:01,050 --> 00:57:02,828
commercial office and they have 

1577
00:57:02,828 --> 00:57:04,883
leveraged the Space Domain awareness 

1578
00:57:04,883 --> 00:57:07,106
capabilities of a number of sensors and 

1579
00:57:07,106 --> 00:57:09,217
provided as an independent verifiable 

1580
00:57:09,217 --> 00:57:11,328
publicly available cap that we use to 

1581
00:57:11,328 --> 00:57:13,550
provide warning on a range of threats . 

1582
00:57:13,550 --> 00:57:15,661
And they also augment and allow us to 

1583
00:57:15,661 --> 00:57:17,883
inform our missile warning capabilities 

1584
00:57:17,883 --> 00:57:20,050
in the future is what we're looking at 

1585
00:57:20,050 --> 00:57:19,840
um from particularly from a data 

1586
00:57:19,850 --> 00:57:22,017
transport layer less so from a warning 

1587
00:57:22,017 --> 00:57:24,183
perspective . So I think the future is 

1588
00:57:24,183 --> 00:57:26,409
bright . You'll see that within um the 

1589
00:57:26,419 --> 00:57:28,308
unfunded priorities list that the 

1590
00:57:28,308 --> 00:57:30,308
commander has submitted . There are 

1591
00:57:30,308 --> 00:57:32,475
some specific things that he's looking 

1592
00:57:32,475 --> 00:57:34,697
for to try to expand and hasten some of 

1593
00:57:34,697 --> 00:57:36,863
the delivery of those capabilities . I 

1594
00:57:36,863 --> 00:57:36,149
think your continued support there 

1595
00:57:36,159 --> 00:57:38,215
would be would be most appreciated , 

1596
00:57:38,215 --> 00:57:40,437
definitely take a look at that . And so 

1597
00:57:40,437 --> 00:57:42,603
in terms of what more we can do , that 

1598
00:57:42,603 --> 00:57:44,770
would be something to take a look at . 

1599
00:57:44,770 --> 00:57:46,715
Also a question is you've , you've 

1600
00:57:46,715 --> 00:57:48,659
outlined sort of defining what the 

1601
00:57:48,659 --> 00:57:50,770
priorities are . Is there any sort of 

1602
00:57:50,770 --> 00:57:52,992
in inverse of that where you don't know 

1603
00:57:52,992 --> 00:57:55,215
what you don't know ? But that civilian 

1604
00:57:55,215 --> 00:57:57,381
industry is , is innovating on and you 

1605
00:57:57,381 --> 00:57:59,492
might be able to take advantage of or 

1606
00:57:59,492 --> 00:58:01,548
benefit from how are you interacting 

1607
00:58:01,548 --> 00:58:03,729
with civilian industry to understand 

1608
00:58:03,739 --> 00:58:05,961
the innovations that are happening that 

1609
00:58:05,961 --> 00:58:08,280
may be useful to you ? A absolutely the 

1610
00:58:08,290 --> 00:58:10,123
there , there's a our commercial 

1611
00:58:10,129 --> 00:58:12,185
integration cell that's at Air Force 

1612
00:58:12,185 --> 00:58:14,449
Base has been a main uh place for our 

1613
00:58:14,459 --> 00:58:16,570
commercial industry partners to go to 

1614
00:58:16,570 --> 00:58:18,626
partner with us . So in the realm of 

1615
00:58:18,626 --> 00:58:20,889
what we're learning all the time in the 

1616
00:58:20,899 --> 00:58:22,843
S D A or space to main awareness , 

1617
00:58:22,843 --> 00:58:24,955
enterprise , a number of the cap they 

1618
00:58:24,955 --> 00:58:26,843
provide are varied . There's some 

1619
00:58:26,843 --> 00:58:28,955
really exquisite capabilities somehow 

1620
00:58:28,995 --> 00:58:31,217
but also increased capacity that others 

1621
00:58:31,217 --> 00:58:33,217
have . So we're learning more about 

1622
00:58:33,217 --> 00:58:35,106
what they have to offer . And our 

1623
00:58:35,106 --> 00:58:37,162
interface for that is the commercial 

1624
00:58:37,162 --> 00:58:39,162
integration . So we've also learned 

1625
00:58:39,162 --> 00:58:38,834
that they have specific relationships 

1626
00:58:38,844 --> 00:58:41,011
they want to have with us on safety of 

1627
00:58:41,011 --> 00:58:42,844
flight and awareness of what the 

1628
00:58:42,844 --> 00:58:45,066
threats are that are on orbit . And how 

1629
00:58:45,066 --> 00:58:47,288
are we sharing that information ? Now , 

1630
00:58:47,288 --> 00:58:49,400
that's a mission set that you would , 

1631
00:58:49,400 --> 00:58:51,622
you'll see transition to the Department 

1632
00:58:51,622 --> 00:58:53,844
of Commerce ultimately , as their space 

1633
00:58:53,844 --> 00:58:55,844
traffic management , it's largely a 

1634
00:58:55,844 --> 00:58:57,955
civil function stands up and begin to 

1635
00:58:57,955 --> 00:59:00,066
repurpose those guardians that are at 

1636
00:59:00,066 --> 00:59:01,955
Vandenberg to do some of the more 

1637
00:59:01,955 --> 00:59:04,177
operationally driven threat warning and 

1638
00:59:04,177 --> 00:59:06,177
assessment mission sets that we see 

1639
00:59:06,177 --> 00:59:05,610
them having . So there's a benefit on 

1640
00:59:05,620 --> 00:59:07,787
both ends here both in what we can get 

1641
00:59:07,787 --> 00:59:09,953
out of the commercial enterprise , but 

1642
00:59:09,953 --> 00:59:12,009
also exploring new technologies that 

1643
00:59:12,009 --> 00:59:13,842
they're providing us in order to 

1644
00:59:13,842 --> 00:59:13,810
execute our mission sets even more 

1645
00:59:13,820 --> 00:59:15,979
efficiently . Thank you . I have 

1646
00:59:15,989 --> 00:59:18,211
several other questions but very little 

1647
00:59:18,211 --> 00:59:20,433
time . So I think if it's all right , I 

1648
00:59:20,433 --> 00:59:22,600
will uh submit them for the record for 

1649
00:59:22,600 --> 00:59:22,060
you all and thank you very much for 

1650
00:59:22,070 --> 00:59:24,860
your service and for your time . Thank 

1651
00:59:24,870 --> 00:59:27,203
you , Representative Turner . Thank you , 

1652
00:59:27,203 --> 00:59:29,259
gentlemen . I think the last several 

1653
00:59:29,259 --> 00:59:31,580
years have shown us that deterrent by 

1654
00:59:31,590 --> 00:59:34,709
nuclear weapons arsenals alone is dead . 

1655
00:59:35,169 --> 00:59:37,820
Uh Russia has threatened both NATO 

1656
00:59:37,830 --> 00:59:41,110
allies , even nuclear weapons nations 

1657
00:59:41,310 --> 00:59:44,439
with nuclear weapon attack . China is 

1658
00:59:44,449 --> 00:59:47,030
tripling its nuclear weapons and is 

1659
00:59:47,040 --> 00:59:49,600
vastly expanding its ICBM capability 

1660
00:59:49,979 --> 00:59:52,560
and of course not in response at all to 

1661
00:59:52,570 --> 00:59:55,909
any missile defense that may in fact 

1662
00:59:55,919 --> 00:59:59,669
thwart in any way their ability to 

1663
00:59:59,679 --> 01:00:03,389
hold us at Press corps at target uh our 

1664
01:00:03,399 --> 01:00:06,080
missile defense system . Uh It's , it's 

1665
01:00:06,090 --> 01:00:08,540
currently configured and our , our um 

1666
01:00:09,489 --> 01:00:11,378
and are just as sure that sits in 

1667
01:00:11,378 --> 01:00:14,719
Europe are publicly by policy stated as 

1668
01:00:14,729 --> 01:00:18,209
targeting North Korea and Iran . We by 

1669
01:00:18,219 --> 01:00:21,389
policy state that we are not deploying 

1670
01:00:21,600 --> 01:00:23,530
missile defense systems for the 

1671
01:00:23,540 --> 01:00:25,762
purposes of defending ourselves against 

1672
01:00:25,762 --> 01:00:27,596
the threat of Russia and China . 

1673
01:00:27,870 --> 01:00:30,479
Clearly , Russia and China are not 

1674
01:00:30,489 --> 01:00:32,600
being deterred by our nuclear weapons 

1675
01:00:32,600 --> 01:00:34,378
arsenals alone because of their 

1676
01:00:34,378 --> 01:00:36,433
continuing vast expanse and the fact 

1677
01:00:36,433 --> 01:00:39,179
that both of them are pursuing what 

1678
01:00:39,189 --> 01:00:41,411
many people call exotic weapons , which 

1679
01:00:41,411 --> 01:00:43,479
are completely new capabilities . 

1680
01:00:43,489 --> 01:00:45,600
They're not modernization of existing 

1681
01:00:45,600 --> 01:00:47,267
capabilities , completely new 

1682
01:00:47,267 --> 01:00:49,649
capabilities that can easily be defined 

1683
01:00:50,360 --> 01:00:53,439
to be classified as first strike 

1684
01:00:53,449 --> 01:00:56,100
weapons weapons that are intended to 

1685
01:00:56,110 --> 01:00:58,332
initiate a nuclear weapons strike . Not 

1686
01:00:58,332 --> 01:01:00,510
one that's merely to deter as our 

1687
01:01:00,520 --> 01:01:03,439
posture has been , we're clearly going 

1688
01:01:03,449 --> 01:01:05,338
to have to move to a more blended 

1689
01:01:05,338 --> 01:01:07,520
architecture where we understand that 

1690
01:01:07,530 --> 01:01:10,270
if there is an attack that we have a 

1691
01:01:10,280 --> 01:01:12,447
responsibility to protect the American 

1692
01:01:12,447 --> 01:01:14,669
public because right now most Americans 

1693
01:01:14,669 --> 01:01:16,669
believe that if a nuclear weapon is 

1694
01:01:16,669 --> 01:01:18,336
headed at this very moment to 

1695
01:01:18,336 --> 01:01:20,002
Washington DC , whether it be 

1696
01:01:20,002 --> 01:01:22,399
hypersonic or an ICBM , that we have 

1697
01:01:22,409 --> 01:01:24,739
systems in place to protect them and we 

1698
01:01:24,750 --> 01:01:27,629
do not . It is time that , that we do . 

1699
01:01:27,860 --> 01:01:29,840
Let's start with Europe first in 

1700
01:01:29,850 --> 01:01:33,340
Ukraine , Russia has claimed 

1701
01:01:33,350 --> 01:01:36,219
that they may use tactical nuclear 

1702
01:01:36,229 --> 01:01:38,709
weapons and even all of the analysts 

1703
01:01:38,719 --> 01:01:41,149
looking at the situation have been 

1704
01:01:41,159 --> 01:01:44,020
concerned that they might , if they did 

1705
01:01:44,169 --> 01:01:47,120
with the placement of our ashore in 

1706
01:01:47,129 --> 01:01:50,649
Poland and in Romania , we restricted 

1707
01:01:50,659 --> 01:01:53,469
those systems so that they again are 

1708
01:01:53,479 --> 01:01:56,030
intended to target Iran and not Russia , 

1709
01:01:56,040 --> 01:01:58,096
meaning that the United States would 

1710
01:01:58,096 --> 01:02:00,709
basically be a casual observer to watch 

1711
01:02:00,719 --> 01:02:02,886
the nuclear exchange instead of having 

1712
01:02:02,886 --> 01:02:04,719
a role to be able to intervene . 

1713
01:02:05,030 --> 01:02:06,808
Admiral Hill , could you please 

1714
01:02:06,808 --> 01:02:09,120
describe to us , um , the , uh the 

1715
01:02:09,129 --> 01:02:11,570
issue that we're facing with the ashore 

1716
01:02:11,580 --> 01:02:13,636
in Poland and Romania , they are not 

1717
01:02:13,636 --> 01:02:15,747
fully functioning systems , correct ? 

1718
01:02:15,747 --> 01:02:17,858
So if you had a ship that was sitting 

1719
01:02:17,858 --> 01:02:19,802
there as opposed to aegis ashore , 

1720
01:02:19,802 --> 01:02:22,110
which Congress funded and authorized it 

1721
01:02:22,120 --> 01:02:24,176
would have greater capabilities than 

1722
01:02:24,176 --> 01:02:26,398
what sits there today . Is that right ? 

1723
01:02:26,398 --> 01:02:28,564
Admiral ? It's that , that's correct , 

1724
01:02:28,564 --> 01:02:30,453
sir . We carved out the ballistic 

1725
01:02:30,453 --> 01:02:32,564
missile defense capability for Europe 

1726
01:02:32,564 --> 01:02:34,676
as part of the European face adaptive 

1727
01:02:34,676 --> 01:02:36,898
approach . There was uh we , we , we do 

1728
01:02:36,898 --> 01:02:36,840
have the computer base , the computer 

1729
01:02:36,850 --> 01:02:39,017
program base that would include cruise 

1730
01:02:39,017 --> 01:02:41,239
missile defense and strike capabilities 

1731
01:02:41,239 --> 01:02:43,406
but those are not included uh at those 

1732
01:02:43,406 --> 01:02:45,461
sites . So we have to scrape off the 

1733
01:02:45,461 --> 01:02:47,683
AIS assure that's there or can those be 

1734
01:02:47,683 --> 01:02:49,739
modified so that they could be fully 

1735
01:02:49,739 --> 01:02:51,850
functioning ? Just assure like our at 

1736
01:02:51,850 --> 01:02:54,072
sea . So very , very early on , we want 

1737
01:02:54,072 --> 01:02:55,961
to make sure that we maintain the 

1738
01:02:55,961 --> 01:02:58,128
flexibility on that site should policy 

1739
01:02:58,128 --> 01:03:00,072
change or we require uh additional 

1740
01:03:00,072 --> 01:03:02,072
capabilities . Uh We could bring it 

1741
01:03:02,072 --> 01:03:04,294
back in through the computer programs , 

1742
01:03:04,294 --> 01:03:06,461
which is , it's only certified for use 

1743
01:03:06,461 --> 01:03:06,034
for a ballistic missile defense only . 

1744
01:03:06,044 --> 01:03:08,211
But you know that the it's an inherent 

1745
01:03:08,211 --> 01:03:10,322
capability , there would likely be uh 

1746
01:03:10,322 --> 01:03:12,211
some additional consoles required 

1747
01:03:12,211 --> 01:03:14,377
depending on what the missions are and 

1748
01:03:14,377 --> 01:03:16,211
potentially additional launching 

1749
01:03:16,211 --> 01:03:18,266
systems . So , existing capabilities 

1750
01:03:18,266 --> 01:03:20,377
that we have could be appended to the 

1751
01:03:20,377 --> 01:03:20,354
systemss giving them the full 

1752
01:03:20,364 --> 01:03:23,004
functioning capabilities that an at sea 

1753
01:03:23,014 --> 01:03:25,181
has . Yes , sir . And I wouldn't refer 

1754
01:03:25,181 --> 01:03:27,181
to it really as appended . It would 

1755
01:03:27,181 --> 01:03:29,125
just be enabled . Ok . Excellent , 

1756
01:03:29,125 --> 01:03:31,292
excellent . Do you think the situation 

1757
01:03:31,292 --> 01:03:33,236
has , has arisen that we , we , we 

1758
01:03:33,236 --> 01:03:35,458
seriously need to consider uh our , our 

1759
01:03:35,458 --> 01:03:38,560
European footprint and we have 

1760
01:03:38,570 --> 01:03:41,300
voluntarily restrained ourselves ? So 

1761
01:03:41,310 --> 01:03:44,830
these capabilities are missing . Um Do 

1762
01:03:44,840 --> 01:03:46,840
you think we've gotten to the point 

1763
01:03:46,840 --> 01:03:48,562
where we need to from a policy 

1764
01:03:48,562 --> 01:03:50,562
perspective begin the debate is why 

1765
01:03:50,562 --> 01:03:50,340
have we done this ? And shouldn't we 

1766
01:03:50,350 --> 01:03:52,517
look at modifying them ? Uh We , we've 

1767
01:03:52,517 --> 01:03:54,461
had questions in the past about uh 

1768
01:03:54,461 --> 01:03:56,628
whether or not we should uh enable the 

1769
01:03:56,628 --> 01:03:58,794
cruise missile defense capability just 

1770
01:03:58,794 --> 01:04:00,906
to defend the site itself . Um But uh 

1771
01:04:00,906 --> 01:04:00,530
it really is a policy question . If 

1772
01:04:00,540 --> 01:04:02,484
you're going to uh add , I'm going 

1773
01:04:02,484 --> 01:04:04,484
right there , buddy . You are other 

1774
01:04:04,484 --> 01:04:06,969
John Hill . So Hill , don't you think 

1775
01:04:06,979 --> 01:04:09,035
it's time that we take a look at the 

1776
01:04:09,035 --> 01:04:11,146
this issue ? The deterrence is dead . 

1777
01:04:11,146 --> 01:04:13,368
How , what blend do we need ? And , and 

1778
01:04:13,368 --> 01:04:15,368
what do we need to do in Europe ? I 

1779
01:04:15,368 --> 01:04:17,257
think it is time and I think NATO 

1780
01:04:17,257 --> 01:04:17,209
thinks it's time and I think NATO is 

1781
01:04:17,219 --> 01:04:19,590
looking at whether NATO needs to change 

1782
01:04:19,659 --> 01:04:21,881
its policy structure . NATO has what is 

1783
01:04:21,881 --> 01:04:23,992
called NATO ballistic missile defense 

1784
01:04:23,992 --> 01:04:26,048
policy and they have NATO integrated 

1785
01:04:26,048 --> 01:04:28,048
air and missile defense policy . It 

1786
01:04:28,048 --> 01:04:30,215
won't go into all of the deep dark art 

1787
01:04:30,215 --> 01:04:32,437
of NATO . But ballistic missile defense 

1788
01:04:32,437 --> 01:04:32,050
focused on Iran integrated air and 

1789
01:04:32,060 --> 01:04:34,338
missile defense focused on all threats , 

1790
01:04:34,338 --> 01:04:36,504
all directions and so forth . The real 

1791
01:04:36,504 --> 01:04:39,159
question is , should we be able to use 

1792
01:04:39,169 --> 01:04:43,000
the ashore sites for both ? As Admiral 

1793
01:04:43,010 --> 01:04:44,954
Hill explained , technically , you 

1794
01:04:44,954 --> 01:04:47,177
could do it . Now , the policy question 

1795
01:04:47,177 --> 01:04:49,010
given what everybody has seen in 

1796
01:04:49,010 --> 01:04:51,232
Ukraine over the past year , people are 

1797
01:04:51,232 --> 01:04:53,454
asking themselves exactly that question 

1798
01:04:53,454 --> 01:04:55,677
of what's the balance of deterrence and 

1799
01:04:55,677 --> 01:04:57,788
defense going forward that we need to 

1800
01:04:57,788 --> 01:04:59,843
have ? And that's what our committee 

1801
01:04:59,843 --> 01:05:02,121
I'm certain will be doing at your back , 

1802
01:05:02,121 --> 01:05:02,100
Mr Chairman . Thank you , 

1803
01:05:02,110 --> 01:05:04,780
Representative Carba Hall . Thank you , 

1804
01:05:04,790 --> 01:05:06,957
Mr Chair . Uh First , I'd like to take 

1805
01:05:06,957 --> 01:05:09,250
a second to congratulate the Space 

1806
01:05:09,260 --> 01:05:12,110
Force on their recent successful launch 

1807
01:05:12,120 --> 01:05:14,030
from the Space Force Space in my 

1808
01:05:14,040 --> 01:05:17,300
district . Congratulations . Uh The 

1809
01:05:17,310 --> 01:05:19,421
rocket carried the initial tranche of 

1810
01:05:19,421 --> 01:05:21,588
space uh development agency satellites 

1811
01:05:22,030 --> 01:05:24,139
that are key uh part of the missile 

1812
01:05:24,149 --> 01:05:26,260
warning missile tracking architecture 

1813
01:05:26,530 --> 01:05:29,409
that we're discussing here today . Vice 

1814
01:05:29,419 --> 01:05:32,090
Admiral Hill uh Gao published a report 

1815
01:05:32,100 --> 01:05:34,649
in May 2022 that highlighted 

1816
01:05:34,659 --> 01:05:36,659
opportunities to reduce the risk of 

1817
01:05:36,659 --> 01:05:39,560
missile defense agency programs from 

1818
01:05:39,570 --> 01:05:41,350
experiencing cost overruns and 

1819
01:05:41,360 --> 01:05:44,399
scheduled delays . One recommendation 

1820
01:05:44,409 --> 01:05:46,576
is for increased collaboration between 

1821
01:05:46,576 --> 01:05:48,899
program offices and war fighters . What 

1822
01:05:48,909 --> 01:05:51,020
steps has the agency taken to enhance 

1823
01:05:51,020 --> 01:05:53,510
the partnership between MD A and other 

1824
01:05:53,520 --> 01:05:55,739
missile defense organizations and ? 

1825
01:05:55,750 --> 01:05:57,917
Great , great . Uh Thank Thank you for 

1826
01:05:57,917 --> 01:06:00,028
the question . Congressman . Uh We uh 

1827
01:06:00,028 --> 01:06:02,194
have a series of uh hybrid uh programs 

1828
01:06:02,194 --> 01:06:04,361
within the agency . So , and I'll just 

1829
01:06:04,361 --> 01:06:06,528
start from the bottom and work our way 

1830
01:06:06,528 --> 01:06:08,528
up when we have the THADD program . 

1831
01:06:08,528 --> 01:06:10,750
It's , it's there on Redstone Arsenal . 

1832
01:06:10,750 --> 01:06:10,610
We have an army colonel running that 

1833
01:06:10,620 --> 01:06:12,731
program . He's right next door to his 

1834
01:06:12,731 --> 01:06:14,953
partners who are running patriot in the 

1835
01:06:14,953 --> 01:06:17,231
I B CS system . So that partnership is , 

1836
01:06:17,231 --> 01:06:19,342
is alive and well from an acquisition 

1837
01:06:19,342 --> 01:06:21,453
perspective and as we uh uh field and 

1838
01:06:21,453 --> 01:06:23,398
deploy those systems , uh our navy 

1839
01:06:23,398 --> 01:06:25,379
program for is in Dal , Virginia , 

1840
01:06:25,389 --> 01:06:27,445
right at the Center of Excellence uh 

1841
01:06:27,445 --> 01:06:30,040
for the uh program uh tied closely to 

1842
01:06:30,050 --> 01:06:31,883
all capabilities there . The EIS 

1843
01:06:31,883 --> 01:06:33,939
training right in the center there . 

1844
01:06:33,939 --> 01:06:36,106
Naval officers are in charge of uh the 

1845
01:06:36,106 --> 01:06:38,106
efforts there at uh at uh ballistic 

1846
01:06:38,106 --> 01:06:40,161
missile defense in Dal um , when you 

1847
01:06:40,161 --> 01:06:42,439
look at the work that we're doing , uh , 

1848
01:06:42,439 --> 01:06:44,661
for G MD , there's not a day that we're 

1849
01:06:44,661 --> 01:06:46,883
not talking either directly to Northern 

1850
01:06:46,883 --> 01:06:46,520
Command and the , uh , the different 

1851
01:06:46,530 --> 01:06:48,530
servicemen that are serving on that 

1852
01:06:48,530 --> 01:06:50,586
staff to ensure that we're providing 

1853
01:06:50,586 --> 01:06:52,697
them all the support they need . Uh , 

1854
01:06:52,697 --> 01:06:52,280
same thing with Fort Greely . The 

1855
01:06:52,290 --> 01:06:54,290
maintenance is done in hand in hand 

1856
01:06:54,290 --> 01:06:56,457
with the soldiers up there in terms of 

1857
01:06:56,457 --> 01:06:58,401
the launch site and , uh , all the 

1858
01:06:58,401 --> 01:07:00,401
command and control . So I think we 

1859
01:07:00,401 --> 01:07:02,512
have a very good , uh , strong hybrid 

1860
01:07:02,512 --> 01:07:02,239
system and our partnership with the 

1861
01:07:02,250 --> 01:07:04,417
service is as strong as I've ever seen 

1862
01:07:04,417 --> 01:07:06,417
it . Thank you , Lieutenant General 

1863
01:07:06,417 --> 01:07:08,439
Carb . The need for missile defense 

1864
01:07:08,449 --> 01:07:10,939
assets is at an all time high due to 

1865
01:07:10,949 --> 01:07:13,300
the operational tempo of NATO and our 

1866
01:07:13,310 --> 01:07:15,199
allies . How are we balancing the 

1867
01:07:15,199 --> 01:07:17,199
global demand for Patriot and Thaad 

1868
01:07:17,199 --> 01:07:18,977
missile defense batteries while 

1869
01:07:18,977 --> 01:07:21,580
maintaining our readiness requirements ? 

1870
01:07:24,500 --> 01:07:26,790
Uh Thanks Congressman . Uh , as I 

1871
01:07:26,800 --> 01:07:29,078
talked about a little bit earlier , uh , 

1872
01:07:29,078 --> 01:07:31,830
we identified we had to reduce , uh , 

1873
01:07:31,840 --> 01:07:33,760
the demand signal for air missile 

1874
01:07:33,770 --> 01:07:36,100
defense forces , uh , specifically in 

1875
01:07:36,110 --> 01:07:38,590
the A O R so that we could , we could 

1876
01:07:38,600 --> 01:07:40,433
get that balance . So we weren't 

1877
01:07:40,433 --> 01:07:42,267
putting the air defense soldiers 

1878
01:07:42,267 --> 01:07:44,267
through the grinder and , um , uh , 

1879
01:07:44,267 --> 01:07:46,489
affecting uh , readiness through , uh , 

1880
01:07:46,489 --> 01:07:49,070
uh , very high tempo . So we've done 

1881
01:07:49,080 --> 01:07:52,389
that , uh , the soldiers have elected 

1882
01:07:52,399 --> 01:07:54,566
to re enlist and , and stay with their 

1883
01:07:54,566 --> 01:07:56,899
current units which increases readiness . 

1884
01:07:56,899 --> 01:07:58,843
So , instead of a big turnover now 

1885
01:07:58,843 --> 01:08:01,121
soldiers , uh , particularly this year , 

1886
01:08:01,121 --> 01:08:03,121
39% of the soldiers have stabilized 

1887
01:08:03,121 --> 01:08:05,343
within their current units as they , as 

1888
01:08:05,343 --> 01:08:07,455
they re enlist that helps readiness . 

1889
01:08:07,455 --> 01:08:09,621
Because those crews now that have been 

1890
01:08:09,621 --> 01:08:11,788
trained together for months and months 

1891
01:08:11,788 --> 01:08:13,732
now stay together for two or three 

1892
01:08:13,732 --> 01:08:15,899
years and , and then they get promoted 

1893
01:08:15,899 --> 01:08:18,010
through the ranks and , and then they 

1894
01:08:18,010 --> 01:08:17,879
can share those lessons learned with 

1895
01:08:17,890 --> 01:08:19,959
their subordinate soldiers . And so 

1896
01:08:19,970 --> 01:08:22,137
that , that helps improve readiness as 

1897
01:08:22,137 --> 01:08:23,914
well . Uh Our , our air defense 

1898
01:08:23,914 --> 01:08:26,399
readiness and , and we're there 24 7 , 

1899
01:08:26,689 --> 01:08:30,459
always stays uh well within the combat 

1900
01:08:30,470 --> 01:08:32,526
commander requirements . And again , 

1901
01:08:32,526 --> 01:08:34,692
that's a testament to the soldiers who 

1902
01:08:34,692 --> 01:08:36,803
have uh who have stayed on with their 

1903
01:08:36,803 --> 01:08:38,803
organizations . Thank you . Uh Vice 

1904
01:08:38,803 --> 01:08:40,970
Admiral Hill , what are the challenges 

1905
01:08:40,970 --> 01:08:42,748
of defending against hypersonic 

1906
01:08:42,748 --> 01:08:44,520
missiles from a technological 

1907
01:08:44,529 --> 01:08:46,680
standpoint ? And as it relates to 

1908
01:08:46,689 --> 01:08:49,189
hypersonic missiles , are your efforts 

1909
01:08:49,200 --> 01:08:51,367
focused on homeland defense or are you 

1910
01:08:51,367 --> 01:08:53,367
looking at regional applications as 

1911
01:08:53,367 --> 01:08:55,939
well or both ? Yes , sir . Uh we , we 

1912
01:08:55,950 --> 01:08:58,172
are focused in on regional capability . 

1913
01:08:58,209 --> 01:09:00,042
Uh If you look at it through the 

1914
01:09:00,042 --> 01:09:02,153
framework of detect control and gauge 

1915
01:09:02,153 --> 01:09:04,339
uh detection , uh tracking of 

1916
01:09:04,350 --> 01:09:06,072
hypersonic missiles incredibly 

1917
01:09:06,072 --> 01:09:08,183
challenging because of their maneuver 

1918
01:09:08,183 --> 01:09:10,072
capability . So they , they don't 

1919
01:09:10,072 --> 01:09:12,183
launch on a singular as uh they don't 

1920
01:09:12,183 --> 01:09:14,294
come directly at you , they go in and 

1921
01:09:14,294 --> 01:09:16,461
around you . So field of view of radar 

1922
01:09:16,461 --> 01:09:18,628
has become very limited , which is why 

1923
01:09:18,628 --> 01:09:20,850
we advocate for space in order to track 

1924
01:09:20,850 --> 01:09:20,549
hypersonic missiles when it comes to 

1925
01:09:20,560 --> 01:09:22,782
the command and control . Uh because of 

1926
01:09:22,782 --> 01:09:24,782
the speeds they fly , uh that means 

1927
01:09:24,782 --> 01:09:26,838
reaction time is very short . And so 

1928
01:09:26,838 --> 01:09:29,004
that challenges uh command and control 

1929
01:09:29,004 --> 01:09:31,171
and the ability to get the information 

1930
01:09:31,171 --> 01:09:31,060
to the operator to make decisions . And 

1931
01:09:31,069 --> 01:09:32,791
then finally , when you get to 

1932
01:09:32,791 --> 01:09:34,736
engagement , uh typically , if you 

1933
01:09:34,736 --> 01:09:36,847
engage them in the terminal , uh that 

1934
01:09:36,847 --> 01:09:38,625
is a very environment . Uh it's 

1935
01:09:38,625 --> 01:09:40,791
electromagnetic down there , there are 

1936
01:09:40,791 --> 01:09:40,429
jammers on the front ends of these 

1937
01:09:40,438 --> 01:09:42,660
things . They maneuver quickly . Uh Our 

1938
01:09:42,660 --> 01:09:44,938
most recent test from uh two weeks ago , 

1939
01:09:44,938 --> 01:09:47,105
uh demonstrated our capability to take 

1940
01:09:47,105 --> 01:09:49,216
that threat on in in terminal and the 

1941
01:09:49,216 --> 01:09:51,382
glide phase interceptor that we talked 

1942
01:09:51,382 --> 01:09:51,159
about earlier . Our regional capability 

1943
01:09:51,168 --> 01:09:53,398
is to be an area of defense . Uh that's 

1944
01:09:53,409 --> 01:09:55,576
in the glide phase . So if you look at 

1945
01:09:55,576 --> 01:09:57,742
a boosting hypersonic threat , it goes 

1946
01:09:57,742 --> 01:10:00,076
into a glide phase before it dives down , 

1947
01:10:00,076 --> 01:10:02,131
we want to engage it there and glide 

1948
01:10:02,131 --> 01:10:01,339
before it comes back into the 

1949
01:10:01,350 --> 01:10:03,350
atmosphere . Uh which is one of the 

1950
01:10:03,350 --> 01:10:05,406
hardest places to engage , but we do 

1951
01:10:05,406 --> 01:10:07,739
have capability there today . Thank you , 

1952
01:10:07,739 --> 01:10:09,683
Mr Chair . Thank you . Thank you , 

1953
01:10:09,683 --> 01:10:11,683
Representative Stefanic . Thank you 

1954
01:10:11,683 --> 01:10:13,850
chairman for your statements regarding 

1955
01:10:13,850 --> 01:10:16,072
the East Coast missile defense . As you 

1956
01:10:16,072 --> 01:10:18,294
open this hearing , I wanted to address 

1957
01:10:18,294 --> 01:10:17,990
Vice Admiral Hill as you know , both 

1958
01:10:18,000 --> 01:10:19,889
the N D A A and the Department of 

1959
01:10:19,889 --> 01:10:22,000
Defense have publicly designated Fort 

1960
01:10:22,000 --> 01:10:23,778
Drum as the site selected for a 

1961
01:10:23,778 --> 01:10:25,833
potential East Coast missile defense 

1962
01:10:25,833 --> 01:10:28,056
location . And recently in this hearing 

1963
01:10:28,056 --> 01:10:30,222
room . Chairman Milley responded to my 

1964
01:10:30,222 --> 01:10:32,278
question , stating his support for a 

1965
01:10:32,278 --> 01:10:34,500
third missile defense site specifically 

1966
01:10:34,500 --> 01:10:36,778
focused on the east coast at Fort Drum . 

1967
01:10:36,778 --> 01:10:38,889
What is your best military assessment 

1968
01:10:38,889 --> 01:10:40,889
regarding the national security and 

1969
01:10:40,889 --> 01:10:43,165
missile defense need to face 21st 

1970
01:10:43,174 --> 01:10:45,564
century threats and specifically how is 

1971
01:10:45,575 --> 01:10:47,908
Fort Drum well positioned to meet those ? 

1972
01:10:48,390 --> 01:10:50,446
Uh Yes , ma'am . Uh When it comes to 

1973
01:10:50,446 --> 01:10:52,168
defense , uh geography is very 

1974
01:10:52,168 --> 01:10:54,390
meaningful and uh our ability to expand 

1975
01:10:54,390 --> 01:10:56,501
the battle space for something like a 

1976
01:10:56,501 --> 01:10:58,612
next generation interceptor . Uh That 

1977
01:10:58,612 --> 01:11:00,668
is exactly what the location uh does 

1978
01:11:00,668 --> 01:11:02,834
and , and what it does provide , we'll 

1979
01:11:02,834 --> 01:11:05,001
often talk about a shoot , assess suit 

1980
01:11:05,001 --> 01:11:04,790
shoot , that means getting a shot in 

1981
01:11:04,799 --> 01:11:06,799
early . So if you're geographically 

1982
01:11:06,799 --> 01:11:08,910
dispersed and you have a third site , 

1983
01:11:08,910 --> 01:11:11,077
you have the ability to engage early , 

1984
01:11:11,077 --> 01:11:13,299
then engage again after you've assessed 

1985
01:11:13,299 --> 01:11:12,759
whether or not you've hit the first 

1986
01:11:12,770 --> 01:11:14,992
time . So there , there is a compelling 

1987
01:11:14,992 --> 01:11:17,214
need there that we continue to watch as 

1988
01:11:17,214 --> 01:11:19,159
the threat increases . Uh Chairman 

1989
01:11:19,159 --> 01:11:21,214
Lamborn talked about uh space launch 

1990
01:11:21,214 --> 01:11:24,100
vehicles uh as a ruse . It really is . 

1991
01:11:24,109 --> 01:11:25,776
Uh it's ICBM technology being 

1992
01:11:25,776 --> 01:11:27,887
demonstrated , being mature . Um So I 

1993
01:11:27,887 --> 01:11:29,942
think the threat is real and I think 

1994
01:11:29,942 --> 01:11:32,165
that where the chairman was going , the 

1995
01:11:32,165 --> 01:11:34,331
more defenses you have the better . Uh 

1996
01:11:34,331 --> 01:11:36,553
it is a key part of deterrence . So you 

1997
01:11:36,553 --> 01:11:36,100
would support Chairman Milly's 

1998
01:11:36,109 --> 01:11:38,660
assessment . Yes , ma'am . Um My next 

1999
01:11:38,669 --> 01:11:41,580
question is uh in terms of the timeline , 

2000
01:11:41,589 --> 01:11:43,645
there are many steps that need to be 

2001
01:11:43,645 --> 01:11:45,867
taken to prepare for that threat of the 

2002
01:11:45,867 --> 01:11:47,978
future . Can you walk us through that 

2003
01:11:47,978 --> 01:11:50,145
timeline and the steps that are needed 

2004
01:11:50,145 --> 01:11:52,478
to be taken in the next few years ? Yes , 

2005
01:11:52,478 --> 01:11:52,350
ma'am . The , the , the comment you 

2006
01:11:52,359 --> 01:11:54,470
made earlier about the site selection 

2007
01:11:54,470 --> 01:11:56,692
is really step one . Uh You assess some 

2008
01:11:56,692 --> 01:11:58,748
number of sites generally uh to meet 

2009
01:11:58,748 --> 01:12:00,748
the , the Nipah rules , you have to 

2010
01:12:00,748 --> 01:12:02,803
assess at least three sites . So you 

2011
01:12:02,803 --> 01:12:05,026
have a comparative uh nature there . Uh 

2012
01:12:05,026 --> 01:12:04,799
And that's usually had a very top level 

2013
01:12:04,810 --> 01:12:07,143
view , you know , what would make sense ? 

2014
01:12:07,143 --> 01:12:09,088
All the analysis goes into play in 

2015
01:12:09,088 --> 01:12:11,088
terms of , you know , timelines and 

2016
01:12:11,088 --> 01:12:10,919
whether or not you can get that shoot , 

2017
01:12:10,930 --> 01:12:12,930
assess uh shoot uh capability . And 

2018
01:12:12,930 --> 01:12:15,041
then so those locations do matter and 

2019
01:12:15,041 --> 01:12:17,097
you get a general scrub of what that 

2020
01:12:17,097 --> 01:12:19,208
area would be and what the challenges 

2021
01:12:19,208 --> 01:12:18,830
would be just from a geography 

2022
01:12:18,839 --> 01:12:20,617
perspective . The next steps uh 

2023
01:12:20,617 --> 01:12:22,839
generally involve going in and doing uh 

2024
01:12:22,839 --> 01:12:25,740
more invasive work on the areas that we 

2025
01:12:25,750 --> 01:12:27,917
might be considering . So if it is for 

2026
01:12:27,917 --> 01:12:29,750
Drum , we would want to go in to 

2027
01:12:29,750 --> 01:12:31,972
determine how hard would it be to build 

2028
01:12:31,972 --> 01:12:34,194
there . Uh And then you have the uh the 

2029
01:12:34,194 --> 01:12:33,979
other discussions about , well , how 

2030
01:12:33,990 --> 01:12:36,268
many Silas would you require ? Uh what , 

2031
01:12:36,268 --> 01:12:38,434
what are the timelines ? What would we 

2032
01:12:38,434 --> 01:12:40,601
do with the N G I production line ? Uh 

2033
01:12:40,601 --> 01:12:42,879
Because to me that would be , you know , 

2034
01:12:42,879 --> 01:12:42,149
the best military advice on what to 

2035
01:12:42,160 --> 01:12:44,271
plan for would be the next generation 

2036
01:12:44,271 --> 01:12:46,493
interceptor since we will have at least 

2037
01:12:46,493 --> 01:12:48,327
one production line , maybe more 

2038
01:12:48,327 --> 01:12:50,327
depending on the decisions that are 

2039
01:12:50,327 --> 01:12:52,549
made . And then lastly , the F Y 23 N D 

2040
01:12:52,549 --> 01:12:54,327
A required an MD A to report to 

2041
01:12:54,327 --> 01:12:56,438
Congress on an updated assessment for 

2042
01:12:56,438 --> 01:12:58,104
an additional missile defense 

2043
01:12:58,104 --> 01:13:00,216
interceptor site specifically at Fort 

2044
01:13:00,216 --> 01:13:02,438
Drum , as well as a funding profile for 

2045
01:13:02,438 --> 01:13:04,660
that site . You recently wrote a letter 

2046
01:13:04,660 --> 01:13:06,660
to Chairman Rogers dated March 24th 

2047
01:13:06,660 --> 01:13:08,938
indicating that the report is now late , 

2048
01:13:08,938 --> 01:13:08,589
but you are going to meet a deadline of 

2049
01:13:08,600 --> 01:13:10,711
June 30th . Can I get your commitment 

2050
01:13:10,711 --> 01:13:12,600
that you'll meet that deadline of 

2051
01:13:12,600 --> 01:13:14,267
submission before June 30th ? 

2052
01:13:14,267 --> 01:13:16,489
Absolutely , ma'am . We , we uh we have 

2053
01:13:16,489 --> 01:13:18,711
a heat and light on that report . Uh We 

2054
01:13:18,711 --> 01:13:20,822
know what you're asking for and those 

2055
01:13:20,822 --> 01:13:20,464
are reasonable requests and we'll get 

2056
01:13:20,475 --> 01:13:22,808
those to you on time . Well , thank you , 

2057
01:13:22,808 --> 01:13:25,031
Admiral Hill . I also want to take this 

2058
01:13:25,031 --> 01:13:27,253
opportunity to thank my colleagues . Uh 

2059
01:13:27,253 --> 01:13:28,808
I have led this effort as a 

2060
01:13:28,808 --> 01:13:31,031
representative for Fort Drum for many , 

2061
01:13:31,031 --> 01:13:32,697
many years and because of the 

2062
01:13:32,697 --> 01:13:34,753
bipartisan work on this committee as 

2063
01:13:34,753 --> 01:13:36,697
well as our work with MD A and dod 

2064
01:13:36,697 --> 01:13:38,697
broadly , we are continuing to move 

2065
01:13:38,697 --> 01:13:40,642
this project forward . We know how 

2066
01:13:40,642 --> 01:13:42,475
important it is for our national 

2067
01:13:42,475 --> 01:13:44,419
security , our military uh and our 

2068
01:13:44,419 --> 01:13:46,586
missile defense . Uh So thank you very 

2069
01:13:46,586 --> 01:13:48,753
much and now you're back . Thank you , 

2070
01:13:48,753 --> 01:13:52,339
Representative Garamendi . Uh Thank you , 

2071
01:13:52,350 --> 01:13:55,629
Mr Chairman , uh a couple of things uh 

2072
01:13:56,330 --> 01:13:59,029
in a recent hearing on defending Guam , 

2073
01:13:59,660 --> 01:14:01,549
there was a long list of um , 

2074
01:14:03,740 --> 01:14:06,500
unfunded priorities . 

2075
01:14:08,569 --> 01:14:11,419
Uh Can any of the 

2076
01:14:12,879 --> 01:14:15,729
programs that you three gentlemen have 

2077
01:14:16,620 --> 01:14:20,390
be delayed so that the 

2078
01:14:21,009 --> 01:14:22,979
defense of Guam can go forward ? 

2079
01:14:25,060 --> 01:14:27,116
In other words , shifting money from 

2080
01:14:27,116 --> 01:14:30,470
your programs to the defense of Guam . 

2081
01:14:32,569 --> 01:14:34,680
Uh As the acquisition got the table , 

2082
01:14:34,680 --> 01:14:36,513
I'll , I'll tell you that I have 

2083
01:14:36,513 --> 01:14:38,513
limited uh capability to move money 

2084
01:14:38,513 --> 01:14:40,458
from program to program . Uh There 

2085
01:14:40,458 --> 01:14:42,513
would have to be , how much money do 

2086
01:14:42,513 --> 01:14:44,402
you have ? Uh We're , we're a $10 

2087
01:14:44,402 --> 01:14:46,870
billion 10.9 in PB 24 . Yes , sir . I 

2088
01:14:46,879 --> 01:14:48,601
think the number may have been 

2089
01:14:48,601 --> 01:14:50,768
classified , so I won't give it here . 

2090
01:14:50,768 --> 01:14:53,101
It's significantly less than 10 billion . 

2091
01:14:53,560 --> 01:14:55,727
And one of the things that we ought to 

2092
01:14:55,727 --> 01:14:58,189
be paying attention to here on this 

2093
01:14:58,200 --> 01:15:00,367
committee and in the full committee is 

2094
01:15:00,560 --> 01:15:03,549
we make choices . Some people say the 

2095
01:15:03,560 --> 01:15:05,671
defense of Guam is rather important . 

2096
01:15:06,930 --> 01:15:10,660
Um What is the role of 

2097
01:15:10,669 --> 01:15:14,660
directed energy in the , not 

2098
01:15:14,669 --> 01:15:18,500
in the exo atmosphere but in 

2099
01:15:18,509 --> 01:15:22,209
the other defense mechanisms that you 

2100
01:15:22,220 --> 01:15:25,930
intend to employ ? Is that a question 

2101
01:15:25,939 --> 01:15:28,109
for me , sir ? I , I seems to be all 

2102
01:15:28,319 --> 01:15:30,319
happy to give you . So why don't we 

2103
01:15:30,319 --> 01:15:32,597
start with you and we'll go down ? Yes , 

2104
01:15:32,597 --> 01:15:34,708
sir . Uh We , we're , we're investing 

2105
01:15:34,708 --> 01:15:34,649
in direct and energy specific in 

2106
01:15:34,660 --> 01:15:37,189
lethality . Uh So what we do is we , we 

2107
01:15:37,200 --> 01:15:39,422
are actively running tests to determine 

2108
01:15:39,422 --> 01:15:41,422
the right places to place energy in 

2109
01:15:41,422 --> 01:15:43,478
order to get an effect and there's a 

2110
01:15:43,478 --> 01:15:45,311
range of those effects from just 

2111
01:15:45,311 --> 01:15:47,533
absolute destruction to just disturbing 

2112
01:15:47,533 --> 01:15:49,644
something to take it off track , um , 

2113
01:15:49,644 --> 01:15:52,450
threat . Oh , you have multiple , uh , 

2114
01:15:52,459 --> 01:15:54,681
different types of the whole range of , 

2115
01:15:54,681 --> 01:15:57,490
uh , missile threats . And how far off 

2116
01:15:57,500 --> 01:16:01,419
is your culmination of this effort ? 

2117
01:16:02,040 --> 01:16:04,151
Um , I would say that directed energy 

2118
01:16:04,151 --> 01:16:06,318
is promising it's not something you're 

2119
01:16:06,318 --> 01:16:08,262
going to see in the near term , at 

2120
01:16:08,262 --> 01:16:10,484
least for missile defense . Uh , if you 

2121
01:16:10,484 --> 01:16:12,651
just look at the threat , uh ballistic 

2122
01:16:12,651 --> 01:16:14,762
hardened nuclear threat , uh you have 

2123
01:16:14,762 --> 01:16:16,762
to have energy on that target for a 

2124
01:16:16,762 --> 01:16:18,596
long period of time . Hypersonic 

2125
01:16:18,596 --> 01:16:18,509
threats are designed to fly in a very 

2126
01:16:18,520 --> 01:16:20,687
high heat environment . So you have to 

2127
01:16:20,687 --> 01:16:22,909
overcome that baseline heat environment 

2128
01:16:22,909 --> 01:16:24,810
to inflict damage . So it's a big 

2129
01:16:24,819 --> 01:16:26,652
challenge for missile defense to 

2130
01:16:26,652 --> 01:16:28,986
leverage direct energy in the near term . 

2131
01:16:28,986 --> 01:16:32,379
I see . Uh Are you familiar with the 

2132
01:16:32,390 --> 01:16:36,259
Israeli application of directed energy 

2133
01:16:37,049 --> 01:16:39,709
coupled with the iron dome and David 

2134
01:16:39,720 --> 01:16:42,069
slang where they have a software system 

2135
01:16:42,080 --> 01:16:44,609
that will determine whether to use a 

2136
01:16:44,620 --> 01:16:48,160
missile or a directed energy 

2137
01:16:48,339 --> 01:16:50,617
solution ? Yes , sir . And we are also , 

2138
01:16:50,617 --> 01:16:52,783
uh we also have investments in weapons 

2139
01:16:52,783 --> 01:16:54,839
selection logic that would determine 

2140
01:16:54,839 --> 01:16:56,729
best use of whatever weapon it is 

2141
01:16:56,740 --> 01:16:58,851
directed energy or hard kill weapon . 

2142
01:16:59,029 --> 01:17:02,490
Does the system work ? Their system is 

2143
01:17:02,500 --> 01:17:04,667
in trials . It has not been deployed . 

2144
01:17:04,667 --> 01:17:06,833
It's not certified for operational use 

2145
01:17:06,833 --> 01:17:09,479
yet . Thank you . Uh Could you give us 

2146
01:17:09,490 --> 01:17:11,601
an update ? Uh I don't know which one 

2147
01:17:11,601 --> 01:17:13,770
of you would handle this one . Maybe 

2148
01:17:13,779 --> 01:17:17,759
it's uh Mr Cobler . What is the 

2149
01:17:18,089 --> 01:17:21,500
assure situation in 

2150
01:17:21,509 --> 01:17:25,319
Poland ? Uh I'll take that uh in Poland 

2151
01:17:25,330 --> 01:17:27,620
has uh reached its technical capability 

2152
01:17:27,629 --> 01:17:29,740
declaration . It is going through the 

2153
01:17:29,740 --> 01:17:31,851
board of inspection and survey a navy 

2154
01:17:31,851 --> 01:17:33,962
process for acceptance . Uh The chief 

2155
01:17:33,962 --> 01:17:35,851
of naval operation is on track to 

2156
01:17:35,851 --> 01:17:37,962
accept the site uh for the navy uh at 

2157
01:17:37,962 --> 01:17:40,018
the end of this fiscal year and then 

2158
01:17:40,018 --> 01:17:41,907
it'll go through U C and the NATO 

2159
01:17:41,907 --> 01:17:44,129
acceptance to be fully operational next 

2160
01:17:44,129 --> 01:17:47,959
year . Thank you . Um How many 

2161
01:17:48,049 --> 01:17:51,870
s ashore missiles would be 

2162
01:17:51,879 --> 01:17:54,479
necessary to deal with 

2163
01:17:55,319 --> 01:17:58,910
Russia's intermediate range nuclear 

2164
01:17:58,919 --> 01:18:01,560
weapons ? So I'd like to take that to 

2165
01:18:01,569 --> 01:18:05,189
the close session . I see . 

2166
01:18:06,160 --> 01:18:09,520
Well , probably the number if you go 1 

2167
01:18:09,529 --> 01:18:12,850
to 1 which we probably ought not 

2168
01:18:12,859 --> 01:18:16,330
assume we may need 2 to 1 

2169
01:18:17,990 --> 01:18:20,157
because we sometimes miss or there may 

2170
01:18:20,157 --> 01:18:22,959
be some problem . It's been calculated , 

2171
01:18:22,970 --> 01:18:26,549
it's over a trillion dollars just to 

2172
01:18:26,560 --> 01:18:29,359
defend Europe . Yes , sir . And I'm not 

2173
01:18:29,370 --> 01:18:31,537
sure what assumptions you're making on 

2174
01:18:31,537 --> 01:18:33,481
which threats and I'll be happy to 

2175
01:18:33,481 --> 01:18:35,703
share them with you . I I'd love to see 

2176
01:18:35,703 --> 01:18:35,350
it , but uh yes sir . It's , it's , it 

2177
01:18:35,359 --> 01:18:37,640
would be expensive . I yield back . 

2178
01:18:38,959 --> 01:18:41,070
Thank you , Representative Desjarlais 

2179
01:18:41,790 --> 01:18:43,679
Admiral Hill . I just had a quick 

2180
01:18:43,679 --> 01:18:46,000
question for you . Um Fiscal year 24 

2181
01:18:46,009 --> 01:18:48,370
budget requests include 800 million to 

2182
01:18:48,379 --> 01:18:50,549
support the defense of Guam . Uh The 

2183
01:18:50,560 --> 01:18:52,727
current plan outline is for an initial 

2184
01:18:52,729 --> 01:18:55,390
capability to be ready on Guam in 2024 

2185
01:18:55,470 --> 01:18:57,526
followed by delivery of the enhanced 

2186
01:18:57,526 --> 01:19:00,120
capability by 2029 I met with the Guam 

2187
01:19:00,129 --> 01:19:02,259
Chamber of Commerce earlier today and 

2188
01:19:02,270 --> 01:19:04,459
they echoed Admiral Aquino's concerns 

2189
01:19:04,470 --> 01:19:06,637
this morning about whether the present 

2190
01:19:06,637 --> 01:19:08,748
workforce is capable of meeting these 

2191
01:19:08,748 --> 01:19:10,637
goals . Uh to what extent are you 

2192
01:19:10,637 --> 01:19:12,803
hindered by labor and workforce issues 

2193
01:19:12,803 --> 01:19:14,803
in meeting these timeline goals and 

2194
01:19:14,803 --> 01:19:16,637
what can we do uh to support the 

2195
01:19:16,637 --> 01:19:18,803
workforce in Guam to ensure we stay on 

2196
01:19:18,803 --> 01:19:21,137
track ? It's a great question and it is , 

2197
01:19:21,137 --> 01:19:23,540
it is a real concern . Uh I would say 

2198
01:19:23,549 --> 01:19:25,160
anyone that's doing military 

2199
01:19:25,160 --> 01:19:27,382
construction on the island of Guam will 

2200
01:19:27,382 --> 01:19:29,493
be impacted . Uh We have not realized 

2201
01:19:29,493 --> 01:19:31,327
that yet . We're just doing site 

2202
01:19:31,327 --> 01:19:32,771
selection and the initial 

2203
01:19:32,771 --> 01:19:34,771
environmentals . But once we get to 

2204
01:19:34,771 --> 01:19:36,827
military construction in the 25 time 

2205
01:19:36,827 --> 01:19:38,938
frame , uh there will be an impact if 

2206
01:19:38,938 --> 01:19:41,105
we don't come through the visa issue . 

2207
01:19:41,105 --> 01:19:43,216
Ok . Apparently they'd mentioned that 

2208
01:19:43,216 --> 01:19:42,669
there was some misconception that 

2209
01:19:42,680 --> 01:19:44,736
workforce was coming in from China . 

2210
01:19:44,736 --> 01:19:46,958
They said that's not true and they were 

2211
01:19:46,958 --> 01:19:49,069
wanting to know about H two B visas . 

2212
01:19:49,069 --> 01:19:51,013
Uh Would that be helpful that that 

2213
01:19:51,013 --> 01:19:53,069
would be very helpful ? Uh not , not 

2214
01:19:53,069 --> 01:19:55,124
the Chinese piece , but uh Exactly . 

2215
01:19:55,124 --> 01:19:57,291
Yeah . Ok . Thank you . Um I have some 

2216
01:19:57,291 --> 01:19:59,458
questions for the closed session , but 

2217
01:19:59,458 --> 01:20:02,790
I'll yield back . Thank you , 

2218
01:20:02,799 --> 01:20:05,189
Representative Strong . Thank you , Mr 

2219
01:20:05,200 --> 01:20:07,144
Chairman uh General Carver Carbo . 

2220
01:20:07,144 --> 01:20:09,144
Thank you for stopping by my office 

2221
01:20:09,144 --> 01:20:11,144
yesterday . Uh And it's been a true 

2222
01:20:11,144 --> 01:20:13,478
honor to work with you . Over the years . 

2223
01:20:13,478 --> 01:20:15,478
I thank you for your service to our 

2224
01:20:15,478 --> 01:20:17,478
country . I'd be remiss if I didn't 

2225
01:20:17,478 --> 01:20:19,200
note how proud Alabama's fifth 

2226
01:20:19,200 --> 01:20:21,311
congressional district is to host the 

2227
01:20:21,311 --> 01:20:23,311
missile defense agency and the Army 

2228
01:20:23,311 --> 01:20:25,367
Space and Missile Defense Command at 

2229
01:20:25,367 --> 01:20:27,311
Redstone Arsenal uh General Miller 

2230
01:20:27,311 --> 01:20:29,422
Admiral Hill , Mr Hill . Uh It's good 

2231
01:20:29,422 --> 01:20:31,589
to see each of you again . Last year's 

2232
01:20:31,589 --> 01:20:33,700
N D A A uh mandated the department to 

2233
01:20:33,700 --> 01:20:35,533
provide a report to Congress , a 

2234
01:20:35,533 --> 01:20:38,314
comprehensive and layered strategy of 

2235
01:20:38,325 --> 01:20:40,915
how the US military will use uh a uh 

2236
01:20:40,924 --> 01:20:43,915
asymmetric capabilities to defend 

2237
01:20:43,924 --> 01:20:47,604
hypersonic missile threats . Uh That 

2238
01:20:47,615 --> 01:20:50,720
was due on March the first . Do you 

2239
01:20:50,729 --> 01:20:52,840
know how the current status of what's 

2240
01:20:52,840 --> 01:20:54,840
the current status of this report ? 

2241
01:21:03,910 --> 01:21:05,966
Yeah , let me , let me take that one 

2242
01:21:05,966 --> 01:21:08,188
for the record . If , if I may , that'd 

2243
01:21:08,188 --> 01:21:10,354
be fine . Thank you , sir . Uh General 

2244
01:21:10,354 --> 01:21:12,299
car car yesterday in my office you 

2245
01:21:12,299 --> 01:21:14,132
shared uh that capacity is a top 

2246
01:21:14,132 --> 01:21:16,299
concern of yours . Like you said , the 

2247
01:21:16,299 --> 01:21:18,229
C C P isn't uh conducting science 

2248
01:21:18,240 --> 01:21:21,089
projects . Uh The threats uh posed are 

2249
01:21:21,100 --> 01:21:23,299
real . Can you share with us uh what 

2250
01:21:23,310 --> 01:21:25,910
your top uh capacity concerns are when 

2251
01:21:25,919 --> 01:21:27,919
it comes uh to our missile defense 

2252
01:21:27,930 --> 01:21:30,839
system and uh how potential problems uh 

2253
01:21:30,850 --> 01:21:34,520
can be avoided ? Yes , sir . As 

2254
01:21:34,529 --> 01:21:37,069
we look at the adversaries as we've 

2255
01:21:37,080 --> 01:21:39,390
talked about throughout the hearing 

2256
01:21:39,399 --> 01:21:42,509
thus far , every combatant commander 

2257
01:21:42,520 --> 01:21:44,729
wants more patriot , they need more . 

2258
01:21:44,899 --> 01:21:47,310
Thaad and the army has been very good . 

2259
01:21:47,319 --> 01:21:50,250
We're getting 1/16 patriot Batton eight 

2260
01:21:50,259 --> 01:21:52,629
th battery through the work with the 

2261
01:21:52,640 --> 01:21:54,862
missile defense agency , we're standing 

2262
01:21:54,862 --> 01:21:57,520
up for maneuver shore Batton to get 

2263
01:21:57,529 --> 01:22:00,899
after the U drone challenges that our 

2264
01:22:00,910 --> 01:22:03,850
soldiers face uh continued uh 

2265
01:22:04,500 --> 01:22:07,160
continued invigoration of the organic 

2266
01:22:07,169 --> 01:22:09,740
industrial base uh through F MS 

2267
01:22:09,750 --> 01:22:12,479
purchases of Patriot and are very 

2268
01:22:12,490 --> 01:22:15,750
helpful for us . But uh but uh the 

2269
01:22:15,759 --> 01:22:18,540
additional capacity requirements , we 

2270
01:22:18,549 --> 01:22:21,359
have to meet the adversaries that are 

2271
01:22:21,370 --> 01:22:24,120
out there . Uh I , I've just , I'm 

2272
01:22:24,129 --> 01:22:27,229
never comfortable uh with the current 

2273
01:22:27,240 --> 01:22:29,540
uh current capacity that we have and I 

2274
01:22:29,549 --> 01:22:31,438
know it's challenging in a budget 

2275
01:22:31,438 --> 01:22:33,660
environment to , to have additional air 

2276
01:22:33,660 --> 01:22:35,827
missile defense units . That's why I'm 

2277
01:22:35,827 --> 01:22:38,049
very happy with where the secretary and 

2278
01:22:38,049 --> 01:22:40,105
chief of staff of the army are at in 

2279
01:22:40,105 --> 01:22:41,993
terms of helping increase our air 

2280
01:22:41,993 --> 01:22:44,216
missile defense capabilities again , on 

2281
01:22:44,216 --> 01:22:46,160
the patriot thad side and with the 

2282
01:22:46,160 --> 01:22:48,327
maneuver shore . Thank you right now , 

2283
01:22:48,327 --> 01:22:48,109
the US is facing extremely high 

2284
01:22:48,120 --> 01:22:50,470
operational tempos for our air and 

2285
01:22:50,479 --> 01:22:52,312
missile defense assets . Can you 

2286
01:22:52,312 --> 01:22:54,535
discuss how the global requirements are 

2287
01:22:54,535 --> 01:22:56,701
impacting the readiness of our Patriot 

2288
01:22:56,701 --> 01:23:00,640
and Thaad batteries ? Yes , sir . We've 

2289
01:23:00,649 --> 01:23:02,649
gotten after this . We recognize it 

2290
01:23:02,649 --> 01:23:04,760
again . The health of the force study 

2291
01:23:04,760 --> 01:23:06,593
that the chief staff of the army 

2292
01:23:06,593 --> 01:23:08,705
commissioned identified the stress on 

2293
01:23:08,705 --> 01:23:11,950
the force laid out recommendations that 

2294
01:23:11,959 --> 01:23:14,549
we are implementing . And again , as we 

2295
01:23:14,560 --> 01:23:16,709
see soldiers re enlisting at the 

2296
01:23:16,720 --> 01:23:18,720
highest rates within the army for a 

2297
01:23:18,720 --> 01:23:20,459
division size element . That's 

2298
01:23:20,470 --> 01:23:22,600
quantitative measure to show that we 

2299
01:23:22,609 --> 01:23:25,160
are making a difference . We've also 

2300
01:23:25,169 --> 01:23:26,947
been able to provide a level of 

2301
01:23:26,947 --> 01:23:29,200
predictability to our soldiers . One of 

2302
01:23:29,209 --> 01:23:30,830
the challenges that was very 

2303
01:23:30,839 --> 01:23:33,061
frustrating was they would go for a six 

2304
01:23:33,061 --> 01:23:35,228
month rotation , would get extended at 

2305
01:23:35,228 --> 01:23:37,450
nine months or a nine month rotation to 

2306
01:23:37,450 --> 01:23:39,617
a year or a year rotation and then get 

2307
01:23:39,617 --> 01:23:41,839
extended beyond a year . And what we've 

2308
01:23:41,839 --> 01:23:43,839
been able to do here in the past uh 

2309
01:23:43,839 --> 01:23:45,783
year and a half is really get that 

2310
01:23:45,783 --> 01:23:45,629
predictability back to the soldiers and 

2311
01:23:45,640 --> 01:23:47,807
their families . Thank you and again , 

2312
01:23:47,807 --> 01:23:49,696
thank you for your service to our 

2313
01:23:49,696 --> 01:23:51,918
country . General Miller . I know space 

2314
01:23:51,918 --> 01:23:51,740
Domain awareness is a top priority for 

2315
01:23:51,750 --> 01:23:54,290
both space comm . Uh and the dod at 

2316
01:23:54,299 --> 01:23:56,359
large . How is space command 

2317
01:23:56,370 --> 01:23:58,148
integrating with the commercial 

2318
01:23:58,148 --> 01:24:00,203
companies to strengthen Space Domain 

2319
01:24:00,203 --> 01:24:03,490
awareness and sensor management ? Thank 

2320
01:24:03,500 --> 01:24:05,722
you for the question , Congressman . Um 

2321
01:24:05,722 --> 01:24:07,500
I think a few areas I mentioned 

2322
01:24:07,500 --> 01:24:09,556
previously , I I'll , I'll foot on a 

2323
01:24:09,556 --> 01:24:11,444
couple if I can . Um the the main 

2324
01:24:11,444 --> 01:24:13,611
effort we've focused on up till now is 

2325
01:24:13,611 --> 01:24:15,611
to ensure that we we call those non 

2326
01:24:15,611 --> 01:24:17,778
traditional centers . In other words , 

2327
01:24:17,778 --> 01:24:17,549
not purpose built necessarily for a 

2328
01:24:17,560 --> 01:24:19,504
missile warning or missile defense 

2329
01:24:19,504 --> 01:24:21,979
mission . So we have taken sensors and 

2330
01:24:21,990 --> 01:24:24,212
capabilities that the commercial sector 

2331
01:24:24,212 --> 01:24:26,270
has offered to provide . On the one 

2332
01:24:26,279 --> 01:24:28,446
hand , unique places and locations for 

2333
01:24:28,446 --> 01:24:30,770
us to leverage for collection detection 

2334
01:24:30,779 --> 01:24:33,299
tracking . We have also looked to the 

2335
01:24:33,310 --> 01:24:35,140
commercial sector to provide us 

2336
01:24:35,149 --> 01:24:37,560
advanced algorithms and tools to allow 

2337
01:24:37,569 --> 01:24:40,180
us to provide better analytic data on 

2338
01:24:40,189 --> 01:24:42,680
any potential risk threats or even just 

2339
01:24:42,689 --> 01:24:44,800
safety of flight concerns that we see 

2340
01:24:44,800 --> 01:24:46,745
while simultaneously disseminating 

2341
01:24:46,745 --> 01:24:49,120
warning to our partners and using 

2342
01:24:49,169 --> 01:24:51,336
unclassified means in order to be able 

2343
01:24:51,336 --> 01:24:53,169
to do that . So all the way from 

2344
01:24:53,169 --> 01:24:54,947
detection , all the way through 

2345
01:24:54,947 --> 01:24:57,002
reporting that see the the threat of 

2346
01:24:57,002 --> 01:24:59,169
commercial integration has been put at 

2347
01:24:59,169 --> 01:25:00,947
every step along that way , the 

2348
01:25:00,947 --> 01:25:02,947
commercial integration strategy was 

2349
01:25:02,947 --> 01:25:05,169
designed to enhance that . And we see a 

2350
01:25:05,169 --> 01:25:04,859
lot of product productivity coming out 

2351
01:25:04,870 --> 01:25:06,926
of that relationship just so far and 

2352
01:25:06,926 --> 01:25:09,037
it's only been months since initiated 

2353
01:25:09,037 --> 01:25:08,970
congressman . Thank you . I thank each 

2354
01:25:08,979 --> 01:25:11,146
of you for being here today , Mr Chair 

2355
01:25:11,146 --> 01:25:13,959
and our bank . Thank you . We will now 

2356
01:25:13,970 --> 01:25:16,192
go into a brief recess . We'll go up to 

2357
01:25:16,192 --> 01:25:20,180
the skiff in room 23 37 votes 

2358
01:25:20,189 --> 01:25:22,850
will be called at about five o'clock . 

2359
01:25:22,859 --> 01:25:25,192
So with the indulgence of the witnesses , 

2360
01:25:25,192 --> 01:25:27,026
we'll go till approximately five 

2361
01:25:27,026 --> 01:25:29,192
o'clock and then we'll be done for the 

2362
01:25:29,192 --> 01:25:30,939
day and uh we will now be in recess .